Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War

This article explores what strategies rebels use to prepare their ethnic community for negotiated peace. Proposed strategies are distilled from relevant theory and systematically investigated in case analyses of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegal. The empirical findings indicate that although a coercive military capacity underpinned claims to ethnic representation, coercion did not dominate during the prenegotiation phase. During negotiations, noncoercive persuasion, as well as collective and selective incentives, clearly dominated. Moreover, the most important measures were internal to the negotiating rebel group. The successful rebel negotiator appeared to “mobilize in reverse” by initially targeting the core of military leaders followed by competitor groups and constituents. The article systematically examines across cases what measures rebel negotiators have used to “ripen” their own community, how these measures have been sequenced, and against whom they have been directed. The findings have important implications for the concepts of ripeness and prenegotiation and their requirements. The study underscores in particular the relevance of rebels' nonviolent commitment signals, something that has been largely overlooked in the research on nonstate armed actors. The policy implications suggest the possible benefits of third‐party assistance to efforts to promote communication, public outreach, and procedural transparency on the nonstate side in connection with peace talks.     

Political linkages between CSOs and parliament in Indonesia: a case study of political linkages in drafting the Aceh Governance Law

This research explores how political linkages between civil society organizations (CSOs) and Parliament are established, formed, and operated, using the drafting of the Aceh Governance Law as a case study. It finds that the initiative of establishing political linkages between CSOs and Parliament was taken by the CSOs joined in the Aceh Democracy Network (JDA, Jaringan Demokrasi Aceh). It confirms Lawson’s finding that parties are not the only linkage providers; however, the establishment of non-party linkages are not indicators of parties’ failure to provide linkage. This article shows how what Lawson terms ‘typology’—participatory linkage, policy-responsive linkage, linkage by reward, directive or coercive linkage—is manifested more as different ‘dimensions’ of linkages. Participatory linkage involves a bottom-up model, unlike directive or coercive linkage, which are top-down. Likewise, the motives behind responsive linkages—for aspirations, demands, and views to be heard—tend to be from the bottom, while the motives of linkage by reward is more frequently from the top.Abbreviations: ACSTF: Aceh Civil Society Task Force; ADF: Aceh Development Fund. Independent non-profit organization that works to mobilize funds and other resources to be channelled to CSOs are characterized by changes in the framework of poverty alleviation and strengthening of democracy, with the scope of the working area of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; AJMI: Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institute. Aceh-based nongovernmental organization which advocates for victims of state violence; Cetro: Centre for Electoral Reform. Non-profit organization that aim to strengthen and promote fair elections through electoral system reformation; Demos: Lembaga Kajian Demokrasi dan Hak Asasi (democracy and human rights think tank); ELSAM: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Institute for Societal Study and Advocacy); Flower: Aceh-based civil society organization concerned with gender, empowerment and strengthening grassroots women in urban and rural areas; FORBES: Forum bersama politisi asal Aceh (Joint Forum of Politicians from Aceh); Forum: LSM Aceh Forum Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Aceh Nongovernment Organization Forum); GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement); Golkar: Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). Party formed under the New Order and represented as a governmental party at that time; ICW: Indonesia Corruption Watch. Nongovernmental organization founded in 1998 whose primary mission is to monitor and report to the public incidents of corruption in Indonesia; Imparsial: Indonesian Human Rights Monitor. Founded in 2002 to monitor and investigate human right violations; JDA: Jaringan Demokrasi Aceh (Aceh Democracy Network); JPUK: Jaringan Perempuan untuk Kebijakan (Women’s Policy Network); Kalyanamitra: Women’s advocacy organization, especially for women who work as labourers, farmers, fishers, informal sector workers. Kalyanamitra derives from Sanskrit ‘Good Friend’; Koalisi NGO HAM: Coalition of Human Right Nongovernment Organizations. Founded in 1998 by nongovernmental organizations whose concern is promoting human rights in Aceh; KontraS: Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence; KPMD: Komite Monitoring Perdamaian dan Demokrasi (Committee for Peace and Democracy). Founded in Aceh in 2002 to bring peace and justice for Acehnese people; MISPI: Mitra Sejati Perempuan Indonesia (True Partner of Indonesian Women). Aceh-based women’s organization that promotes women’s participation and encourages women to speak with their own voices; MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly); PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). Moderate Islamist political party that was founded by reformists, including Amien Rais, former chairman of the Muhammadiyah organization; PBR: Partai Bintang Reformasi (Star of Reform Party). Islamist political party founded in 2002 as a result of PPP conflict; PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democrat Party-Struggle). Founded by Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Soekarno, in 1999; PDRM: Pergerakan Demokratik Rakyat Miskin (Democratic Movement for the Poor); PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party). Established in 1998, representing Nahdlatul Ulama organization (associations of ulamas formed in 1926 in East Java); PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). New name of Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), which emerged from the Tarbiyah party movement; PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party). Founded by the New Order in 1973 as part of the ‘rationalization of political life’; PSHK: Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan (Centre for Legal and Policy Studies). Established in 2008 by several scholars, advocates, and law students to drive efforts for legal reform after the 1998 reformation; WALHI: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Environmental Forum). Founded in 1980, its scope is broader than just environmental concerns, but also works for social transformation, people’s sovereignty, and sustainability of life and livelihoods; YAPPIKA: Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi Inisiatif dan Kemitraan Masyarakat (Foundation to Reinforce Public Participation, Initiative, and Partnership). Founded in 1991 to promote peacebuilding, development of democratic local governance, active citizenship, and claiming state responsibility to meet people’s basic needs     

Predatory peace. Dispossession at Aceh’s oil palm frontier

The end of the civil war in Aceh brought peace, but it has been of a predatory nature. As a moment of rupture, the peace revealed interests, powers and dynamics, and it offered an opportunity for their reconfiguration. When unrest ceased, old agrarian conflicts between smallholders and planters resumed. Peace held promise of land reform. Yet old patterns of smallholder dispossession were entrenched as the former insurgency leadership aligned with the old elite of plantation companies. Oil palm contract-farming schemes effectively alienated smallholders from their land, and violence precluded their organization. As a result, large-scale plantation production expanded. Through the creation of a violent frontier, smallholders were denied recognition of independent rights and property. In essence, smallholders were dispossessed by a combination of violence, political power and duplicitous paperwork. The study is based on fieldwork in areas where current land conflicts are played out, as well as on secondary sources.     

Drifting between accommodation and repression: explaining Indonesia's policies toward its separatists

A central government facing separatist activities adopts various policies to respond to them. In some cases, the government represses them harshly, while in other cases, it tries to accommodate the separatists’ demands. We currently have two strands in the literature to understand which policies are implemented by the government: the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model. However, neither of them is sufficient to explain Indonesia's policies toward its separatists in Aceh and Papua following democratization. Indonesia's policies toward separatists have been drifting between accommodation and repression. To understand these policy shifts, this paper emphasizes the importance of the inner workings of the central government, introducing two variables: the preferences of national leaders and the existence of veto players. This paper demonstrates that these perspectives are essential in order to fully explain the Indonesian government's policies toward its separatists.