Do Russian research universities have a secret mission? a response to Forrat

This paper challenges the central claim of Natalia Forrat’s article that university support programs under Putin targeted the suppression of anti-regime student mobilization. Empirical evidence, both on the national-policy level and on the level of higher education institutions, suggests that the government introduced support programs in order to establish a research capacity at Russian flagship universities and to develop a more competitive national science system. The low level of students’ political engagement can rather be attributed to the outdated structures of student representation, inherited from the Soviet period.     

The political economy of Russian higher education: why does Putin support research universities?

This article argues that Vladimir Putin's regime launched support programs for the leading Russian universities in 2005 because of a perceived threat of the political mobilization of youth, similar to the one that triggered “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. The support programs created cleavages in the university community, covered an attack on university autonomy, and made the containment of possible anti-regime student mobilization a part of an implicit agreement between the regime and the universities. The historical coincidence of the “demographic hole,” which caused a shrinkage of the higher education market, and high oil prices, which provided the necessary resources for the regime, made this implicit agreement possible. The article contributes to the research on authoritarianism, youth mobilization, authoritarian backlash after the color revolutions, and the development of research universities in Russia.     

Resurgent authoritarianism: the case of Russia's new NGO legislation

Following the protest demonstrations of the 2011–2012 electoral cycle, tensions between the limited modernization efforts of Medvedev and the resurgent authoritarianism of Putin have become increasingly manifest. These are seen not only in the relationship between society and the state, but also in the “para-constitutional” institutions of the dual state. This article argues that whereas Medvedev created an arena for liberalization within these para-constitutional structures, Putin has firmly rejected these policies, among other things by revising the 1995 law on NGOs amended in 2006. Using the perspective of the dual state, the article argues that with the introduction of the Law on Foreign Agents (2012), the original law draft On Public Control (2014), a key element in Medvedev's modernization program, was delayed and substantially altered. Together, these amendments create precarious conditions for NGOs, pressuring their independence by threats of dissolution and reducing the quality of civil control over state organs.     

Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches

Abstract

Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.     

Against All Odds? Russia’s Financial Crisis and Global Geopolitics

Over the past 15 years, Russia’s model of political-economy has evolved around three main channels of global economic integration: 1) export of natural resources and a national system of redistribution of export revenues; 2) financialisation, acting as a boost for domestic consumption/demand; and 3) the offshore integration of Russian capital into global capital markets. The current crisis is affecting all three channels of Russia’s global political economy. Together, reduced export revenues, the deepening financial crisis and the dominance of offshore-sourced investments into Russia, serve as crisis transmission mechanisms, and thus constitute three sets of (inter-related) dilemmas for the Russian authorities. Four scenarios of possible development of the current situation are provided.     

俄罗斯的反恐对策及借鉴

俄罗斯是恐怖主义犯罪的重灾区,其完备的反恐立法、全面的反恐措施、艰辛的反恐实践为世界各国提供了反恐样本。与之相比,我国要加强对恐怖主义犯罪的打击力度,尚需要制定统一的反恐法,建立完善的反恐危机管理机制,实施“堵”、“控”策略,扩大国际合作。     

The rise and fall of “Novorossiya”: examining support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine

In the spring of 2014, some anti-Maidan protestors in southeast Ukraine, in alliance with activists from Russia, agitated for the creation of a large separatist entity on Ukrainian territory. These efforts sought to revive a historic region called Novorossiya (“New Russia”) on the northern shores of the Black Sea that was created by Russian imperial colonizers. In public remarks, Vladimir Putin cited Novorossiya as a historic and contemporary home of a two-part interest group, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, supposedly under threat in Ukraine. Anti-Maidan agitation in Ukraine gave way to outright secession in April 2014, as armed rebel groups established the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhans’k People’s Republic on parts of the eponymous Ukrainian oblasts. Rebel leaders aspired to create a renewed Novorossiya that incorporated all of eastern and southern Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odesa oblasts. To examine the level of support for this secessionist imaginary in the targeted oblasts, our large scientific poll in December 2014 revealed the Novorossiya project had minority support, between 20 and 25% of the population. About half of the sample believed that the concept of Novorossiya was a “historical myth” and that its resuscitation and promotion was the result of “Russian political technologies.” Analysis of the responses by socio-demographic categories indicated that for ethnic Russians, residents of the oblasts of Kharkiv and Odesa, for older and poorer residents, and especially for those who retain a nostalgic positive opinion about the Soviet Union, the motivations and aims of the Novorossiya project had significant support.     

Russia’s economic policy in 2015–2016: the imperative of structural reform

In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, we have seen uneven development in the leading advanced and emerging economies, new models of economic growth that vary from country to country, uncertain prospects for globalization and challenges of “regional globalization,” looming currency re-configurations, as well as shifting energy price dynamics and their influence on political and economic prospects of particular states. This paper discusses current challenges for social and economic policy in the context of the history of the past 30 years. With reference to Russia, it focuses on a new growth model, structural transformation (including import-substitution issues), economic dynamics, fiscal and monetary concerns, and social issues. It concludes by addressing the priorities of economic policy.     

Political actors,preferences and election rule re-design in Russia and Ukraine

Institutional designers, international organizations and post-Soviet political actors have directed considerable attention to the design and conduct of elections in postcommunist states. This article explores the nature of electoral system re-design by investigating the motives and interactions of legislators, parties and presidents. Following the veto players literature, the analysis focuses on the determinants of policy stability and change. The process of institutional re-design is evaluated in two cases: the successful introduction of the Law on Political Parties in Russia and unsuccessful attempts at major election reform in Ukraine. The article shows that the outcomes of policy reform processes in these 'superpresidential' systems were not solely determined by presidential preferences. Rather, to fully understand election system re-design, it is critical to evaluate the preferences of all relevant veto players.     

中、俄、蒙三国的油气合作

中国处于石油资源相对贫乏的东亚西太平洋区域,总体石油资源不足;俄罗斯东西伯利亚和远东地区的石油和天然气储量丰富,蒙古石油矿藏集中在中蒙两国边界地区,这为中、俄、蒙的油气合作提供了可能,并且从蒙古直接穿过进入中国的中俄石油管道是最近、最安全的线路。从未来发展的趋势看,中国可积极利用俄蒙的资源投资与合作,参与输气、输油管道的建设,拓宽和夯实中俄油气合作的经济基础。