网络舆情语境下提升民主党派基层组织参政议政能力的路径思考

当前,网络舆情在给我国民主党派基层组织参政议政带来机遇的同时,其突发性、偏差性、繁杂性等特性对民主党派基层组织的应急能力、政治智慧、实战水平等方面提出了严骏挑战,这就要求各民主党派基层组织应当勇于抓住网络舆情对参政议政带来的良好机遇,努力适应当前网络舆情发展的新形势,积极借助网络平台,时刻关注舆情讯息,充分汲取网络民意,深入开展网络调查与监督,着力提升参政议政能力。     

Keeping the rascals in: Anti‐political‐establishment parties and their cost of governing in established democracies

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral ‘cost of governing’. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti‐political‐establishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti‐political‐establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by ‘bringing the party back in’. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.     

From voter ID to party ID: How political parties affect perceptions of election fraud in the U.S.

This paper uses a survey experiment to assess what individuals understand about election fraud and under what circumstances they see it as a problem. I argue that political parties are central to answering both these questions. Results from the 2011 CCES survey suggest respondents are able to differentiate between the relative incentives of Democrats and Republicans where fraud tactics are concerned, but whether voters see these tactics as problematic is heavily influenced by partisan bias. The results show little support for the notion that partisan ideology drives fraud assessments, and suggest support for the idea that individual concerns for fraud are shaped a desire for their preferred candidate to win. These results offer insights that might be applied more broadly to questions of perceptions of electoral integrity and procedural fairness in democracies.     

The Philippines’ Arbitration Pleading Bodes Ill for SouthChina Sea Disputes

正THE Philippines submitted on March 30 a memorial to the arbitral tribunal at The Hague,urging it to invalidate China’s"nine-dash line"in the South China Sea.The Philippines first initiated arbitral proceedings against China over the     

The mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties and decompose it into a mechanical and a psychological effect. We study the case of Morocco, whose local elections afford a rare opportunity to uncover the causal effect of the legal threshold, using a differences-in-differences approach. Our results show a large effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties. We find a large psychological effect in absolute terms: a 3% increase in the legal threshold leaves almost one effective party out of the council for purely strategic reasons. We conjecture that this large effect is due to the lack of institutionalization and programmaticness of most Moroccan parties.     

民主党派利益代表机制研究

利益是政党活动的核心,政党政治是实现各种复杂的社会利益最权威的活动.在我国,民主党派参政虽然是民主的政治活动,但也必然围绕着利益展开活动,其核心就在于如何在实现该政党所代表的阶层的政治、经济利益的同时保证不同社会阶层之间利益的公正协调.因此,充分发挥参政党的利益代表功能,趋利弊害,对于实现社会和谐与均衡发展均有重要意义.本文从上述视角出发,着重探讨了民主党派利益代表机制的基本内涵以及其顺利实现对社会和谐的意义.     

Conservative Constituency Parties' Funding and Spending in England and Wales, 2004–2005

Under new regulations established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 , data are now available—through the Electoral Commission—on the income, expenditure and financial health of constituency political parties. These cover all parties with an annual turnover of £25,000 or more. The returns from 263 Conservative constituency party units in England and Wales for 2004 and 2005 (the latter being a general election year) are analysed here, showing that not only are very few wealthy but that a majority implicitly operate with an annual turnover below the defined threshold. Sources of income and patterns of expenditure are analysed, as are the patterns of large donations (which have to be separately reported). In general, the greatest turnover is to be found in marginal constituencies.     

Institutional determinants of the largest seat share

The degree of predominance of the largest party in a representative assembly affects government formation and survival. The seat share of the largest party, in turn, is constrained by the interaction of assembly size and electoral district magnitude in the following way. When all S seats in an assembly are allocated in districts of magnitude M, a logical quantitative model proposes that the largest fractional share is s₁ = (MS)^−1/8. As a curve, the model is found to fit with R² = 0.509, considering data from the averages of 46 periods in 37 countries, during which the electoral rules were essentially steady. As a worldwide average, the expression s₁(MS)^1/8 = 1 holds within 1%. Deviations from this average express the impact of various country-specific political and socio-cultural factors that can be investigated once the basic institutional constraints are controlled-for. This means that the degree of largest party predominance may be engineered to hover around a desired average by adjusting assembly size, and district magnitude, while keeping country-specific factors in mind.     

Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification

This article constructs a rational choice model of the intergenerational transmission of party identification. At a given time, identification with a party is the estimate of average future benefits from candidates of that party. Experienced voters constantly update this expectation using political events since the last realignment to predict the future in accordance with Bayes Rule. New voters, however, have no experience of their own. In Bayesian terms, they need prior beliefs. It turns out that under certain specified conditions, these young voters should rationally choose to employ parental experience to help orient themselves to politics. The resulting model predicts several well–known features of political socialization, including the strong correlation between parents' and children's partisanship, the greater partisan independence of young voters, and the tendency of partisan alignments to decay.