全文获取类型
收费全文 | 927篇 |
免费 | 38篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 38篇 |
工人农民 | 20篇 |
世界政治 | 50篇 |
外交国际关系 | 38篇 |
法律 | 258篇 |
中国共产党 | 44篇 |
中国政治 | 103篇 |
政治理论 | 214篇 |
综合类 | 200篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 2篇 |
2023年 | 16篇 |
2022年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 15篇 |
2020年 | 22篇 |
2019年 | 21篇 |
2018年 | 30篇 |
2017年 | 36篇 |
2016年 | 37篇 |
2015年 | 26篇 |
2014年 | 66篇 |
2013年 | 106篇 |
2012年 | 59篇 |
2011年 | 42篇 |
2010年 | 44篇 |
2009年 | 51篇 |
2008年 | 52篇 |
2007年 | 32篇 |
2006年 | 47篇 |
2005年 | 41篇 |
2004年 | 74篇 |
2003年 | 34篇 |
2002年 | 41篇 |
2001年 | 38篇 |
2000年 | 12篇 |
1999年 | 11篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有965条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
961.
Patrick Emmenegger Scherwin M. Bajka Cecilia Ivardi 《Swiss Political Science Review》2023,29(4):355-378
The rise of the knowledge economy challenges coordinated models of capitalism by requiring their skill formation systems to produce a workforce with higher skills. This paper examines how coordinated capitalism adapts to upskilling pressures by jointly studying general education and vocational education and training (VET) at both upper-secondary and tertiary levels. Employing a comparative research design covering German and Swiss upskilling efforts over the past 50 years, we observe important differences. Switzerland, with influential small firms and weak union presence, focuses on keeping VET an attractive option at upper-secondary level by favoring VET graduates' access to tertiary education. By contrast, Germany, marked by large firm dominance and influential unions, concentrates on expanding general education throughout and adding vocational elements later. Our analysis suggests that firms' reform preferences are conditioned by their size and political constraints to reform. 相似文献
962.
963.
Studies on policy monitoring and ministerial survival within coalition governments are usually conducted separately. In this study, we bring these topics together and argue that the strategy of coalition partners to oversee the implementation of one another's policies has surprising consequences on the duration of office-holding ministers. Our main theoretical insight suggests that the degree to which ministers behave as faithful agents of the government depends on their expectations about their partners' monitoring behavior, such that when they expect to be under high scrutiny, they moderate their drifting behavior. Using evidence from legislative information requests on the activities of individual ministers over all multiparty cabinets formed in Brazil between 1995 and 2014, we demonstrate that: (1) greater policy monitoring by coalition partners is observed under more ideologically heterogeneous cabinets, and (2) more frequent policy-monitoring efforts by coalition partners lead to a lower ministerial replacement within the government term. 相似文献
964.
This article assesses the effect of changes in the lawmaking process on the success of the president’s legislative agenda, distinguishing between within-term success (bills that passed during the term) and overall success (including bills that passed after the president left office). With the 2064 presidential bills introduced in seven terms (1990–2018) in Chile’s presidential system, we assess the impact of changes in lawmaking rules on within-term (59.9%) and overall success (70.6%). Changes that decrease attributions of the president and create more opportunities for executive-legislative bargaining—including concurrent elections—increase the chances of success of presidential bills. The use of presidential urgency motions, an agenda-setting tool, makes bills more likely to pass, but the issuance of many urgency motions undermines the bill’s chances to succeed. Presidential bills introduced early in the term and those on issues where there is more policy convergence are more likely to pass. 相似文献
965.
Runoff systems allow for a reversion of the first-round result: the most voted candidate in the first round may end up losing the election in the second. But do voters take advantage of this opportunity? Or does winning the first round increase the probability of winning the second? We investigate this question with data from presidential elections since 1945, as well as subnational elections in Latin America. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that being the most voted candidate in the first round has a substantial positive effect on the probability of winning the second round in mayoral races – especially in Brazil –, but in presidential and gubernatorial elections the effect is negative, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. The positive effect in municipal races is much stronger when the top-two placed candidates are ideologically close – and thus harder to distinguish for voters – but weakens considerably and becomes insignificant when the election is polarized. We attribute these differences to the disparate informational environment prevailing in local vs. higher-level races. 相似文献