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21.
世界银行与国际货币基金组织在为借款国提供贷款援助时,通过交叉设定贷款条件强化贷款条件对借款国的约束力。依交叉条件设置方式不同,可分为正式的贷款交叉条件与非正式的贷款交叉条件,其中世界银行在贷款协议中对国际货币基金组织贷款条件的交叉引用,使得国际货币基金组织非条约性质的贷款条件获得了法律约束力。中国应未雨绸缪,推动国际金融组织贷款条件的实体内容与设定程序改革,并采取必要的措施弱化贷款交叉条件的法律约束力。 相似文献
22.
The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes 下载免费PDF全文
MARKUS HINTERLEITNER FRITZ SAGER EVA THOMANN 《European Journal of Political Research》2016,55(3):549-567
During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme. 相似文献
23.
Dursun Peksen 《国际相互影响》2018,44(4):681-708
What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes. 相似文献
24.
Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance and operations, but not to how IMF programs are differentiated under
the array of available lending windows. This paper examines empirically the economic and political circumstances associated
with the use of IMF facilities. It therefore extends existing research into the determinants of IMF arrangements by investigating
the extent to which different influences are at work in the case of different facilities. Focusing initially on extended arrangements
as compared to stand-bys, the results indicate that although initially the facilities were used in different economic circumstances,
since the mid 1980s these differences have largely disappeared. Instead the differences between user countries have become
more political than economic. There are, however, some differences between concessionary and non-concessionary facilities
beyond the income levels of countries using them. The policy implications for the range and design of the Fund’s lending windows
are discussed.
相似文献
Dane RowlandsEmail: |
25.
The paper investigates changes in IMF activities using the analytical framework of international public goods. The IMF promotes
international financial stability, whose outputs are joint products with varying degrees of publicness. In recent years, IMF
loans (recipient-specific benefits) have assumed decreased importance, while the Fund’s technical assistance and monitoring
activities have taken on greater importance. As a consequence, the club and purely public outputs (e.g., disseminating best
practices) have grown as a share of IMF activities. Changes in the mix of IMF activities alter the mix of international public
goods and, in so doing, change policy recommendations regarding the role of IMF. The future of IMF is also addressed, especially
in light of increased private capital flows.
相似文献
Todd SandlerEmail: |
26.
Bessma Momani 《The Review of International Organizations》2007,2(1):39-57
Current IMF reform proposals are preoccupied with changing governance structures by reallocating Executive Board chairs and
quota shares and with expanding and altering the Fund’s surveillance role, but not enough attention has been paid to whether
organizational change at the staff level is also needed. IMF staff have intellectual dominance and discretion in the design
of loan conditionality, writing of surveillance reports, and provision of technical and policy advice. There are also clear
internal and external criticisms of how the Fund’s organizational culture—that is perceived to be hierarchical, technical/economistic,
bureaucratic, and homogeneous/conforming—negatively affects the Fund’s policy output and relationship with borrowing members.
This article suggests altering ’how things are done’ at the IMF by making changes to recruitment and organizational structure.
相似文献
Bessma MomaniEmail: |
27.
论人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
西方在人民币汇率问题上的核心意图在于舍IMF而取WTO的争端解决机制,因此,需要廓清IMF与WTO的关系以确定人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据.合理界定二者的关系需要区分外汇措施和汇率安排.由于外汇措施与贸易措施具有交叉重叠的效果,IMF以技术方法界定外汇措施,WTO在外汇措施是否与IMF条款一致的问题上对IMF的管辖权给予充分的吸收.但是,汇率安排属于IMF专属管辖,WTO的有关规定与此无涉.西方对人民币汇率的指控属于汇率安排问题,应由IMF依其协定第4条进行监督,而不应由WTO争端解决机制解决. 相似文献
28.
29.
赵杰宏 《胜利油田党校学报》2008,21(1):61-64
一个既为IMF成员方又为WTO成员方在履行IMF的义务时会违反WTO的义务,而履行WTO的义务时又有可能违反IMF的义务,这就构成了一成员方对IMF与WTO的义务交叉冲突;IMF与WTO的磋商机制是必需的,现有的IMF与WTO磋商机削仅具有框架性作用,WTO争端解决机制在具体个案中对IMF与WTO是否冲突没有解释的权利,只能采取回避的办法;完善IMF与WTO磋商机制势在必行。 相似文献
30.
Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators
We examine the impact of IMF programs on economic performance in 95 developing countries over the period 1993–2002. Three
macroeconomic measures of economic performance are considered: the real per capita economic growth rate, the ratio of the
fiscal surplus to GDP, and the ratio of the current account surplus to GDP. Three estimation techniques are used: censored-sample,
full-sample instrumental-variable, and matching. Substantively, we find little statistical support that IMF programs contemporaneously
improve real economic growth in participating countries, but stronger evidence of an improvement in economic growth in years
following a program. We find that both the fiscal ratio and the current-account ratio improve contemporaneously with IMF participation
relative to the counterfactual, with effects in succeeding years differing little from the impact effects. We conclude that
the program-effect estimates of matching and other estimators will differ largely because of the sample included in estimation.
Matching by its nature excludes country episodes associated with extreme values of the propensity score, while the instrumental-variable
estimator includes those. If there is heterogeneity of performance response in extreme vs. moderate cases, the estimates differ
systematically between the two techniques.
JEL codes F33 · F34 · C34 相似文献