违宪法律的效力

违宪法律是否具有效力,并非完全取决于“违宪”的判断结论,而视乎无效决定之效力状态。各国对于违宪法律应否具有效力的处理方式有所不同,但仍存在一定的规则：违宪法律的对象效力范围,与维护宪法秩序和保障个人权利这两种法律价值观密切相关,并有一般无效与个别无效两种不同的法律处理;违宪法律的时间效力范围取决于“构成说”与“宣示说”这两种无效学说下的不同规定性,而违宪法律的自始无效与将来无效则成为各国设计违宪法律的时间效力范围时必须面对的关键问题。     

The House of Lords: The Working of the Electoral Process in the 1999 Act of Parliament

This article investigates the working of the 1999 Act of Parliament in relation to the electoral process. One of the more controversial measures in the 1999 Act was the preservation of the representation of the hereditary element in the House of Lords. In the 2007-2008 session of Parliament, Lord Avebury introduced the House of Lords (Amendment) Bill, to repeal this electoral process, and Lord (David) Steel of Aikwood introduced the House of Lords Bill, which had provisions to the same effect as Lord Avebury's Bill. The working of this electoral process is therefore likely to be a topic of debate in the 2008-2009 session of the House of Lords. We suggest that there are three possible options to deal with the likely future issues for this electoral process. These we present as a contribution to a wider debate on the way forward for this constitutional issue.     

地方党政关系的宪政思考

地方党政关系是中国地方政治结构的重要组成元素之一,地方党政关系的发展对于地方政治发展具有重要影响。从宪政视角看,地方“党”与“政”之间要形成和谐稳定的党政关系,需做好两方面的工作：在法治方面,通过法治形成对地方党政关系的刚性规范;在制度安排方面,重新分配地方党委和地方政府的权力和职能,地方党委享有决策权,地方政府拥有执行权。     

The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland–and the European Union

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.     

Conflict,choice or geography? Explaining patterns of democracy in continental Europe

The ‘character’ of democracy is regularly summarised using political‐institutional measures of, for instance, ‘consensus’ or ‘majoritarian’ democracy. Yet, there is little quantitative‐comparative research on the origins of such configurations. Drawing on literature on endogenous institutions and constitutional design, this article proposes a model for the explanation of empirical patterns of democracy. Using a novel database of 26 continental (neighbouring) European democracies and Bayesian spatial modelling, the results indicate that while today's empirical patterns of democracy in terms of proportional power diffusion can be traced back to waves of democratisation rather than historical partisan power configurations, decentral power diffusion can partially be explained by socio‐structural factors, and spatial dependencies exist for all variants of power diffusion.     

Whose Mandate is it Anyway? Brexit,the Constitution and the Contestation of Authority

Over the past year, a seemingly relentless barrage of Brexit‐related challenges has besieged the British constitution, which together have called into question the legitimacy of the political system. Yet, although it is tempting to regard the decision to hold a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union as precipitating an acute constitutional crisis, this article argues that political and democratic dilemmas arising from Brexit are symptomatic of a wider constitutional malaise, the roots of which extend far beyond 23 June 2016. Flowing out of this, the article contends that the current crisis is one of ‘constitutional myopia’, fuelled by decades of incoherent reforms and a failure to address adequately democratic disengagement; and that the EU referendum and its aftermath have merely exposed the extent to which the foundations of the constitution have been eviscerated.     

Municipal Leadership of Climate Adaptation Negotiations: Effective Tools and Strategies in Houston and Fort Lauderdale

Negotiation analysis of climate change–related issues has largely focused on public dispute resolution mechanisms that are typically applied in the face of specific environmental crises, or on multiparty diplomacy relating to international climate agreements. Mayors and other municipal leaders, however, are increasingly taking steps to negotiate urban planning efforts with stakeholders to implement policies for managing the intensifying impact of climate change. In this article, we analyze negotiations in Houston, Texas, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to identify which methods municipal leaders employed to conduct negotiations to implement climate adaptation policies and also consider whether those methods were effective. The two cities present two differing city management structures: Houston has a strong mayor‐driven system, while Fort Lauderdale uses a city commission and city manager system. In this article, we examine the barriers that leaders must overcome and consider their options for negotiating lasting agreements.     

Implementation Challenges of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Selected Districts in Ghana: Evidence from the Field

Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, introduced in 2003, aims to remove financial barriers to health-care access and bridge the inequality gaps in health care. This paper reports on a study of the implementation process in four local government areas in southern and northern Ghana. The paper profiles key institutional actors and draws on qualitative interview data from 33 in-depth interviews. Findings highlight the gaps and challenges that have emerged in the implementation process. Issues of managerial capacity, inadequate and uneven distribution of medical facilities and health-care professionals, cost escalation, fraud and abuse, and reimbursement of providers threaten the sustainability of the scheme.