From Rebels to Rulers: The Challenges of Transition for Non-state Armed Groups in Mindanao and Myanmar

This article presents a critical comparison of the ongoing peace processes in the southern Philippines and Myanmar (Burma). It does so by examining two key armed groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on Mindanao, and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar. We identify common elements that help to explain the relative – albeit incomplete – success of these two groups in navigating their respective peace processes. The MILF and KNU are ethnonationalist armed groups struggling for self-determination against states that are experienced by ethnic minority communities as culturally alien, and economically and politically dominant. Both conflict actors are characterized by complex combinations of “greed” and “grievance” factors but nevertheless enjoy significant (albeit contested) political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. We explore the complex relationships between armed ethnic groups, conflict-affected communities, and civil society actors. We argue that engagement with civil society is a key element of success in the Mindanao peace process, which could be replicated in Myanmar. We examine the roles and changing nature of the state in the Philippines and Myanmar, and contrast the degrees of international involvement, as key variables in these peace processes. We observe that negotiations of comprehensive peace settlements are threatened by “the tyranny of elections” in Myanmar (2015) and the Philippines (2016), and observe the importance of including national parliaments in peace processes in a timely manner. The peace process between Manila and the MILF represents a rare example of a Muslim minority pursuing its political objectives through structured dialogue. The article focuses on the challenges faced by armed groups moving from insurgency to reinvent themselves as credible political actors and governance authorities. Our analysis draws on peace-building literature, specifically the phenomenon of “rebel governance.”     

缅甸局势及其对中国安全战略的影响

缅甸政府在军人执政22年后,改文官为主组成新政府,22个政党中有17个为少数民族党派,这些党派大部分生存于中缅边界,组成人员大多与中国华人血脉相连,无论从政府、经济、人文、民族甚至习俗都不可分割。本文从缅甸局势对中国安全战略的不稳定因素及影响做分析并提出对策。     

A ‘nation of intent’ in Burma: Karen ethno-nationalism,nationalism and narrations of nation

Fully-formed nationalisms do not emerge from nothing. Nor are they inextinguishable expressions of pre-modern forms of identity and political aspirations. The argument in this paper is that if they are fully formed, they have to emerge from ethno -nationalism; that is, out of ethnic identification-writ-large, where ethnic identification becomes ‘mapped’ onto that larger thing called a ‘nation’. Ethnic identification, however, requires a transformation in modes of consciousness and atavistic ethno-histories before ethno-nationalism and then full-blooded nationalisms can come into being. The argument is made in relation to the Karen nationalist movement in Burma. Karen nationalism emerged out of ethno-nationalism that was fostered by Christian missionary interest and ethnological attempts to set out a Karen ethno-history. Missionary writings offered Christian-educated Karen, in colonial times, the basis for a ‘narration of nation’ and for viewing themselves not merely as an ethnic group but a ‘nation’. This paper sets out the ceaseless unfolding of this ‘narration of nation’ that began in the nineteenth century and now tragically occurs in refugee camps in Thailand because of drastically altered politico-military conditions in Burma since the late 1980s. These narrations can only be understood in terms of their discursive history and how this history has been shaped. These narrations are examined with a view to addressing some key theoretical issues contained in more recent studies of nationalism and nation-state-making as modern phenomena and how ethno-nationalism is transformed into nationalism.     

Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22?years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian “regime breakdown” and “regime maintenance”. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalize once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism”, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total “victory” for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.     

冷战时期中缅关系研究（1955—1966）——以外交部解密档案为中心的考察

继1954年中缅政治关系出现突破性发展之后，1955—1966年中缅邦交发展迅速。这一阶段成为冷战期间中缅关系史上最为密切和友好的时期。但是，随着20世纪60年代中国对外政策的左转和缅甸实行封闭的排外的“缅甸式社会主义”政策，中缅关系开始出现裂痕，最终在1967年演变为中缅关系的破裂。     

境外“金三角”缅甸北部地区毒品复燃对中国的影响

中国云南省境外缅甸北部地区传统罂粟毒品种植面积自2007年以来逐年大幅上升,新型合成冰毒类毒品来势凶猛,对中国构成巨大威胁。缅甸新政府成立后对中缅边境地区的安全形势有何影响,缅北地区毒品种植与毒品加工的反弹以及禁毒工作的严峻态势,值得中国禁毒理论学界和实战部门关注与研究。     

滞缅“国军”与台湾和缅甸的关系

国共战争结束后,由李弥率领的"国军"从云南退出并滞留缅甸。蒋介石"政府"基于"反攻大陆"的目的,对这批"国军"进行各种支持,对刚独立不久的缅甸政府构成甚大威胁,于是缅甸向联合国提出控诉,抗议这批"国军"在缅甸边境的军事行动。最后在国际社会的压力下,这批部队终于撤退至台,而不愿接受安排者留滞当地成为流民。     

Death and injury caused by land mines in Burma

One hundred and eighty-eight Burmese refugees in Thailand were interviewed. One hundred and five of those interviewed had knowledge of a total of 313 persons who had been exposed to land mine explosions. Twenty-three of the interviewed were land mine survivors. They were all male, aged between eight and 68 years, and all except one had been injured between 1986 and 1997. Fifteen of the 23 were civilians, eight were guerilla soldiers who were injured either in battle or while deploying or disarming land mines. Those who had stepped on land mines were all crus or femur amputated and had several scars on the lower limbs, abdomen and some also on the forearms. Those who had handled a land mine had lost either fingers or hands and one also lost both eyes. This study shows that the frequency of land mine accidents in Burma has been underestimated and that the mortality is high. The study also supports the general impression that many victims are civilians.     

Democratic ‘freedom’ in Myanmar

In Robert Dahl’s work on ‘polyarchy’, democratic ‘freedom’ is liberty from the abuses of the state and freedom for citizens to formulate and express their preferences. This meaning of freedom is central to contemporary scholarship on democratization. At the same time, freedom has also been a key concept for activists and leaders involved in Myanmar’s long democratic struggles. Yet, when freedom is referred to by Burmese activists and democratic leaders, does this entail support for liberty or freedom of the type outlined by Dahl? This article argues that Berlin’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedoms can help to clarify overlaps and divergence in notions of freedom. When exploring ‘negative’ democratic freedoms, such as freedom from government restrictions on speech or association, there is considerable overlap between the visions of Burmese activists and democratic leaders and the key elements of Dahl’s democratic freedom. In considering ‘positive’ freedoms, however, there is more divergence. Amongst activists and democratic leaders in Myanmar, there is a focus not on freedom as the exercising of own entitlements but rather on freedom for moral conduct; freedom to bear to the responsibilities and discipline of democracy.