质疑“程序轻微瑕疵不影响相对人合法权益”

程序轻微瑕疵是指未对相对人实体权利产生影响的程序违反。山东、湖南等省份的行政程序规定中关于＂程序轻微瑕疵不影响公民、法人或其他组织合法权益＂的说法并不准确,有忽略程序权利在合法权益范畴中地位的嫌疑,建议修改。补正制度符合行政公平与效率并重的目标模式,是程序轻微瑕疵的最优解决方案。     

论上市公司股东代理权征集滥用的规制--以新《证券法》第90条为对象

股东代理权征集对上市公司治理具有"双刃剑"的作用,其优势与弊端共存的特性使其更需严格规制以防止被滥用。从法理层面进行分析、并结合以往征集投票权实践所暴露的问题可知,新《证券法》第90条相比以前法律规范虽有重大进步,但仍存在对代理权征集滥用规制的不足。可以运用代理人道德风险理论、信义义务理论解释和规制代理权征集滥用行为。分析新《证券法》第90条规定可知,对征集人资格、条件和行使权利程序规定的不足,对征集过程中信息披露和违法征集损害赔偿责任等事项的粗放式规定都可能带来代理权征集的滥用。为了更有效地规制代理权征集滥用行为,应从限缩征集人资格和条件、确立代理权征集决策程序的内部控制机制、强制披露包括征集目的在内的法定信息披露制度和差异化信息披露制度、实施证券"看门人"见证制度等入手,进一步完善新《证券法》第90条规定和加强对代理权征集滥用的规制。     

程序法定侦查原则论

侦查活动有其突出的策略性 ,欲实现侦查目的固然要求侦查行为必须遵循技术规则进行。但是作为一种重要的国家权力的侦查行为 ,更应当受到法律规范的规制和调整。按照法治国家建设标准要求 ,在侦查程序的运行和侦查行为的实施方面 ,应当确立程序法定侦查原则。     

试论审前程序主体在侦查阶段之关系

审前程序犹如刑事诉讼整个大厦的地基 ,如果没有科学的、合理性的建构 ,之后的诉讼程序将难以为继。本文通过采用结构主义理论和比较研究的方法 ,就刑事审判前程序中的几个重要问题作了阐发和论证。总的目标是在侦查程序中构建中立司法机构的审查和控制机制 ,建立“程序性裁判”制度 ,使侦查程序中涉及限制人身权利和自由的行为纳入司法审查和诉讼的轨道 ,在惩罚犯罪和保护人权之间找到一个合乎理性的平衡点。     

Government accountability and voting choice in Italy, 1990–2008

Between 1996 and 2008 Italy has experienced four government alternations in as many consecutive elections. It could be argued that after the dramatic party change that occurred in the early 90s the Italian system is in a state of constant flux and voters appear rather bewildered. This paper presents an opposite argument, showing that voters' choice reflects the greater importance of valence politics – performance, the economy – acting as a cue to voting behaviour, interacting with a long-term political predisposition. In turn, this promotes parties' responsiveness and accountability since the overall performance of a government – even of a coalition government – appears as a goal to be shared by all partners, under the threat of defeat for all. The analysis is carried out employing the Italian National Elections Studies series.     

Strategic voting and effective representation thresholds: Evidence from three Spanish general elections

The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mobilisation is controlled for in the constituencies, which is unusual in the literature on strategic voting that uses regression‐based methods.     

Strategic adaptation to new electoral systems

How quickly, to what extent and under what conditions do voters and elites adapt to new electoral institutions in order to not waste their votes and effort on hopeless competitors? A latent‐curve model of strategic adaptation is developed and fitted to district‐level election data from Spain. The extent of strategic adaptation is generally found to vary with the strength of the electoral system. However, grave ethnic tensions are demonstrated to seriously retard adaptation even under favourable institutional conditions.     

Voter sincerity and the time-of-voting-decision

This article explores the relationship between vote sincerity and the time at which vote decisions are finalized. It posits that a specific set of competitive circumstances are necessary for insincere voting to occur, and that voters' understanding of these circumstances can be influenced by exposure to information during a campaign. The article introduces a new method of operationalizing a commonly overlooked type of insincere voting: the protest voter. As defined here, protest voters express their political dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not their first preference. Canadian Election Study data reveal that protest voters make up a small, but noteworthy segment of the electorate and that insincere voters tend to make their vote decisions relatively late.     

Voting when the economy goes bad,everyone is in charge,and no one is to blame: The case of the 2009 German election

The economy was a major issue in Germany’s 2009 election. The global economic crisis did not spare Germany, whose economy is tightly integrated into the global economy. So when the German economy experienced a historical shock, did voters connect their views of the economy with their vote choice? Or did they, as some research has suggested, recognize Germany’s dependence on global markets and cut the government slack, especially when the government consists of the country’s two major parties? Using pre- and post-election panel surveys from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we investigate the weight that voters gave to the economy, relative to other considerations, when casting their ballot and whether governing parties were disproportionately judged based on the state of the economy.