EU Simulations and Engagement: Motivating Greater Interest in European Union Politics

While the effects of simulation-based courses on the knowledge of participating students may be marginal in relation to standard lecture and discussion-based courses, this article argues that the greatest leverage is gained by increasing participating students’ level of interest in the subject of study and in politics more broadly. Participants tend to become increasingly absorbed in their roles and in the politics of the institutions at the center of the simulation. To better consider this possibility, we conducted a survey of students participating in the 2015 Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation and of appropriate control populations. The survey results indeed suggest that, much more than simply acquiring knowledge about the EU, the simulation experience serves to generate more robust interest in the subject of study.     

Competition and switching in public service markets: Can they reduce inequalities?

Regulatory reforms to public infrastructure services across European Union (EU) countries were aimed at increasing consumer welfare by introducing competition and choice into service markets. However, empirical evaluations have questioned whether these reforms have benefitted all consumers, suggesting that vulnerable groups of service users (especially those with lower levels of formal education), might be locked into poorly performing services. We assess the relationship between the level of competition in electricity and fixed telephony markets in EU countries and evaluate the affordability of these services for different socio‐educational layers. Our findings show that – although in countries where there is a relatively high frequency of switching, inequalities between socio‐educational groups are smaller and eventually disappear – competition as such does not play a part. These results suggest that demand‐side regulation that successfully enables consumer switching has the potential to equalize social welfare, thereby reflecting a possible convergence of regulatory instruments and the central aims of the welfare state in this context.     

论新时期“无直接利益冲突”矛盾预警与应急机制

“无直接利益冲突”是众多参与者与事件本身无关,只是表达、发泄一种情绪的社会冲突。其通常表现是起哄、扎堆、看热闹,严重的可引发骚乱。社会矛盾预警应急机制可有效预防和化解“无直接利益冲突”。新时期“无直接利益冲突”呈现出的新情况、新趋势、新动向等特征,迫需构建这种机制。构建这种机制,需夯实“地直接利益冲突”预警应急的基础,建设科学、高效的矛盾预警与应急系统。     

论中国利益群体参与公共政策制定存在的问题

处于社会转型期的中国,如何处理利益群体参政问题关乎改革开放的历史进程和社会稳定。中国的渐进式改革路径在保持社会稳定方面发挥了重要的作用,但是这种渐进式改革更多地表现在经济领域,而政治领域的改革,特别是公民参政权的落实则略显迟滞和不够。由此引起的矛盾和问题使人们产生了诸多不满和怨恨,因此探讨中国利益群体在参与公共政策制定上存在的问题,对于进一步完善中国利益群体参政的路径、提高政府的执政能力和管理创新能力,其理论价值和现实意义不言而喻。     

绑架问题与日朝关系

最近几年,由于日本和朝鲜在绑架日本人问题上严重对立,使得原本紧张的两国关系更是雪上加霜。日朝两国在绑架问题上坚持各自立场,最根本的分歧在于双方在政治、安全和战略利益方面的巨大差异。日本方面热炒绑架问题,可谓是一石两鸟。日本以防范"来自朝鲜的威胁"为由,不断强化日美同盟和增加军事实力,使军事能力在国家发展战略中的位置和作用不断提升。同时,绑架问题还是日方手中最为重要的筹码,在日朝关系正常化谈判中可以与朝方抗衡,甚至可以对冲朝方提出的"清算殖民统治的历史,进行赔偿"的要求,争取谈判主导权。     

进攻性联盟、模糊性威慑与AUKUS的战略性扩张

2021年9月15日,美国、英国和澳大利亚建立三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)。美英澳三国基于追求权力最大化、改变既有国际秩序的扩张性动机,构建进攻性联盟。美国企图巩固印太地区霸权;英国试图提升印太地区影响力,推动“全球英国”构想;澳大利亚希图扩张在印太地区的威慑力,强化南太平洋区域强国地位。AUKUS的威慑功能具有模糊性,主要体现在威慑对象及触发条件的模糊性。其模糊性威慑主要包括模糊性威慑的信号功能、震慑功能、作战功能、信息和情报共享功能、军工合作功能。AUKUS通过模糊性威慑功能实现美国在印太地区的战略性扩张;威胁中国国家安全和阻挠中国统一进程;诱使印度深化与三国战略合作;引发东盟国家意见分歧;加速欧盟防务自主进程;削弱国际核不扩散机制,恶化地区安全形势,对全球及地区安全局势产生消极影响。     

美国环境犯罪严格刑事责任的演化与评析

为了确保食品、药物及环境等涉及公共福利领域的安全,美国法院发展并确立严格刑事责任制度,该制度包括公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则。确立环境严格刑事责任的目的是确保刑法在保护环境和促进环境法遵守方面的效率。公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则减轻了美国起诉部门的证明责任,降低了司法成本,同时提高了犯罪的成本,增强了刑法的威慑力。这体现了美国环境刑事政策的价值取向是社会利益保护优先和效率优先。     

论国际投资仲裁中的公共利益保护

国际投资争端往往涉及重大的公共利益,国际投资仲裁度制度的合理设置有助于维持正常的国际经济交往秩序、保障公共利益。但在仲裁实践中,由于国际投资仲裁存在着强调私有财产权的倾向、仲裁程序欠缺透明度、投资者享有争端解决选择权等制度性缺陷,制约着国际投资仲裁对公共利益重要价值追求的实现。应通过缩小仲裁庭的管辖权,规范其审慎解释权,平衡仲裁秘密性与透明性的关系,借鉴"法庭之友"制度建立第三方参与制度,设立国际投资仲裁上诉机制等不同具体制度的改革完善,限制国际投资仲裁庭的自由裁量权,确保国际投资仲裁中的公共利益得以有效维护。     

公证人的法律责任问题研究

就公证法律责任的主体、承担法律责任的基本原则、及其种类等方面来研究公证人的法律责任,从而规范公证法律行为,构建和完善与国际接轨并符合中国国情的公证法律制度体系。     

Transcending the dilemma of “public interest”

This paper discusses the evolution and recent trends in the development of the constitutional concept of “public use” in the case-law history of the United States starting from the source of US government’s taking powers and the original meaning of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Since the concepts of “public use” and “public interest” are extremely difficult to be defined, it is very hard for the US courts to develop a relevant operative criterion. In the United States, the safeguard of “public interest” in taking mainly lies legislative rather than judicial control. In a democratic society, legislative judgment is highly respected by the courts and the entire takeovers that conform to public use as determined by the Congress are usually deemed constitutional. In this sense, the Congress is a “public interest machine”, which automatically generates laws and decisions on behalf of public interests through the democratic representative process. The paper eventually suggests that China should divert its attention from the theoretical definition of “public interest” to institutional construction, and should make the National and Local People’s Congresses and their standing committees to play major roles in deciding taking and compensation schemes. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Faxue 中国法学 (China Law), 2005, (5): 36–45