A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET

"Network neutrality" is the shorthand for a proposed regimeof economic regulation for the Internet. Because of the trendto deliver traditional telecommunications services, as wellas new forms of content and applications, by Internet protocol(IP), a regime of network neutrality regulation would displaceor subordinate a substantial portion of existing telecommunicationsregulation. If the United States adopts network neutrality regulation,other industrialized nations probably will soon follow. As aresult of their investment to create next-generation broadbandnetworks, network operators have the ability to innovate insidethe network by offering both senders and receivers of informationgreater bandwidth and prioritization of delivery. Network neutralityregulation would, among other things, prevent providers of broadbandInternet access service (such as digital subscriber line (DSL)or cable modem service) from offering a guaranteed, expediteddelivery speed in return for the payment of a fee. The practicaleffect of banning such differential pricing (called "accesstiering" by its critics) would be to prevent the pricing ofaccess to content or applications providers according to priorityof delivery. To the extent that an advertiser of a good or servicewould be willing to contract with a network operator for advertisingspace on the network operator's affiliated content, anotherpractical effect of network neutrality regulation would be toerect a barrier to vertical integration of network operatorsinto advertising-based business models that could supplementor replace revenues earned from their existing usage-based businessmodels. Moreover, by making end-users pay for the full costof broadband access, network neutrality regulation would denybroadband access to the large number of consumers who wouldnot be able to afford, or who would not have a willingness topay for, what would otherwise be less expensive access. Forexample, Google is planning to offer broadband access to end-usersfor free in San Francisco by charging other content providersfor advertising. This product offering is evidently predicatedon the belief that many end-users demand discounted or freebroadband access that is paid for by parties other than themselves.Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that suchrestrictions on the pricing policies of network operators arenecessary to preserve innovation on the edges of the network,as opposed to innovation within the network. However, recognizingthat network congestion and real-time applications demand somedifferential pricing according to bandwidth or priority, proponentsof network neutrality regulation would allow broadband Internetaccess providers to charge higher prices to end-users (but notcontent or applications providers) who consume more bandwidthor who seek priority delivery of certain traffic. Thus, thedebate over network neutrality is essentially a debate overhow best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadbandnetwork in a two-sided market in which senders and receivershave additive demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—andhence additive willingness to pay. Well-established tools ofRamsey pricing from regulatory economics can shed light on whethernetwork congestion and recovery of sunk investment in infrastructureare best addressed by charging providers of content and applications,broadband users, or both for expedited delivery. Apart fromthis pricing problem, an analytically simpler component of proposednetwork neutrality regulation would prohibit a network operatorfrom denying its users access to certain websites and Internetapplications, such as voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). Althoughsome instances of blocking of VoIP have been reported, suchconduct is not a serious risk to competition. To address thisconcern, I analyze whether market forces (that is, competitionamong access providers) and existing regulatory structures aresufficient to protect broadband users. I conclude that economicwelfare would be maximized by allowing access providers to differentiateservices vis-à-vis providers of content and applicationsin value-enhancing ways and by relying on existing legal regimesto protect consumers against the exercise of market power, shouldit exist.     

脑缺氧损伤后线粒体途径神经元凋亡

脑缺氧后神经元线粒体损伤不单使细胞发生能量缺失和功能丧失,还可以介导凋亡调节信号,是缺氧损伤后神经元凋亡的一个中心环节。线粒体膜通透性转变,释放细胞色素C活化特定的caspase蛋白酶,使细胞进入不可逆的凋亡程序中;Bcl-2家族促凋亡和抑制凋亡成员之间相互作用,调控细胞色素C释放,调节线粒体介导的凋亡过程。     

基于B／S的WEB数据库技术

本文给出了基于B／S计算模式的信息查询的数据库系统,介绍了ASP的Web数据库开发,讨论了数据的查询、浏览、添加及修改的基本实现细节。     

利用蜜罐技术改进P~2DR模型及在公安网络上的应用研究

当前公安网络安全体系还没有形成统一的网络安全策略,难以保障公安网络上公共信息的安全。P2DR模型将防护、检测、响应组成一个较完整的安全策略,是对传统安全模型的重大改进;蜜罐系统是基于主动防御理论的一种诱骗技术。利用蜜罐技术改进P2DR模型,提高了事前检测能力,并初步实现了在公安网络上的应用,提高了P2DR的效能,增加了公安网络的防御纵向深度。     

我国无证搜查制度法理之构建——《刑事诉讼法》第111条第二款质疑

《刑事诉讼法》第111条第二款"在执行逮捕、拘留的时候,遇有紧急情况,不另用搜查证也可以进行搜查"的规定,含义比较模糊,可作"重叠式"和"并列式"两种理解。从目前实务运作和立法用语表达习惯来看,"重叠式"理解比"并列式"理解合理。但如果作"重叠式"理解,第二款在三个方面违背了有关搜查制度预设的基本法理。构建我国无证搜查制度的基本法理,对抑止搜查权力滥用和发挥搜查权力的应有效能势所必然。应明确无证搜查的种类,同时将必要性要件、可能性要件和适度性要件作为无证搜查合法实施的构成要件及认定标准。     

脑络通对气虚血瘀证脑缺血大鼠作用机理研究

目的：探讨脑络通对气虚血瘀证脑缺血大鼠作用机理,为脑络通的临床应用提供实验依据。方法：采用多因素病证结合气虚血瘀脑缺血大鼠模型,观察了局部脑组织血流量（ｒＣＢＦ）,脑水肿,血流流变性,血浆血栓素Ａ２（ＴＸＡ２）及前列环素（ＰＧＩ２）的变化,结果：脑络通能显著增加模型鼠ｒＣＢＦ,减轻脑水肿程度（Ｐ〈０．０１）,能显著改善模型鼠血流变性,能显著降低模型鼠血浆ＴＸＢ２水平,升高ＰＧＩ２水平（Ｐ〈０．０５     

脾虚患者SIL-2R与淋巴细胞增殖活性相关性研究

目的：研究脾虚患者ＳＩＬ ２Ｒ 含量与淋巴细胞增殖活性关系。方法：采用３ Ｈ ＴｄＲ 掺入法,ＥＬＩＳＡ 双抗体夹心法测定脾虚患者、正常人外周血淋巴细胞增殖活性,血浆及ＰＨＡ 诱导的７２ｈ淋巴细胞培养上清ＳＩＬ ２Ｒ 含量。结果：脾虚患者外周血淋巴细胞对ＰＨＡ 诱导的增殖反应较正常人明显下降（ Ｐ＜ ０ ．０１） ,淋巴细胞培养上清ＳＩＬ ２Ｒ含量显著低于正常组,其水平与淋巴细胞增殖反应量正相关（ Ｐ＜ ０ ．０１） ,但外周血ＳＩＬ ２Ｒ 含量显著地高于正常对照组（ Ｐ＜ ０ ．０１） 。结论：脾虚患者存在免疫功能紊乱     

英语A、B级无纸化考试系统简析

借助于计算机技术的英语网络无纸化考试系统,对节约考试成本,提高考试效率,确保考试结果的公平、公正、科学、及时等具有重要的意义。广东省英语A、B级网络无纸化考试模式由五大子系统组成,采用WEB和WindowsMedia技术,便于客户端的维护,具有较强的网络故障适应能力,可进行听力或口语在线考试,实现了考试管理的创新。