Chinese and Japanese investment in Southeast and South Asia: case studies of the electronics and automobile industries

Abstract

This article uses extensive fieldwork data to focus on the question of how Chinese and Japanese companies are competing in neighboring countries of Asia, and what economic forces will shape their future growth in the region. It begins by briefly discussing the history of Chinese and Japanese investment in the South and Southeast Asian regions. It traces the development of Japanese overseas investment policies, as well as China's more recent ‘Going Out’ government program to encourage overseas flows of capital. It then builds on prior political economy work as it uses case study focuses, with primary data based on the author's fieldwork research in several nations of Southeast Asia and in India, of the two key sectors of automobiles and electronics. It compares and contrasts the investment strategies of companies from each country, as well as the successes and failures of investments in the industries. It finds that Japanese companies’ advantages lie in industries utilizing advanced technology and management skills. Though the Japanese continue to lead in many areas, including automobiles, they have begun to face competition and potentially reduced profits in vital manufacturing areas. Meanwhile, Chinese overseas companies have made significant advances in the consumer electronics sector, using low prices and good quality, though overseas automobile investments have gained little traction. The article concludes that, if the Chinese can improve their product quality, capitalize on improving managerial skills and a deeper level of experience in the region, and establish brands they can sell with reliable distribution networks, Japanese companies could face losses to their Asian neighbor in these important parts of the continent they have dominated for decades.     

Taiwan and the geopolitics of late development

Abstract

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system.     

Hong Kong's political influence over China: institutional,informative, and interactive dynamics of sovereignty

Abstract

This article explores how Hong Kong has exercised political influence on China since the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, and tries to comprehend such seemingly impossible influences by reinterpreting the concept of sovereignty. It argues that the British Hong Kong existed as a ‘reference society’ for China's modernization and helped to change Chinese perceptions of capitalism. As this resulted in Chinese recognition of the legitimacy of Hong Kong's colonial institutions, which were featured with political legacies of civic freedom and the rule of law, it also reveals the institutional dimension of sovereignty. Secondly, the information flow from Hong Kong to China reflects a communicative (in contrast to coercive) nature of sovereignty, which highlights Hong Kong's central position in the Chinese world of information. Thirdly, Hong Kong's ongoing democratization challenges Chinese authoritarianism through societal interactions that are beyond state control. Conceptually, in this article, state sovereignty is argued as being something fluid and constantly reshaped in everyday practice with institutional, informative, and interactive dynamics; practically, it attempts to find some remaining ‘silver lining’ to the growing authoritarian Chinese clouds above Hong Kong as reversing the logic of examining external factors in democratization.     

中国梦视角下大学生有效政治参与的途径研究

大学生有效政治参与是我国公民政治参与的重要组成部分,对实现中国梦具有重要意义。当前我国大学生有效政治参与仍存在不平衡性、实用主义等现实问题,通过发挥国家调控、学校引领、个人自律等方面的力量,解决大学生有效政治参与存在的现实问题,为实现中国梦尽一份力。     

Explaining Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea, 1988–99

The current paper discusses Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea during the period 1988–99. These policies are discussed with reference to ‘realist’ and ‘non-realist’ theoretical approaches. The realist position regards Taiwan's South China Sea policies as an outcome of its relations with the People's Republic of China and the Southeast Asian countries. These policies are fashioned and implemented in a coherent way by a unitary state. Two ‘non-realist’ positions are identified. One focuses on influences from domestic political parties and party factions, bureaucratic segments and economic interests. The other emphasizes the impact of transnational alliances, mainly through oil business lobby groups allied with mainland Chinese partners. The investigation sustains much of the realist argument. It is, however, argued that party politics and bureaucratic infighting has had an independent effect on Taiwan's South China Sea policies, while the impact of oil business interests has been limited.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

Stretching a third of the way around the globe, the Asia Pacific is the world's most populous region. Yet, it remains the sole region without a human rights court or commission, and without a human rights treaty. The notable absence there of a human rights mechanism based on such institutions is often explained away by reference to the region's size and heterogeneity, the constituent states’ reluctance to interfere in the affairs of others, and the existence of rivalries. Whilst agreeing that there is no inter-governmental initiative that looks set to change the present state of affairs in the Asia Pacific, this article places the spotlight on another model of creating a regional human rights mechanism, that is, the unique and burgeoning Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Specifically, it assesses the prospects for Japan, Taiwan and China – three key regional players whose membership of the Forum is still outstanding – to create domestic human rights bodies that eventually join.     

Escaping the merchant/missionary dilemma: an imperial policy for the Asia-Pacific

The Asia policy of the Bush administration follows from two principles: its preference for ‘hub-and-spoke relationships’ led from Washington, and the restored priority of security issues over the mixture of trade interests and human rights that was the hallmark of the Clinton presidency. The initial focus of the administration on the restoration of political and strategic ties with old allies such as Japan, and on strategic competition, has been mitigated by another realistic approach: the need to seek new allies and partnerships. This policy was already evident towards India before September 11, 2001, but has been magnified with the onset of a coalition against terrorism, and almost as importantly, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of strategic and military ties with China, the priority of anti-terrorist cooperation over human rights issues with Southeast Asia, the increased support for India that is of more strategic value than America's tactical involvement with Pakistan, are developments that overshadow the US relationship with traditional allies such as Japan or the European Union. The major weakness of the Bush Asia policy, however, is its relative neglect of major economic and social issues in the region. Although support for some weakened ASEAN economies has increased, there is neither a more intense coordination of economic policies with Japan, in spite of initially declared intentions, nor a major economic and social strategy for Southeast and South Asia that would support the fight against terrorism.     

Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither ‘unipolar’ nor ‘multipolar’ designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role.     

Chinese—Indian relations and the process of building confidence: Implications for the Asia‐Pacific

China's traditional approach to security questions appears to be antithetical to the cooperative security approach that has been adopted by ASEAN and by embryonic multilateral organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Yet, in the course of normalizing relations with India, China has shown itself willing to explore the kind of confidence‐ and security‐building measures associated with this approach. Although it was a change in interests that prompted China to explore the worth of such measures, nevertheless cooperative security ideas have proved helpful in defusing tensions between New Delhi and Beijing. Possibly as a result of its experience with India, there are indications that China has become more receptive to the use of a cooperative security framework elsewhere in the Asia‐Pacific, most notably in dealing with the ASEAN Regional Forum. Its involvement in this process has increased the diplomatic and economic costs that would be incurred should it decide to use force to make good its irredentist claims in the South China Sea.     

The emergence of the entrepreneurial state in contemporary China

As market reform has progressed in China, state bureaux have adapted and become entrepreneurial. This contradicts expectations that states will either simply retreat in the face of encroaching markets to play a minimal role in the economy, or obstruct market‐oriented change through bureaucratic conservatism or rent‐seeking. This paper describes the state entrepreneurialism that has appeared in the Chinese city of Tianjin in the early 1990s and explains its emergence as the consequence of both market‐induced structural transformation and the resultant changing incentives and demands on officials. It proposes the ‘entrepreneurial state’ as a model of state adaptation to marketization and assesses its implications for both our conception of the developmental state and for anticipation of rent‐seeking and resistance to market reform.