IMF quotas: Constructing an international organization using inferior building blocks

The International Monetary Fund's structure and rules are based on the quota system that was constructed when the Fund was set up in 1946. Quotas affect contributions and resource availability at the Fund, access to resources, the distribution of Special Drawing Rights, and voting rights. Despite periodic reviews and modifications, the quota system has gradually been eroded and undermined. The fundamental problem is that a single system is attempting to serve four separate and incompatible functions. We illustrate how this erosion has taken place, and how an unreformed quota system will compromise the future operations of the IMF and the international monetary and financial system. Although the difficulties associated with reforming quotas are myriad and complex, the legacy of an unreformed quota system may be profoundly undesirable. We argue that a refined IMF structure must accommodate a clearer separation of a member's contributions to the IMF, its access to IMF resources, and its voting rights at the institution. JEL codes F42 · H79 · H11     

国际货币基金组织投票权分配制度及其改革:发展中国家的视角

投票权的分配直接关系到成员国在IMF中发言权的大小.IMF的投票权分配制度,没有跟上不断变化的国际经济现实,亦未能给发展中国家参与决策提供有效保障.从发展中国家的视角对IMF投票权分配制度进行历史性梳理,评析相关改革意见和举措,为建构稳定与和谐的国际货币金融秩序奠定"群策群力"的社会基础,具有现实的参考意义.     

20国集团与韩国的外交

20国集团由20多个主要发达国家和发展中国家组成，旨在国际层面进行合作以克服全球经济危机和改革国际金融体系。围绕着加强金融监督、改革国际金融机构、宏观经济政策共助等核心争论点，由于主要参与国之间的观点差异非常大，预计在第二次20国集团首脑峰会上很难在短期内达成有效的国际性协议。与巴西、英国一起担任20国首脑峰会“主要三国”（Management Troika）的韩国，应加强外交方面的努力，调解发达国家与发展中国家之间的立场，提出在短期内行之有效的政策方案。     

国际货币基金组织何去何从

本文指出国际货币基金组织构建的布雷顿森林体制实行固定汇率制，有利于国际货币金融秩序的稳定。但随着布雷顿森林体制的崩溃，取而代之的牙买加体制，实行浮动汇率制，加剧了国际金融市场的动荡，频发金融危机，面对金融危机，国际货币基金组织表现低能，只立足于救火，未能建立完善的“防火”体制。     

Parties and Change in the Post-Bailout Cyprus: The May 2016 Parliamentary Elections

The parliamentary elections of 2016, the first following Cyprus’ exit from the bailout programme, took place in a context of indifference on the part of the citizens. Characterised by a decline in bipartisanship, a rise in abstention and a more fragmented party system, the elections paved the way for the historical entry into parliament of the far right party, ELAM. This article sets these outcomes against the broader backdrop of the Great Recession while also paying attention to the reinvigoration of the cultural dimension of political conflict, with potentially significant constraints for future negotiations on the Cyprus problem.     

The Effect of IMF Programs on Women’s Economic and Political Rights

Though much research has been devoted to the socioeconomic and political consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for recipient countries, little is known about the impacts of these programs on the level of respect for women’s rights. We postulate that IMF-induced policy reforms of privatization and public spending cuts, and the growing political repression and instability following the implementation of IMF programs, undermine the government’s ability and willingness to protect women’s economic and political rights. To substantiate the theoretical claims, we combine data on women’s political and economic rights with data on IMF programs for the years 1981–2004. Our findings suggest that IMF involvement is likely to deteriorate the level of respect for women’s economic rights while having no discernible effect on women’s political rights. The results further indicate that the effect of these programs is not conditioned by political regime type and economic wealth of recipient countries. One major policy implication of our findings is that the IMF should start to recognize that the conditions attached to lending programs might be implemented at the expense of women’s economic rights and that more explicit protections of women’s rights need to be included in program negotiations.     

论IMF新《监督决定》对人民币汇率的影响

IMF 2007年双边监督决定在保持对已实行监督领域的监管的基础上,把监管与国内政策联系起来。IMF与其他成员方可能会利用新《监督决定》对人民币汇率进行指责。新《监督决定》对汇率监督范围的界定,也为IMF广泛介入各会员方的国内政策提供了依据。IMF新《监督决定》的原则性建议及衡量外部稳定和汇率偏差存在技术难题使IM F难以对人民币汇率作出不利于我国的认定。     

Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation

Research into IMF program implementation has usually taken the form of large sample regression analyses. A more detailed explanation is offered in this paper through a case study of program implementation in Turkey between 1999 and 2004. Our research is based on a series of in-depth interviews with policy makers, program negotiators, bureaucrats, interest groups and IMF personnel. Our results reinforce hypotheses that emerge from the theory of implementation and the large sample econometric work, but they also offer new and enhanced explanations. Program implementation depends on a range of factors which interact with one another. These include domestic political economy factors, such as the importance of special interest groups, political cohesiveness and program ownership by the government and the IMF, but also other idiosyncratic factors such as, in the case of Turkey, the existence of a crisis, the desire to join the EU and the role of influential technocrats. Our research has implications for the design of IMF programs.

IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals

Current IMF reform proposals are preoccupied with changing governance structures by reallocating Executive Board chairs and quota shares and with expanding and altering the Fund’s surveillance role, but not enough attention has been paid to whether organizational change at the staff level is also needed. IMF staff have intellectual dominance and discretion in the design of loan conditionality, writing of surveillance reports, and provision of technical and policy advice. There are also clear internal and external criticisms of how the Fund’s organizational culture—that is perceived to be hierarchical, technical/economistic, bureaucratic, and homogeneous/conforming—negatively affects the Fund’s policy output and relationship with borrowing members. This article suggests altering ’how things are done’ at the IMF by making changes to recruitment and organizational structure.

The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework

IMF supported programs have conventionally been assessed by examining their effects on intermediate variables and final outcomes. More recently greater attention has been paid to their implementation, on the assumption that in order to work programs need to be implemented. Empirical studies have begun to include political economy variables in an attempt to explain implementation. They have used the concept of ‘ownership’ to provide a theoretical foundation. This paper provides an alternative and simple conceptual framework based on the marginal benefits and costs of implementation. It goes on to discuss policies that might be expected to improve implementation based on this framework.