领导素质测评中心理测验的应用与困境

心理测验在领导素质测评中的应用逐渐增多，取得了良好效果，但也存在一些问题，如“心理测验的滥用与专业人员的不足”、“心理测验概括性与领导测评针对性的矛盾”和“神化心理测验与测验本身局限性的矛盾”等。面对这些问题，加强心理测验队伍的建设、开发领导素质测评专用量表和综合运用多种测评手段可能是有益的尝试。     

南通市卫生行政许可现状与思考

本文深入阐述了南通市卫生行政许可的现状，剖析了卫生行政许可存在的问题及产生的原因，并对如何适应新一轮审批制度改革，提出了创新性的举措，以及依法开展许可工作做了思考。     

"私家侦探"的法律思考

"私家侦探"的存在是合理的,但存在诸多问题。规范"私家侦探"的措施有: 立法、准入资格和程序、管理机制、服务领域、权利和义务、委托合同代理、证据效力、法律责 任和风险防范等。     

试论数字化警务中居民身份识别与管理构想

数字化警务是指警察机关的社会行政管理和刑事执法活动借助计算机信息和数宇信息技术手段进行管理的警务方式方法。从社会管理和刑事执法的角度来讲,确认公民的个人身份及有关信息是非常重要的。在现代数字化警务工作中,必须把居民的身份识别与社会信息数字化管理有机地结合在一起。     

德里苏丹国时期印度奴隶的地位及其身份演变

德里苏丹国时期印度奴隶因穆斯林政权的建立呈现出不同的特色.连年的战乱及伊斯兰教与印度本土宗教的冲突使奴隶的数量急剧增长,奴隶来源亦更加多元和广泛.这一时期印度奴隶的地位较历史上其他时期有所改善,奴隶的身份和地位呈现出朝向特权阶级的向上的"流动性".伊斯兰教所宣扬的平等思想和苏非圣人们的说教为这种"流动"提供了理论上的可能,以战争为主题的时代背景为这种"流动"提供了实践的机会,初来乍到的穆斯林统治者在印度次大陆立足未稳的客观现实,以及对当地宗教、文化及自然环境所表现出来的"水土不服"为这种"流动"提供了实现的可能.在穆斯林政权建立之后,一部分精英奴隶由于表现出色,被主人解除了奴隶身份,在政治地位上显现出明显的优越性,他们跻身统治阶级,成为封建贵族,极个别奴隶还成功问鼎权力的顶端.一部分奴隶为满足穆斯林宫廷需要,变身为手工业者或艺人,有力地推动了社会经济和文化的发展.不过这一时期绝大多数奴隶的地位并没有发生根本性的变化,他们虽然皈依了伊斯兰教,摆脱了印度社会的种姓压迫,实现了身份的转变,但依然生活在社会的最底层,依然是被压迫、被剥削的对象.     

The status stratification of radical right support: Reconsidering the occupational profile of UKIP’s electorate

Drawing on Weber’s conceptualisation of class and status as distinct principles of social order, this article argues that support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is better understood as a status-based phenomenon than a class-based one. Operationalising status as a function of social distance between occupational groups, we show that whilst class was a poor predictor of UKIP support in 2015, status scores were strongly and negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting UKIP. The opposite is true for the Conservatives’ and the Labour Party’s electorates, which were still much more strongly aligned on class lines. The effect of status on UKIP preference remains strong after controlling for educational qualifications, suggesting that the status scale taps into a deeper divide than simply an educational cleavage. Moreover, we find that status plays a similar role in predicting the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in other Western European countries as well.     

Russia says no: Power,status, and emotions in foreign policy

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia's new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia's takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia's reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.     

The frustrating partnership: Honor,status, and emotions in Russia's discourses of the West

This paper analyzes Russia's presidential discourses and emotions of the West from March 2008 to December 2012. By studying the languages of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in annual addresses to the Federation Council and public statements, I have identified several distinct stages in the Kremlin's emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the initial fear (March 2008–June 2009), hope (September 2009–the late 2010), and frustration (since the early 2011). The Russia's emotional shifts are shaped by the country's historically established social relations with the West and are not to be reduced to the dynamics of power and prestige/status. Russia's deep emotional connection to the West as well as Russia's own concept of national honor are the two factors that drive the nation's leaders' complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when in the eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized.     

Status conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and emotional biases

This article looks at the status conflicts between Russia and the West and asks: why do these conflicts exist despite attempts to avoid them? If status conflicts refer to merely a symbolic recognition, then they should arguably be easier to solve than conflicts stemming from competition for power and resources. Yet, status conflicts can be difficult to solve even when they were not conceived as zero-sum games. The article argues that status conflicts cannot be understood without the interplay of perceptions and emotions. First, what really matters is not objective status but perceptions thereof and there seems to be a gap how Russia and the West perceive status in general. Secondly, the perceptions of when status is gained or lost seem to be emotionally loaded. Russia is more willing to understand its relative status when military or economic issues are at stake, but if the dispute deals with international norms and questions of justice Russia is more likely to interpret Western action as violating its status and conversely, it is more likely to interpret its own action as enhancing its status when it is defending such values differently from the West.     

The Functions of Class at the Present Time: Including Taste,or Sex and Class as Culture

Gagnier provides an analytic account of current uses of gender, sex and sexuality, and of class as objective condition, role, identity, subjectivity, performance, product of cultural formation, pain and pleasure. She concludes that we shall do better today to take from the history of political economy a focus on the division of labour, the kinds of work people do, including women's unpaid labour at home, and the ways that work structures identity and subjectivity, than on more abstract class identity (e.g. wage-labourers and capitalists), and to see that both local and global divisions of labour or work patterns are along race and gender lines as much as along class lines. The introduction of consumption models of taste and status draws together both class and gender, for consumption and leisure, the realm for most wage-labourers of pleasure, is as significant in the formation of identity and subjectivity as work, production or pain. We should account for people's pleasures and desires as well as their pain and place in narrowly conceived 'productive' relations. Class is no less significant than it always was, but future work should disaggregate the concept along these lines, mindful of gender salience in the division of labour and the reproduction of class. And it should include critical analysis of the realms of taste, pleasure, consumption, leisure and status.