金融危机下中东欧转型模式再评估

新兴市场国家经济与政治体制转型是转型问题研究的焦点,而中东欧国家的转型模式也作为一个范例持续得到来自理论和实证研究上的关注.本研究以金融危机发生、演化为背景,旨在检测金融危机背景下中东欧国家的整体经济表现与金融市场表现,并通过分析对国际学术界公认的"转型优等生"中东欧国家的转型模式进行再评估和反思.     

俄罗斯问题的西方表述——关于欧美俄苏研究导论

在国际学术界和国际政治领域,俄罗斯问题是一个很复杂的概念.之所以如此,远不只是俄国本身的文明结构之复杂性所致,更有西方的独特表述之原因.影响西方对俄罗斯问题表述的,是因为西方自身的欧洲中心论、欧美所建构的"西方"概念及其在国际和俄国所产生的反应、对俄罗斯问题进行斯拉夫-俄国-苏联学研究等,这些原因从不同方面促成了西方对俄罗斯问题的认知和判断远不同于俄国,既时有谬误,又始终有着主体意识、独特发现.     

广东高职院校创新性技能人才培养模式研究

培养创新性技能人才,是时代发展和社会进步对高职教育提出的新要求。广东高职教育作为广东高等教育大众化的主体,伴随着珠三角地区的产业结构升级和调整,企业加大了创新性技能人才的需要。而当前高职创新性技能人才培养的不足,导致广东省高职创新性人才培养不能满足社会经济发展的需求。因此,要适应时代发展和社会进步的要求,广东高职院校需要构建创新性人才培养模式,增加创新课程开发,加强校企合作,改革教育考核模式来提高学生的创新能力。     

Stage model for female criminals: business school students’ perceptions of white-collar offenders

We know that half of the population in Norway is female, and we know that females represent 6% of the white-collar crime prison population. In the stage model overview, we derive percentages from the literature into the gender model to explain stepwise reduction from 50% to 6%. In our empirical research, we asked two groups of business school students to come up with their own estimates for the stages in the model for female criminals. While estimates from executive students resulted in 3% women in prison, bachelor students’ estimates resulted in 10% women in prison. The most obvious discrepancy between the research literature and our two survey groups is related to relative convictions. Based on the literature, we suggested that female defendants receive more serious convictions because they may perceive and feel more guilt for a crime, for example in terms of regret, shame and depression. Thus women may have a tendency to confess more easily. Both executive students and bachelor students disagree with this estimate of 140%, as they suggest 62% and 69% respectively. One reason for their suggestion of less serious convictions for female white-collar criminals – sometimes labelled pink-collar criminals – might be that family situation and other elements are taken into account before a verdict is passed on a woman. Another substantial discrepancy is related to detection risk. The literature suggests a low detection risk for women, but may be not as low as we estimated at 30%. Both executive and bachelor students believe that the gender difference in detection likelihood is not that formidable, as they suggest 75% and 65% respectively.     

劳模精神、劳动精神和工匠精神探析

党的十八大以来,在习近平总书记关于工人阶级和工会工作的系列重要讲话中,多次强调要坚 持弘扬劳模精神、劳动精神、工匠精神。认真领会劳模精神、劳动精神、工匠精神的科学内涵以及它们之间的 逻辑关系,对于实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦、增强文化自信和全面提升我国产业工人队伍整体素质有着重 大的理论价值和现实意义。劳模精神和劳动精神是整体和部分的关系,劳模精神和工匠精神是外力和内力的关系, 劳动精神和工匠精神是共性和个性的关系。总之,劳动精神,工匠精神,劳模精神存在逐步递进的逻辑。劳动 精神是成为人的精神,工匠精神是成为更加优秀的人的精神,劳模精神则是成为影响别人的人的精神。     

Attitudes towards highly skilled and low‐skilled immigration in Europe: A survey experiment in 15 European countries

To what extent do economic concerns drive anti‐migrant attitudes? Key theoretical arguments extract two central motives: increased labour market competition and the fiscal burden linked to the influx of migrants. This article provides new evidence regarding the impact of material self‐interest on attitudes towards immigrants. It reports the results of a survey experiment embedded in representative surveys in 15 European countries before and after the European refugee crisis in 2014. As anticipated by the fiscal burden argument, it is found that rich natives prefer highly skilled over low‐skilled migration more than low‐income respondents do. Moreover, the study shows that these tax concerns among the wealthy are stronger if fiscal exposure to migration is high. No support is found for the labour market competition argument predicting that natives will be most opposed to migrants with similar skills. The results suggest that highly skilled migrants are preferred over low‐skilled migrants irrespective of natives’ skill levels.     

“三种精神”引领职工文化自信

职工文化自信是文化自信的具体体现,打造健康文明、昂扬向上的职工文化,离不开工人阶级和广大劳动群众的伟大品格,离不开工匠精神、劳模精神和劳动精神。这三种精神,是新时代职工文化建设的旗帜,是新时代职工文化自信的引领。     

Soviet legacies,organized crime,and economic gangsterism: Russia, 1995–2010

In countries like Russia, where legal institutions providing political accountability and protection of property rights are weak, some elite actors accept the use of violence as a tool in political and economic competition. The intensity of this violent exposure may vary depending on the position the province had had in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. The higher the province's position before 1991, the greater the intensity of business violence one is likely to observe there in post-communist times, because the Soviet collapse left a more gaping power vacuum and lack of working informal rules in regions with limited presence of traditional criminal organizations. Post-Soviet entrepreneurs also often find it worthwhile to run for office or financially back certain candidates in order to secure a privileged status and the ability to interpret the law in their favor. Businessmen-candidates themselves and their financial backers behind the scenes may become exposed to competitive pressures resulting in violence during election years, because their competitors may find it hard to secure their position in power through the existing legal or informal non-violent means. To test whether Soviet legacies and Provincial elections indeed cause spikes in commerce-motivated violence, this project relies on an original dataset of more than 6000 attacks involving business interests in 74 regions of Russia, in 1991–2010. The results show that only legislative elections cause increases in violence while there is no firm evidence that executive polls have a similar effect.     

Obtaining redress for abuse of office in Russia: The Soviet legacy and the long road to administrative justice

This article examines the options for redressing abuse of office available to citizens in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. I consider the courts, the procuracy, and the complaint mechanism as sites for citizens to lodge claims against abuse of office in late-Soviet and post-Soviet times. After the collapse of the Soviet system there was an attempt to overcome the Soviet legacy, to strengthen legal institutions and establish administrative justice. Analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet normative documents and statistical data allows us to argue that opportunities for Russian citizens to combat service crimes in the courts have improved substantially. However, the system for coping with abuse of office remains imperfect, and retains features of the Soviet legacy despite vague legislation about administrative justice and dual ways of coping with abuse through legal and quasi-legal mechanisms. The re-establishment of the complaint mechanism in the conditions of contemporary Russia exacerbates this imperfection. Overall, the complaint mechanism occupies a significant place in people's options for making claims against officials, especially claims against high-ranking officials.