Legislation Under Review: An Assessment of Post-Legislative Scrutiny Recommendations in the UK Parliament

Post-legislative scrutiny allows Parliament to revisit legislation after it has been enacted to ensure that it is operating as intended. As most literature on the UK legislative process suggests that is not optimal, this is an important task that committees can undertake to ensure that any problems can be located and rectified. This paper reports the findings of a systematic study of the outcomes of post-legislative scrutiny in terms of the types of recommendations being made, whether they are being accepted by the government, and what factors impact upon the acceptance of those recommendations. It concludes that there is a bias in the legislation being selected to receive post-legislative scrutiny and that committees, on the whole, are producing weaker recommendations which are more likely to be accepted. Additionally, it concludes that the stronger the action that a recommendation calls for, the more likely it is to be rejected.     

Fiscal transparency puzzle and electoral institutions: applying a 3Ds approach for tracking the action cycle in Egypt

This article aims at contributing to the discussion on the fiscal transparency puzzle. The authors challenge the idea that fiscal disclosure can directly increase fiscal accountability. Using an original data set at the level of individual members of parliament (MPs) in the Egyptian parliament, constructed from content analysis of budgetary discussions during the period 2000–10, it is shown that political incentives determined by a majoritarian electoral system curbed the willingness to check government fiscal behaviour, even among opposition MPs. This is because MPs still favoured pork-barrel behaviour to boost their re-election chances. Moreover, fiscal data disclosed could not be communicated to voters and the opposition showed a relatively higher avoidance against fiscal disclosure. The authors conclude that the electoral system is a dominant factor in shaping the final effect of transparency given its influence on the structure of political incentives.