中国的区域经济发展与新加坡在华投资

近年来,新加坡在中国的直接投资迅速发展.目前,新加坡已成为中国吸引外资的第六大来源地.随着中国区域经济的发展,新加坡企业积极调整投资与经营战略,新加坡对华投资呈现出新的格局.     

中国与东盟农业合作状况与展望

中国和东盟开展农业合作不仅是中国国家整体外交的需要,也是中国农业可持续发展、农业企业发展壮大的必然要求.本文在分析中国与东盟农业合作现状和存在问题的基础上,提出了促进中国和东盟农业合作的政策建议.     

关于法家学说与秦代法制关系探讨

法家学说和秦代法制关系密切.法家学说是秦代法制建设的指导思想,秦代法制是法家学说的切实贯彻.探讨两者具体的契合关系,有助于深层次理解秦代法律文化及中国古代正统法律文化的形成及丰富内涵.     

理想图景与正义问题——《中国法学向何处去》读后

通过对中国法学自1978年以来26年间的这一个时代的批判,邓正来提出了一种以社会秩序的建构及其正当性为核心问题的中国法律哲学观,其任务是建构一种"中国法律理想图景".以"中国法学向何处去"为主题的系列论文,不仅强调了世界结构是这种法律哲学观的历史性条件,还隐含着建构"中国法律理想图景"必须考虑的三类正义问题.     

中国法学"现代化范式"之关系主义批判——评《中国法学向何处去》

邓正来教授试图凭借"中国法律理想图景"经由关系主义视角来探究和处理"应然"与"实然"、中国与西方、中华民族与世界结构的关系.然而,将关系主义批判的研究方法运用到中国法律哲学批判和建构这一研究对象上来的时候,邓正来可能会夸大一些问题,甚至可能遮蔽一些问题.我们必须在开放和厘清上述问题的基础上建构21世纪的中国法律哲学.     

Vietnam: riding the Chinese tide

Vietnam's perception of China is nuanced and complex, a mixture of challenge and opportunity. Given its geographic proximity and overwhelming power, China represents a permanent strategic challenge Vietnam cannot escape. However, the two countries are partners in the defence of socialist ideals and communist rule. These circumstances have clearly shaped Vietnam's China policy, which is a mixture of cooperation and struggle. Vietnam's strategy is not about confronting China directly but finding a way to live with and benefit from its power.     

Kantei diplomacy? Japan's hybrid leadership in foreign and security policy

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries.     

China–Japan interaction in the Middle East: a battleground of Japan's remilitarization

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations.     

Asymmetric bargaining between Myanmar and China in the Myitsone Dam controversy: social opposition akin to David's stone against Goliath

The Myitsone Dam suspension is an asymmetric negotiation between Naypyitaw and Beijing. The bilateral agreement of the hydropower project was concluded in 2009. However, Myanmar's civil society started to oppose the dam when political opportunities expanded in 2011. The quasi-civilian government in Myanmar was caught in an ‘audience cost dilemma': either to disappoint domestic constituents by fulfilling international obligations, or to compensate the Chinese dam developer for breaching the contract. In September 2011, Myanmar President Thein Sein declared the suspension of the dam throughout his tenure. Unexpectedly, China's state-owned dam company did not sue Naypyidaw. Moreover, Beijing even engaged with societal actors in Myanmar to seek their support for the project. How could Naypyitaw defy Beijing in this Myitsone Dam case? Drawing from 35 interviews with anti-dam campaigners and other stakeholders, as well as secondary data, this article argues that the rise of civil society successfully conditioned Naypyitaw's diplomatic options in the controversy. The change of Beijing's diplomatic strategy confirms that domestic constraint in Myanmar is not rhetorical. The Myitsone Dam case is an example that shows bilateral agreement without domestic endorsement can become China's business risk. Presumably, the dispute has wider implications for other Chinese overseas projects outside Myanmar.