Theorizing Criminal Law Reform

How are we to understand criminal law reform? The idea seems simple—the criminal law on the books is wrong: it should be changed. But 'wrong’ how? By what norms 'wrong’? As soon as one tries to answer those questions, the issue becomes more complex. One kind of answer is that the criminal law is substantively wrong: that is, we assume valid norms of background political morality, and we argue that doctrinally the criminal law on the books does not embody those norms. Another kind of answer is that the criminal law as it stands presupposes certain empirical facts, and yet those facts do not hold. Traditionally, criminal law reform has been informed by both these answers. Analytical theorists examine doctrine for its conceptual structure, and social scientists examine the actual workings of the criminal justice system. This tidy picture is, however, challenged by social constructivist accounts of the criminal law. They challenge the stability and conceptual purity of doctrine, and they challenge the objectivity of social science. On the basis of these challenges, they undermine the ambitions of traditional criminal law reform, and argue that the only reforms to the criminal law that matter are politicized ones—that criminal law reform is pointless unless it serves the interests of the marginalized and the dispossessed. It seems undeniable that in some sense our perceptions of crime in our society are indeed moulded by social forces, and that crime does not exist independently of the social structures and processes that help to define and control it. But why should those insights have the implications for our understanding of criminal law reform that they are alleged to have? How could it follow from those insights that criminal law reform either becomes radicalized or valueless? The aim of this paper is to show that what can legitimately be taken from the emphasis on the social constructedness of crime does not require wholesale abandonment of the traditional picture of criminal law reform, even though it may require some modifications of that picture.     

犯罪构成四要件说的缺陷:实务考察

从实务的立场上看,在我国处于通说地位的犯罪构成"四要件说"存在诸多弊端:其只能静止地看待犯罪成立的条件,无法展示定罪过程,难以对行为从不同侧面、不同层次进行反复推敲和检验;容易根据形式判断得出结论;不重视法益保护的观念;过于重视行为人的意思;不能妥善处理共犯论的问题;难以实现积极的一般预防。为回应司法实务的需要,使对犯罪的认定更为精准,对"四要件说"进行"阶层化"改造乃是大势所趋。     

论纠纷解决、多边认同与司法积极主义

纠纷解决需借入积极的司法,表现为法院的权力不仅依靠作出裁决和法律解释,亦取决于能在多大程度上赢得对解释和裁决的服从。法官在裁判过程的内外都应在相互冲突的价值之间谨慎地作出选择。但是,法院的裁决需要从总体上权衡多阶层之间的不同利益得失,而不是只关注几个主要阶层的评估,即积极的司法需要实现"多边认同",从而建立一种司法积极主义的立场。这一结论能够获得历时性的经验证成。此外,司法积极主义下的纠纷解决出现了多元纠纷解决机制与公共事件应对机制的引入两个新动向,仍有赖于运作机制设计上的一种复眼式结构或者动态观察。     

诚实信用原则综论

诚实信用原则是现代合同法乃至整个民法的一项极为重要的基本原则,为世界各国民事法律所普遍确认.作为道德法律化的一项民法基本原则,诚实信用原则的作用不仅仅在于指导当事人的行为,也是立法和司法的一项重要原则.在具体的司法实践中,诚实信用原则有利于平衡双方当事人及其与社会之间的利益关系,最大限度地实现效率目的.在实践中,应准确理解立法意图,结合当时社会的具体情况,对适用诚实信用原则掌握一个合理的界限.     

大陆法系物权移转制度的历史与演变

物权移转是市场经济商品交易的核心环节,也是物权法的主要内容之一.在民法史上,物权移转经历了漫长的发展演变,出现了形式主义、意思主义等模式,罗马法、《法国民法典》、《德国民法典》、《日本民法典》各为物权移转的重要发展阶段.物权移转理论和制度的演变过程,体现了人类社会财产交易活动的发展脉络,对其之研究,十分有助于我国物权法的理论发展和立法进程.     

"最后明显机会"规则的交通事故责任分配功能

由于当前交通道路的发达,道路交通事故屡见报端,人们的生命和财产遭受巨大的损失.一旦事故发生,如何认定交通事故的责任以及如何分配这种责任一直是个难以解决的问题.从英美法系中"最后明显机会"规则的借鉴出发,当事双方在一定条件下,没有利用出现的"最后明显机会"去避免损害后果发生的一方,就要承担部分或全部责任.交通肇事罪和普通的道路交通事故均可适用该原则.     

《道路交通安全法》的博弈论分析

我国道路交通事故归责原则经历了三个发展阶段。对各阶段交通事故归责原则进行博弈论分析,可发现我国道路交通法律法规正在不断演进。《道路交通安全法》所确立的归责原则顺应了世界潮流,也是现阶段较为理想的归责模式,但并不完美,有待进一步修正和改进。     

证明力与证据能力辨析——兼评《关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》

传统法学界对证据能力和证据证明力的认识存在诸多不甚明晰之处,准确界定二者概念并厘清它们的区别和联系具有重要的意义,这在很大程度上会影响到证据理论上的其他制度.以这种错乱认识为基点,传统证据理论对证据规则、自由心证原则和证明标准等问题也产生了一定的误解.上述认识的混乱和误区在最高人民法院《关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》中也有着突出的体现.     

我国设立取得时效制度新论

取得时效制度是传统民法的一项重要制度,在市场经济条件下依然有其存在的合理性和必要性,其价值分析即说明了这一点。而对取得时效的构成要件和客体范围的探讨说明其在我国民法上亦有一定的适用空间。     

履行抗辩权探微

我国合同法将同时履行抗辩权和先履行抗辩权分立并无不当,不宜称合同法第66条的规定存在着法律漏洞。履行抗辩权在若干场合可以存在于非对价关系之中。履行抗辩权因当事人的约定而扩张或者收缩。对于同时履行抗辩权的"存在的效力",应当区分情况而定。