我国公司法定类型的反思及逻辑建构

自公司诞生以来,公司这一组织形式就受到各国商业实践和立法的特别重视。各国商事立法均对公司类型加以规定,并分门别类地对公司设立、股东权利、公司治理等进行相应规范。虽然商事逻辑的共通性拉近了各国立法上的公司类型,但各国在公司法定类型及相应公司规制上的差异仍旧鲜明。这也反映在我国学界对公司法定类型的争议上。我国公司法定类型改革应坚持本土商业实践逻辑,并确保改革成本最小化。由此,保留有限责任公司和股份有限公司,并按公司规模大小进一步区分出大型公司与小型公司,就成为理性选择的结果。具体而言,在有限责任公司中,增设大型公司,明确大型公司认定标准,并在公司机关设置、财务会计制度等方面给予相对严格的例外规定;在股份有限公司中,增设小型公司,对其赋予更加灵活、便捷的自治,并将上市公司扩增为公众公司。     

语义Web服务发现研究及其在公安系统集成中的应用

目前公安各业务系统之间存在信息不能有效共享和利用、缺乏智能性等问题,引入语义Web服务,可较好地实现公安系统间智能、自动的交互。而针对语义Web服务发现,如何能高效地找到所需的服务一直是研究热点。基于语义功能匹配和服务质量筛选的Web服务发现方案,能有效地并较精确地找到用户所需的服务。以公安基础信息交换平台建设项目的实际需求为背景,通过公安某部门的一个运行实例说明该方法的执行,同时以模拟试验验证算法发现服务准确性。     

Elements of Successful Change: The Service Tasmania Experience to Public Sector Reform

For Tasmanians accessing Government services has traditionally required visits to various Lead Agency locations, as service delivery was fragmented and bureaucratic. The Tasmanian Government adopted a customer‐focused approach implementing ‘Service Tasmania’ a One‐Stop‐Shop service delivery concept. This paper investigates what led to the success of this public service reform and in particular what change management practices were applied during the change effort. Ten common factors of successful change have been identified in the literature; these are explored determining their relevance throughout this initiative. Data were collected with semi‐structured interviews conducted with 63 staff plus senior management. Data were analysed using a grounded theory approach and open coding was applied during the first pass through the data to reach the initial codes identifying critical terms and generic key issues. Findings confirm that several management interventions were necessary to address resistance and conflict issues and keep the government reform project on track.     

公务员精神与公务员制度

公务员精神来源于公务员制度的本质规定。具有中国特色的社会主义公务员制度决定了中国公务员精神与西方公务员精神既有相同之处,又在“政治中立”这一点上有着根本的区别。随着中国特色社会主义公务员制度的不断完善,公务员精神的内涵也应当不断丰富和发展。公务员精神体现了公务员制度中的爱国主义、集体主义、职业精神和时代精神。当前最为迫切的就是以个人自律、组织教育、制度控制、环境制约等为主要途径,从精神、制度与方法的有机结合上促使每个公务员真正成为“公务员精神”的实践者和体现者。     

A Comparative Analysis of SME Friendly Public Procurement: Results from Canada,Hungary and Italy

This paper studies SMEs’ participation in public procurement in light of perceived barriers and expected benefits of accessing the public marketplace. It presents a comparative analysis of SMEs’ participation in three countries that share similar approaches to SME-friendly public procurement. A common survey protocol was developed to be administered to SMEs in the three countries. Data collected were then analysed using regression methods. Findings suggest that some issues that are typically considered critical barriers, namely administrative requirements and award based on lowest price do not hinder participation. However, findings also suggest that firms’ characteristics associated with size are still relevant hindrances, and that SMEs’ involvement are affected by a shortage of tangible (human and financial) and intangible resources (experience). These findings provide guidance to fine-tune public procurement policies directed to SMEs.     

CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS IN NPM

Global developments have meant that nations increasingly compete on a variety of levels.[1] The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, vol. I and II. OECD, Paris, 1997. [Google Scholar]The basis of competition between nations is not only in terms of market share, but also in the scale, shape and role of their public sectors and the regulatory regimes that are emerging within them. Since the early 1980s there has been growth in industrialised economies and increasing attempts across a large number of different jurisdictions to scale down and reform the large public sectors characteristic of the old Soviet bloc countries and to a lesser extent ‘welfarist’ social democratic regimes.     

With Strings Attached? Improving the Administration of Central State Financed Investment Projects in the PRC

This article takes a new look at the institutional core of China's economic planning—the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC, 1998–2003)—focusing on its role in approving and fundraising for major capital investment projects. The primary objective of this inquiry is to identify changes in the network structure and procedures of inter-agency relations and central planners’ interactions with national legislators, which have produced a diversity of ‘organizational microclimates’ that shape the coherence of the national economic bureaucracy and central–local fiscal relations. Based on interviews of high-level officials and case studies of investment projects in energy, information technology, and transport sectors, it is argued that administrative reforms aiming to improve SDPC's regulatory capacity have been predicated on a concerted effort by key agencies and ministries under the State Council to reduce the window of opportunity for local and industrial interests to politicize capital allocation decisions. This finding suggests caution in interpreting contemporary China through the comparative lenses of a developmental state, a regulatory state, or a fiscal federalist system.     

Actions by Political Officials Have Weakened the Federal Government Workplace: Downsizing Has Cut Lower Level Workers the Most and Replacing Federal Employees with Private Corporations Costs Much More,Creating the Need for Immediate Reform

Abstract

The authors of this paper are four practitioners each of whom has many years of experience working in the Federal government and also has pursued doctoral studies in public or business administration. Three ideas developed in this paper are that: (1) the Federal civil service has been changed from being a model workplace to a much less desirable one; (2) although downsizing has been touted as an efficiency and economy measure, lower level employees experienced the most cuts and (3) the current practice of replacing Federal employees with private corporations costs much more. Over the past two decades private sector workplaces in the United States, and now the Federal government workplace, have experienced so much change that previous theories, concepts, models, and expectations no longer hold. Just as private industry workplaces have been changed by downsizing, reorganizations, mergers, elimination of middle management, and outsourcing, so, too, has the Federal government workplace been fundamentally altered. Reducing the number of government workers, replacing Federal employees with private firms, increasing the number of officials with political agendas, and using harsh personnel management practices have transfigured the Federal workplace. Examples of factors that have contributed to a changed workplace include: the Civil Service Reform Act which replaced the Civil Service Commission with the Office of Personnel Management; importing private sector approaches into the government, e.g., the Grace Commission; replacing the Civil Service Retirement System with the Federal Employees Retirement System; pressure to downsize and privatize; and many elements of the National Performance Review and Government Performance and Results Act. Now that the metamorphosis away from the traditional Civil Service borne of the Pendleton Act is nearly complete (although the new paradigm is not entirely clear), questions about the effects of a changed government workplace are being raised. Some people believe the metamorphosis is from a caterpillar to a butterfly, while others think the opposite. Whether the changed Federal government is a thing of beauty or a distasteful organism will be determined over time by observations and assessments of the effects of the change. These effects will be both internal to the government workplace, itself, and external to it, involving the products, services, outputs, and outcomes it produces. This paper begins by describing some of the politically mandated changes that have altered the very foundation of the Federal government workplace over the past 20 years and made it a much less desirable place to work. Next, some of the effects of two politically mandated changes are examined: (1) downsizing or reducing the number of Americans who can work for their government and (2) contracting out or replacing government workers with private corporations. Political officials have told the media and the American public that these changes were needed to improve the government's efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. It has been suggested that these initiatives will reduce costs. However, an examination of downsizing and contracting out shows the opposite effect. While overall the Federal government has fewer employees now than in 1961, the statistics indicate that lower level employees have been cut the most:

• The number of secretaries decreased by 39% between 1992 and 1998.

• The blue collar workforce is down 40% since 1982, e.g., Supply Clerical and Technician (?35%), Accounting Technician (?24%), and Electronics Mechanic (?41%).

• Between 1993 and 1998 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 employees fell from 767,000 to 594,000.

• In 1983 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 workers exceeded GS‐11 to GS‐15 by nearly 300,000, while in 1997 GS‐11 to GS‐15 outnumbered the lower level workers by 44,000.

Although authoritative cost comparison studies are difficult to conduct because top officials have made little provision to collect information on the cost of contracting with private firms or the number of contract employees, available information indicates that it is much more expensive than using government employees. The contracting out we are talking about is not the usual kind—building ships or planes, or acquiring computer systems or special expertise not available in the government. Rather, it is contracting with private firms to do jobs that are currently being performed by Federal employees. Not satisfied with the level at which firms are being substituted for Federal employees, actions by political officials have created an environment which now favors private corporations and where they can be given work at top management's discretion, often regardless of cost. In fact, today most contracting out is done without the use of Circular A‐76 Cost Comparison Studies. There is empirical and logical evidence that shows that replacing government employees with private corporations is more expensive. For example, a study by the Department of the Army documents what people close to contracting have always known—that it is far more expensive to contract with a private firm for work than to have Federal employees do it. Logically, the government incurs additional items of cost when replacing Federal employees with private corporations. First, there is the profit that goes to the firm. Second, there is the firm's overhead which pays for corporate offices, staffs, and CEOs. Third, there are the costs of the contracting and award process and of contract administration and management. Although the worker on a government contract may be paid a little less than a government worker, the cost of the worker is only a third to a half of what the government pays the firm. Thus, replacing government workers with private firms usually costs far more and it is not unusual for it to cost two to three times as much. This paper partly is based on the authors' long experience in the Federal government. It is not based on the organizations in which they are currently employed.     

New Public Management and Democratic Participation: Complementary or Competing Reforms? A South African Study

Abstract

Administrative and participatory reforms are common in developing countries, often introduced together and expected to complement each other. Some observers question whether the reforms do complement each other, however, specifically suggesting that the two types reflect different relational and governance patterns. Based on such thought, a “differential relationship influence hypothesis” is presented and tested, investigating whether new public management (NPM) reforms complement or compete with democratic‐participatory reforms. Econometric analysis of survey data shows that South African municipalities adopt NPM reforms more readily when influenced by top–down intergovernmental relationships but adopt participatory reforms more readily when faced with bottom–up civic influences. This evidence supports the hypothesis and indicates that administrative and participatory reforms may not complement each other. The study also indicates a common administrative culture effect on both types of reform adoption—differential relational influences can be tempered by experimental and change‐minded administrators in local governments.     

Team Characteristics and Team Member Knowledge,Skills, and Ability Relationships to the Effectiveness of Cross‐Functional Teams in the Public Sector

Abstract

This study examines members of cross‐functional teams in the public sector for the necessary knowledge, skills, and ability (KSA) to be effective team members. It was determined that members of cross‐functional teams in the public sector possess the necessary KSA to perform effectively. The following characteristics are statistically significant factors: (1) years of professional work experience; (2) frequency of team participation; (3) the type of team training, i.e., collaboration and performance management; and (4) situational entry to team assignments (volunteered, assigned, requested), specifically volunteer and requested. The findings are significant in that managers within the government have some guidelines on team formation. They now know who should be team members, team members should be volunteers, and management should ensure that the team members have specific training in the areas of team collaboration and performance management. The findings are significant for employees as well. To acquire experience, employees should be interested in participating in a team environment (i.e., volunteering for the assignment). They should participate on numerous teams, so that they can become more effective as team members. Employees should acquire training in specific team skills (i.e., collaboration and performance management) to help them better understand how to work within the team and the team members and get results.