The Trap

A professor is brought before a secret tribunalin his law faculty for the purpose of decidingthe appropriateness of a student's grade. Thegrounds of the grade appeal are that theprofessor had taught critically instead ofpractically and that he had done so with anacademic bias and prejudice. He is also allegedto have taught philosophy rather than law. After many hours of examination andcross-examination as a defendant and as anexpert witness, the professor, Flink, begins adialogue with a spirit in an effort tounderstand the nature and identity of law. Flink comes to appreciate that law is adisplacing discourse rather than a structure ofcategories signified in an official writing. The analytic method familiar to officials incommon law jurisdictions, Flink comes tounderstand, excludes the experiential meaningsthat are manifested through unwritten gesturesand rituals. Officials embody signs withexperiential expectations and past assumptions.The embodiment of meaning brings life intolegal language. But such an embodiment isforgotten as officials decompose textualfragments and reported social events intoanalytic units. Legal analysis is so successfulthat officials even forget that they hadforgotten something so important as theembodiment of meaning.The professor and the spirit also ask whetherjustice is an `ought' and where one can locatesuch an `ought'. They conclude that there is astructure within which legal officials reason.The exteriority of the structure is anunwritten `ought' realm. But the structurepossesses a gap, which enters into such anunanalysable object-less realm. Analyticreasoning has assumed that reason can take anofficial only so far until she or he mustjourney outside the structure to anunanalysable realm of personal values. However, the embodiment of meanings alsoincorporates unwritten collective values ofwhich officials, precisely because of thesuccess of the analysis project in forgettingthat something was forgotten, have never beenconscious. It is such an unanalysable realmthat grounds or authorises the analyticproject. The exterior authorising origin of theanalytic units of the structure rests upon apossibility that requires faith on the part ofthe officials, a faith that there exists afoundation, radically different from theanalytic units, on the other side of thestructure. The officials can, at best, imagineor picture the authorising origin, located asit is in the unanalysable object-less realmexterior to the written language of thestructure. The imagined origin takes the `form'of a bodiless spirit. The officials (and theprofessor and spirit) are haunted by thepossibility that the structure of humanlyposited rules are ultimately authorised by aspirit.     

宪法权利本质论、价值论与实践论

宪法权利反映了民族国家的社会政治理想和法治理念 ,它既是一种政治道德权利 ,又是一种针对国家的法律原则性权利。宪法权利既有使权利作为目标和手段的正义化和使社会政治制度秩序化的内在价值 ,也有满足宪法关系主体需要的工具性价值。宪法权利一方面依托宪法进行宏观实践 ;另一方面依托自身的权利构造进行各种具体权利的微观实践。我国的宪法权利反映了宪法权利的基本方面 ,也显示出在上述方面存在的不足     

合同解释制度的法理分析

现代合同法解释出现了一些新特点。合同解释的目的不是纯粹的认识和描写,而是重在其规范的机能,即决定判决的基准。在合同解释实践中,法官是在运用而并非是援用解释规则。合同解释规则是在长期审判实践中形成的,但这些规则上升为法律规范,并形成合同解释法律制度是与解释学及法学理论的发展紧密相关的。     

公民宪法义务的语义辨析

由于对中国传统义务本位的深恶痛绝,研究义务特别是宪法义务被看作是“屈服国家”或“过时的思想”。宪法学界普遍认识到人性与失察权力结合可能导致严重后果,但对人性与失范权利结合可能产生的后果关注较少,造成了宪法义务研究阙如的事实。清晰界定公民宪法义务的内涵和外延,是形成义务与权利的良性互动,构建宪法的平衡精神,教育公民“讲权利的同时,讲义务,讲责任”的基础。     

论宪法的人性尊严原则

从法哲学上看,古希腊学者普罗泰格拉斯主张“人是万物的尺度”,中世纪神学大师阿奎那主张神性决定人性;近代以来,洛克等经验理性主义者主张自私、贪欲是人的本性,因此每个人追逐自我利益的结果必然导致他人被工具化和商品化,康德从实践理性的角度提出了“人是目的不是手段”的命题,成为近代以来人性尊严的核心机理。在中国,自古就有“天地之间,莫贵于人”的人性观,孔子认为“己所不欲,勿施于人”。孟子提出了“四心说”和“富贵不能淫”的人性观;现代儒学者蒋庆主张“礼乐制度中的人性尊严”。故此,西方学者主张的是一种利己的权利论式的人性观或者个人主义人性观,中国儒家学者主张的是一种利他的义务论式的人性观或者团体主义人性观。从法释义学上看,个人主义的人性观极力彰显个人自由,尤其是契约自由,国家主义的人性观过分强调整体利益,忽视个人利益,二者均容易导致个人被工具化和商品化;人格主义的人性观介于二者之间,当为可取;“人性尊严”与“人格尊严”的区别在于：“人性”是相对于“神性”和“兽性”而言的,“人格”是指特定人的身份、资格和能力,是区别于他人的个性化权利。人性尊严是一项上位宪法原则,正如国际人权法条文规定的一样,是各项具体人权的本源和基础。人性尊严原则的功能表现为：确立了国家权力运行的人性基础,标定了基本权利保障的底线标准,设定了宪法未列举权利的推定原则。     

论央地法律关系中的宪法主体及其利益博弈

中央与地方之间的法律关系,是宪法学上的一个基本命题,受到多方宪法主体的影响。由于宪法基础的缺失,我国央地关系的协调呈现出了较多的非理性色彩。为此,就必须透过多方宪法主体之间的博弈与互动,理解和把握央地法律关系的实质和全貌,在宪政层面上实现央地间的规范性分权,构建起制度化的公平、公正的利益博弈机制。     

论违宪审查制度

违宪审查制度是对宪法本身乃至于宪政秩序进行维护的制度性保障机制,该制度已经在世界上大多数国家生根落户,并在维护宪政秩序方面发挥着不可替代的作用。通过对世界各国违宪审查制度进行审视和考察,可以从审查机构到审查程序两个方面,对分散式违宪审查和集中式违宪审查这两种审查模式的产生原因及实际效果进行探究分析,以期对我国违宪审查制度的建构起到参考作用。     

论弱势群体的宪法权利及其保护

从宪法学视角看,"弱势群体"系"制度保护不足的宪法权利主体",其宪法权利体系由"自由权"、"社会权"等实体性宪法权利与"请求保护权"等程序性宪法权利组成。弱势群体享有宪法上一般权利主体和特殊权利主体之双重地位,由此而可能发生的"权利竞合"与"权利冲突"现象,须借鉴域外宪法学原理,而透过法律条款作妥适之处理。弱势群体之宪法权利可经由立法路径转化为法律法规上之具体权利,亦可通过"合宪性解释"方式经由"行政保护"与"司法保护"两种路径而予以实现。     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.     

Paradox of China＇s Jurisprudence in Course Of Social Development

改革开放以来的法理学在研究与教学上在一定程度上与中国模式之间存在着一种张力,其表征是：法理学之西方知识与中国模式之东方经验的悖论、法理学之“权利本位”与中国模式之“发展”“稳定”目标的悖论、法理学之法律自由价值优先与中国模式之法律秩序价值优先的悖论、法理学之以“个人”为本的法律观与中国模式之以“人民”为本的法律观的悖论。如何认识与看待这些悖论,是当下法理学发展的新课题。