The frustrating partnership: Honor,status, and emotions in Russia's discourses of the West

This paper analyzes Russia's presidential discourses and emotions of the West from March 2008 to December 2012. By studying the languages of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in annual addresses to the Federation Council and public statements, I have identified several distinct stages in the Kremlin's emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the initial fear (March 2008–June 2009), hope (September 2009–the late 2010), and frustration (since the early 2011). The Russia's emotional shifts are shaped by the country's historically established social relations with the West and are not to be reduced to the dynamics of power and prestige/status. Russia's deep emotional connection to the West as well as Russia's own concept of national honor are the two factors that drive the nation's leaders' complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when in the eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized.     

Status conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and emotional biases

This article looks at the status conflicts between Russia and the West and asks: why do these conflicts exist despite attempts to avoid them? If status conflicts refer to merely a symbolic recognition, then they should arguably be easier to solve than conflicts stemming from competition for power and resources. Yet, status conflicts can be difficult to solve even when they were not conceived as zero-sum games. The article argues that status conflicts cannot be understood without the interplay of perceptions and emotions. First, what really matters is not objective status but perceptions thereof and there seems to be a gap how Russia and the West perceive status in general. Secondly, the perceptions of when status is gained or lost seem to be emotionally loaded. Russia is more willing to understand its relative status when military or economic issues are at stake, but if the dispute deals with international norms and questions of justice Russia is more likely to interpret Western action as violating its status and conversely, it is more likely to interpret its own action as enhancing its status when it is defending such values differently from the West.     

核武器对同盟的影响——以朝核问题与日美同盟的互动为例

核武器通过对威胁能力与威胁认知的修正对同盟建立产生影响。核武器及其拥有国的数量影响同盟的结构样式和结构变动。核武器拥有、部署及威慑功能的变动持续塑造同盟参与国对威胁的认知,从而影响同盟参与国的对外政策。同盟内核保护的明确性与可信性、核武器功能及部署的分享与分工、国际核安全机制的构建,都将影响同盟的内部互信。综观朝核问题对日美同盟的影响:日美同盟参与国对外政策的不协调为其表,日美同盟内互信的动摇为其中,日美同盟结构的进一步"平等化"为其里。     

国外电子政务服务研究综述

服务一直是电子政务的主旨,国外自本世纪初就关注这一主题,我国在2006年的《国家电子政务总体框架》中明确提出"服务是宗旨"的电子政务建设目标。在大量文献调查的基础上对国外电子政务服务研究的基本情况及特征进行定量的统计分析,发现国外电子政务服务文献占整个电子政务研究文献的三分之一以上,文献内容主要集中在一般性介绍、服务传递、服务管理、技术实现、服务作用、影响因素、实证研究、综述与评论等方面;研究的特点是注重服务的作用和影响因素,注重服务管理,关注服务传递,强调实证研究等。认为我国电子政务服务的研究要结合我国国情在服务管理、服务传递和对社会发展推动等方面以实证的方法进行深化研究。     

Foreign,criminal: a doubly damned modern British folk-devil

An association of strangers with danger and criminality is one of the most enduring social myths. However, in the UK, it was only after a media outcry 10 years ago over the release of foreign nationals from British prisons, that the ‘Foreign Criminal’ exploded into political and popular consciousness. Despite the small numbers of people involved, the location of this folk devil at the intersection of legal and moral assessments of ‘wickedness’ and alterity imbues it with considerable potency and has ensured that its reverberations are still felt strongly a decade later. Drawing on qualitative research with immigration detainees, deportees and irregular migrants, the article considers some of the many faces of the Foreign Criminal and illuminates their racialised, classed and gendered natures. It argues that a twin set of developments – coalescing around Operation Nexus and curtailed Article 8 right protections – work together to taint a growing number of non-citizens with criminality, whilst simultaneously undermining their claim to belong. Case studies are presented to demonstrate the fault lines of this malleable and expanding category, and to argue that the Foreign Criminal is paradigmatic of both social disorder and national boundaries, and is fundamentally shifting the lines of citizenship and belonging.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.     

Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies

Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis claims that FDI promotes democratization. The state-capture hypothesis suggests that FDI, by increasing the value of power, may raise the risk of an autocratic transition. Lastly, the stabilization hypothesis, contrary to the first two, claims that FDI can enhance dictatorships’ stability by opening new opportunities for distributing benefits to regime elites. The empirical analysis, covering about 100 countries for the time period 1970–2008, uses data on autocratic breakdowns and transition types to test the above hypotheses. The reported evidence does not support the liberalization or the state-capture hypothesis. FDI is found to reduce the likelihood of democratic transitions.     

日本对蒙古援助分析

以苏联解体和蒙古向市场经济转型为契机,1991年日本正式开始了对蒙古的官方发展援助(ODA),并以相对较小的成本,长期成为国际社会对蒙援助的最大援助国。根据蒙古经济发展的不同阶段和国家战略需求,日本对蒙援助经历了紧急救济型援助、有计划的恢复型援助和有计划的发展型援助三个阶段。ODA成为20世纪90年代以来维系和加深日蒙关系的关键,对促进蒙古经济社会的恢复与发展,推动蒙古市场经济转型等发挥了重要作用。通过对蒙援助,日本提高并巩固了自身在东北亚地区的战略地位,提升了自己的国际影响力和国际形象,为其获得广阔的市场和丰富的资源提供了便利条件。     

略论澳大利亚在《科伦坡计划》中对东南亚的援助

二战后,澳大利亚积极参加地区性建设,参与实施《科伦坡计划》,加大对东南亚国家的经济、文化、军事援助等。《科伦坡计划》是亚洲第一个国际性的政府间相互援助计划,在澳大利亚对外援助中占主导作用。《科伦坡计划》性质具有多重性,不仅仅出于国家利益考虑,而且还涉及人道主义等,在援助方式上形式多样,从而对东南亚国家产生了客观性的多种影响。     

科伦坡计划及其对战后东南亚的经济发展援助

科伦坡计划是世界上第一批援助计划之一,它在20世纪50年代由英联邦国家发起,旨在通过以资金和技术援助、教育及培训计划等形式的国际合作,来加强南亚和东南亚地区的社会经济发展。科伦坡计划有着广泛的政治和战略意义,不能仅从人道主义角度来理解。它与英美的冷战计划结合起来,成为扩大西方影响的重要工具。