非公有制企业应当实行职工代表大会制度

原先公有制企业实行的职工代表大会制度是具有中国特色的工人参与企业管理的一种形式。若干年来,职工代表大会制度对维护职工合法权益、促进企业和基层民主的发展产生并继续产生着重要的作用。职工代表大会不仅适用于非公有制企业,而且应当成为非公有制企业民主管理的基本形式。     

新时期高校教代会制度建设的思考

高校教代会在新世纪、新阶段必须与时俱进,紧跟高校改革发展的步伐,不断充实和完善教代会制度建设,建立与之相匹配,更详细、具体,操作性强的一套工作制度,才能适应新时期、新形势对高等教育快速发展的新形势和加强政治文明建设的新需要。     

Politicians,Scandals, and Trust in Government

In this paper we examine the role that political scandals play in eroding regard for government and political institutions in general. We know that scandals can lower regard for individual politicians and government leaders. Yet, less is known about how scandal influences attitudes toward institutions and the political process. It has been widely assumed that such attitudes are influenced by factors that lie largely beyond the control of individual politicians. Using data from the U.S. and the U.K. we show that scandals involving legislators can have a negative influence on their constituent's attitudes toward institutions and the political process. One consequence of this finding is that, instead of looking for scapegoats in Hollywood or among the failings of voters themselves, politicians should first get their own House in order.     

马克思主义中国化的理论新篇章——谈十六大的理论创新

党的十六大有许多理论创新,集中体现在五个方面马克思主义中国化理论新成果、治党治国规律认识新境界、发展战略新阶段、社会主义现代化事业发展新思路、党建理论新发展.     

论人大个案监督的政治资源与行动策略

以中国各级人民代表大会在实际政治运作中的地位和作用为出发点,以政治资源及由此产生的政治策略为主要研究视角,将个案监督看作人大的创新性职权行使方式之一,力图探究人大及其常委会在监督司法机关时采用个案监督方式的原因所在。认为,人大及其常委会职能的发挥受到党的领导、社会舆论、宪法及法律规定等3方面的影响,这既限制了人大及其常委会的行动范围,又为其行使职权提供了强有力的支持,从而决定性地塑造着各级人大的行为模式。个案监督就是人大诸多职权行使的新方式之一,集中体现了当前中国人大的行为模式和行为特点。     

构筑和谐温馨的精神家园——十七大文化发展战略思想解读

民世纪，中国共产党先后实行了“革命文化”、“改革文化”两大战略。新世纪，党的十七大根据新的时代要求，确立“和谐文化”战略，对内倡导建设“和谐社会”，对外倡导建构“和谐世界”，坚持以“保障人民文化权益，提高国家文化软实力”为文化建设的战略重点，为“更加自觉、更加主动地推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣”，“兴起社会主义文化建设新高潮”，构筑和谐温馨的人类精神家园指明了前进方向。     

From Apalachin to the Buffalo Project: Obstacles on the path to effective federal responses to organized crime, 1957–1967

The Apalachin meeting of recognized underworld leaders from cities across the USA was held in upstate New York on November 14, 1957. The event, well known to historians and justice system officials, has become a textbook case rarely examined for its larger context of how American government officials learned to confront the organization and strength of the American Mafia, later called La Cosa Nostra (LCN). From 1957 to 1967, three presidents, four attorneys general, and hundreds of federal agents and prosecutors traveled an obstacle-filled path toward investigating, indicting, prosecuting, and convicting Apalachin attendees and their successors. Steps were taken to challenge the power of the mob during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, but they were consistently plagued by false starts, frustrations, and side steps. Each obstacle further instructed policy makers, however, on the need for an intensive and coordinated effort grounded in common goals and interagency cooperation. This article considers six key obstacles to the decade-long quest for a concerted federal initiative against organized crime. It examines how the characteristics and the impact of each obstacle contributed to a meandering and slothful federal response to the Mafia’s power. Lessons learned about how to effectively attack the mob were finally implemented in May 1966 when President Johnson institutionalized Executive agency cooperation, making the Attorney General (AG) the focal point in the war on organized crime. One element in this new initiative was known as the ‘Buffalo Project,’ an experiment commencing officially in January 1967 in Buffalo, New York to concentrate intelligence, investigations, and prosecutive resources working across bureaucratic lines to pursue guilty pleas or convictions. The Project, a closely supervised operation directed by the Justice Department’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (OCRS), was conceptualized as a small team of supervisory federal investigators and experienced prosecutors who built cases against local Mafia associates and leaders to withstand the scrutiny of the federal justice system. Assistance was also rendered by state, local, and international organizations. The Project formed a template for the DoJ Criminal Division’s Strike Force program.

论行政案卷排他原则的运作原理——听证者与决定者的统一机制

行政主体内部的管理体制,使得听证者和决定者在形式上必然是分离的。由决定者必须听证发展到听证者必须决定,再发展到案卷排他,才使得听证者和决定者达到完美的统一。而且案卷排他,通过案卷这个"隔音空间",使得机关决定和行政首长的个人决定也达到了完美的统一。最后,案卷排他,通过政策、经验和专业考量等裁量因素的入卷,使得行政首长最后的决定程序也变成了看得见的程序。     

Young adults' under-representation in elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

The U.S. House of Representatives has one of the oldest pools of politicians in the world today: the average member of the House is 58 years at the time of their election, which is about 20 years older than the average American. But why are younger adults scarce among these representatives? Here we trace the relative absence of youth in both the primary and general elections of 2020 using a supply and demand framework. Our study finds that (1) the average candidate is much older than the average citizen and (2) young candidates perform less well than older candidates in both primaries and general elections. These results suggest that youth are disadvantaged because the two main parties do not nominate enough younger adults as candidates for winnable and safe seats. Young adults also seem to be disadvantaged indirectly at the electoral stage because they lack electoral capital (experience in running for and holding office) and tend to suffer strongly from the incumbency advantage of their opponents. We infer from these findings that barring reforms to rules governing minimum candidate ages and term limits, the under-representation of youth in U.S. national-level politics will continue for the foreseeable future.     

The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering on Political Parties

The relationship between votes and seats in the legislature lies at the heart of democratic governance. However, there has been little previous work on the downstream effects of partisan gerrymandering on the health of political parties. In this study, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the impact of partisan advantage in the districting process on an array of downstream outcomes. We find that districting bias impedes numerous party functions at both the congressional and state house levels. Candidates are less likely to contest districts when their party is disadvantaged by a districting plan. Candidates that do choose to run are more likely to have weak resumes. Donors are less willing to contribute money. And ordinary voters are less apt to support the targeted party. These results suggest that gerrymandering has long-term effects on the health of the democratic process beyond simply costing or gaining parties seats in the legislature.