This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.
Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons. 相似文献
Prosecution in England and Wales, traditionally private, was captured by the 'new police', creating an 'English tradition' unlike those of the rest of the United Kingdom. To overcome consequent problems, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recommended the 'Philips principle', whereby investigator and prosecutor were separate, but co-ordinate, on which basis the Crown Prosecution Service was set up. However, the principle was in fact compromised by the 'English tradition', most obviously by permitting continued police prosecution. Moreover, the Serious Fraud Office, set up shortly thereafter, contradicted the principle. Yet, HM Customs and Excise addressed its serious problems by applying the principle. The CPS itself encountered difficulties flowing from the compromises. Reports (Runciman, Narey, Glidewell) recommended various devices, straining the principle, until the Auld Report recognised that reformulation was necessary, along the lines adopted elsewhere in the United Kingdom, that is, by recognising that there should be investigator subordination to prosecutor. 相似文献
