Family systems in central Russia in the 1830s and 1890s

Czap, Moon, and Mironov have suggested that two regional models for the rural family existed side by side in 19th-century Russia. This article approaches the question by examining the rural family as a statistically describable system occurring in a given economic and institutional context. The material applies to 8 local communities representing central Russia in the 1830s and 11 in the 1890s, the majority being the same communities in both cases. The aim is to determine from the household arrangements, economies, and institutional frameworks of these communities the kind of context in which a certain family system occurred. By relating these conclusions to data on the economic circumstances and social structures of the different parts of central Russia, two regional family systems are identified. Czap's “Eastern European family type” predominated in this area in the 1830s. Because the reforms and reorientation of economic activities in the 1860s brought about changes in household arrangements, however, a pattern characteristic of communities with a substantial degree of social stratification became the norm for most of the area.     

Peasant and hunter households in Oulanka,northern Russia, 1710–1910

This article examines the family system prevailing among the population of a parish in the subarctic zone of northern Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries. At the beginning of the period, the Oulanka area was occupied by Lapps, who lived chiefly by hunting, and Karelians engaged in agriculture. Although the Lapps later reverted to a more permanent way of life, the area still possessed two distinct communities with differences in their economies. This research relies on demographic sources such as taxation records, nominal censuses, and parish confessional lists.

A high proportion of large, complex households was typical of the population of the area throughout the period studied. The shaping of the family system was crucially affected by the desire of the inhabitants to ensure the vitality of their households by pursuing several labor-intensive forms of economic activity simultaneously. Although the inhabitants were not serfs, their choice of the optimal ways of organizing their lives in different situations was to a great extent determined by the obligations placed upon them by the government. The similarities between the family system prevailing in Oulanka in the 19th century and that observed in ethnic Russians in general are presumably attributable to the fact that both populations came under the same judicial system.     

Does everyday corruption affect how Russians view their political leadership?

Do Russians’ personal experiences with corruption influence how they evaluate their political leaders and, if so, in what direction? In addressing this question, we focus specifically on small-scale corruption that arises when Russians encounter employees of service provision organizations. We analyze survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person’s support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Being involved in corrupt transactions reduces support for the regime through two indirect mechanisms: by making the political leadership’s performance seem worse and by heightening perceptions that corruption is widespread among the country’s leaders. We find no support for arguments in the literature that bribery and other forms of bureaucratic corruption help citizens pursue their needs in the face of inefficient state institutions and less developed economies. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime.     

Testing for sources of electoral competition under authoritarianism: an analysis of Russia’s gubernatorial elections

What drives electoral competition in competitive authoritarian regimes? Most scholarship has assumed that the outcome of these elections is decided by regime manipulation alone. Using three rounds of newly reinstated gubernatorial elections in Russia’s regions, I test this assumption. I identify three distinct measures of competition calibrated to authoritarian elections and assess whether voter preferences or regime manipulation best explain the degree of electoral competition. Relying on new data on protests across Russia’s regions, I find that regions with high protest activity have more contested elections with narrower margins of victory. The results also confirm recent scholarship highlighting the importance of voter turnout for delivering pro-regime victories.     

Is Putin’s popularity real?

Vladimir Putin has managed to achieve strikingly high public approval ratings throughout his time as president and prime minister of Russia. But is his popularity real, or are respondents lying to pollsters? We conducted a series of list experiments in early 2015 to estimate support for Putin while allowing respondents to maintain ambiguity about whether they personally do so. Our estimates suggest support for Putin of approximately 80%, which is within 10 percentage points of that implied by direct questioning. We find little evidence that these estimates are positively biased due to the presence of floor effects. In contrast, our analysis of placebo experiments suggests that there may be a small negative bias due to artificial deflation. We conclude that Putin’s approval ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russian citizens.     

The September 2015 Regional Elections in Russia: A Rehearsal for Next Year's National Legislative Races

The September 2015 elections in the regions of Russia resulted in victories for the major pro-government party, United Russia, in 11 regional legislative elections and brought success to incumbent chief executives in 21 gubernatorial elections. The performance of United Russia was better than in the previous series of regional elections, which is particularly important given that in many respects, the 2015 regional elections served as a rehearsal for the 2016 national legislative races. The results of the elections generally attested to the efficiency of political and institutional manipulation tools developed by the Russian authorities in recent years.     

Notes on Visit to Russia

正At the invitation of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies,Russian Academy of Science(RAS),a 6-member CAFIU delegation led by Deputy Secretary-general Zheng Yao visited Russia from June 19-22,2014.Though the short visit,the delegation held in-depth exchanges with a number of Russian NGOs and think tanks with a view to increasing understanding and exploring cooperation.Both sides also exchanged views on a     

Russian and Soviet forensic psychiatry: Troubled and troubling

Russian forensic psychiatry is defined by its troubled and troubling relationship to an unstable state, a state that was not a continuous entity during the modern era. From the mid-nineteenth century, Russia as a nation-state struggled to reform, collapsed, re-constituted itself in a bloody civil war, metastasized into a violent “totalitarian” regime, reformed and stagnated under “mature socialism” and then embraced capitalism and “managed democracy” at the end of the twentieth century. These upheavals had indelible effects on policing and the administration of justice, and on psychiatry's relationship with them. In Russia, physicians specializing in medicine of the mind had to cope with rapid and radical changes of legal and institutional forms, and sometimes, of the state itself. Despite this challenging environment, psychiatrists showed themselves to be active professionals seeking to guide the transformations that inevitably touched their work. In the second half of the nineteenth century debates about the role of psychiatry in criminal justice took place against a backdrop of increasingly alarming terrorist activity, and call for revolution. While German influence, with its preference for hereditarianism, was strong, Russian psychiatry was inclined toward social and environmental explanations of crime. When revolution came in 1917, the new communist regime quickly institutionalized forensic psychiatry. In the aftermath of revolution, the institutionalization of forensic psychiatry “advanced” with each turn of the state's transformation, with profound consequences for practitioners' independence and ethical probity. The abuses of Soviet psychiatry under Stalin and more intensively after his death in the 1960s–80s remain under-researched and key archives are still classified. The return to democracy since the late 1980s has seen mixed results for fresh attempts to reform both the justice system and forensic psychiatric practice.     

Russian PNR system: Data protection issues and global prospects

The usage of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for security purposes is growing worldwide. At least six countries have PNR systems; over thirty are planning to introduce them. On 1 December 2013, a Russian PNR system will be implemented. But enhanced collection of personal data leads to increased surveillance and privacy concerns. Russian authorities state that passengers' rights will be respected, but a closer look at the Russian regime reveals a number of critical points. From a global perspective, the Russian regime is only one of many PNR systems, including new ones to come in the future. Apparently, for the majority of them, similar challenges and problems will apply. At the same time, for the EU, with its strict data protection requirements, PNR requests by third countries (i.e. non-EU countries) create conflicts of laws. In order to resolve them, the EU concludes bilateral PNR agreements. However, the current deals, especially the one between the EU and the USA, involve a number of weaknesses. Accepting the latter, and having a pending proposal on the EU PNR system, the EU has weakened its position in negotiations with third countries. How will the EU deal with the Russian as well as with all the future requests for PNR? This paper provides legal analysis of the Russian PNR regime, pointing out common problems and giving prognosis on the global situation.     

APEC–A Boost for Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation

正THE Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,APEC,is the highest-level inter-governmental mechanism for economic cooperation in the AsiaPacific region.China and Russia,who joined in 1991 and 1998 respectively as sovereign states,have deepened bilateral economic cooperation and that with other nations in the region on this important platform.With the steady improvement in their national strength,the two countries now have