“宪政是民主政治”论对宪政的负面影响

"宪政是民主政治"是一个在我国广为流传的、在理论上有缺陷的、对当代中国的宪政建设实践也有负面影响的传统宪政定义."宪政是民主政治"论在理论上的主要缺陷有:它偏离了宪政的主要价值目标;它不能解释民主"异化"为"多数暴政"的问题;它不能解释"有民主,无宪政"的历史事实;它把民主作为宪政概念的唯一构成要素是理论上的独断."宪政是民主政治"论对当代中国宪政建设实践的负面影响主要是:它阻碍了我国宪政分权制度的确立;它阻碍了我国违宪审查制度的建立;它妨碍了宪政观念在我国社会的传播.因此,中国要建设真正意义上的宪政国家就必须修正或放弃"宪政是民主政治"论.     

公共行政的范式转换及其政府信任问题

政府信任是政府和公众之间基于公共利益的博弈互动关系,符合公共利益的行政价值理念将为政府提供持久的、合法的信任源泉。从官僚制到新公共管理,由于片面注重管理主义工具价值,而忽视公共利益和民主价值,不可避免地面临着政府信任的困境。民主行政作为新公共行政的学术识别系统,坚持和发展公共利益价值取向,实现价值理性和工具理性的统一,符合人类理性与社会公共利益均衡健康发展的内在需要,必然会全新构建和强化公众与政府的互信合作关系。     

Conservative Constituency Parties' Funding and Spending in England and Wales, 2004–2005

Under new regulations established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 , data are now available—through the Electoral Commission—on the income, expenditure and financial health of constituency political parties. These cover all parties with an annual turnover of £25,000 or more. The returns from 263 Conservative constituency party units in England and Wales for 2004 and 2005 (the latter being a general election year) are analysed here, showing that not only are very few wealthy but that a majority implicitly operate with an annual turnover below the defined threshold. Sources of income and patterns of expenditure are analysed, as are the patterns of large donations (which have to be separately reported). In general, the greatest turnover is to be found in marginal constituencies.     

社会主义行政法治理念的内容探析

社会主义行政法治理念是社会主义法治理念在行政法领域的具体体现,是社会主义行政法治的内在要求和基本原则的概括和反映,是推进依法行政、建设法治政府的精神支柱。社会主义行政法治理念的内容包括法治行政、服务行政、公开行政、民主行政、公正行政、诚信行政、效能行政、责任行政八个方面。     

中国共产党社会主义民主理论的发展

民主是随着国家的产生而出现的,它同许多政治现象一样,本身也有一个发展变化的过程。马克思主义经典作家在建立马克思主义国家学说和探索无产阶级民主的过程中,对民主有过深入的研究,多层次多侧面地论述过民主问题,对民主的内涵作出了科学的解释。毛泽东关于社会主义民主政治建设的一系列思想观点,对我国的社会主义民主政治建设起了巨大的指导作用,丰富和发展了马克思主义的民主理论。在社会主义建设的新时期,邓小平、江泽民和胡锦涛同志则把中国特色社会主义民主理论和民主政治建设推向了一个新阶段。     

Institutional determinants of the largest seat share

The degree of predominance of the largest party in a representative assembly affects government formation and survival. The seat share of the largest party, in turn, is constrained by the interaction of assembly size and electoral district magnitude in the following way. When all S seats in an assembly are allocated in districts of magnitude M, a logical quantitative model proposes that the largest fractional share is s₁ = (MS)^−1/8. As a curve, the model is found to fit with R² = 0.509, considering data from the averages of 46 periods in 37 countries, during which the electoral rules were essentially steady. As a worldwide average, the expression s₁(MS)^1/8 = 1 holds within 1%. Deviations from this average express the impact of various country-specific political and socio-cultural factors that can be investigated once the basic institutional constraints are controlled-for. This means that the degree of largest party predominance may be engineered to hover around a desired average by adjusting assembly size, and district magnitude, while keeping country-specific factors in mind.     

完善民主监督的必要条件与基本方法

在我国,民主监督是人民群众监督的重要组成部分,是建设有中国特色社会主义民主政治的重要内容。党的三代领导人都非常重视民主监督工作。当前只有具备权力必须接受监督、监督必须拓宽渠道、监督必须加大力度三种必要条件,才能有效发挥民主监督作用,杜绝腐败现象的滋生。     

Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification

This article constructs a rational choice model of the intergenerational transmission of party identification. At a given time, identification with a party is the estimate of average future benefits from candidates of that party. Experienced voters constantly update this expectation using political events since the last realignment to predict the future in accordance with Bayes Rule. New voters, however, have no experience of their own. In Bayesian terms, they need prior beliefs. It turns out that under certain specified conditions, these young voters should rationally choose to employ parental experience to help orient themselves to politics. The resulting model predicts several well–known features of political socialization, including the strong correlation between parents' and children's partisanship, the greater partisan independence of young voters, and the tendency of partisan alignments to decay.     

Popular initiatives in Uruguay: confidence votes on government or political loyalties?

Among stable democracies, Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of direct democratic devices at the national level. If we analyze the relationship between the share of “yes” votes received by any popular initiative and the share of votes received by politicians who politically supported it, we observe a strikingly high positive correlation of 0.9. Explaining this correlation is the central objective of this paper. Three alternative hypotheses are plausible: First, such a correlation could be a spurious association due to aggregation bias. Second, PI results could be reflections of economic conditions. Third, Uruguayans are extremely consistent in following their political parties' advice. This paper finds that when Uruguayans go to the polls to vote on a popular initiative, their vote choice is primarily the result of their party loyalty, rather than their reaction to economic conditions. In testing my hypotheses I rely on the following statistical methods: King's “Ecological Inference,” multivariate regression, and path analysis. The data come from seven popular initiatives in Uruguay since 1985 (133 observations).     

Sleaze or clear blue water?: the evolution of corporate and pressure group representation at the major UK party conferences

There has been growing academic and public interest in corporate political lobbying in both the UK and EU in recent years. In Britain, links between politicians and commercial interests have been one of the areas examined by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (‘the Nolan Committee’ and now ‘the Neill Committee’). A visible but under‐researched aspect of political lobbying by firms and other groups is the range of activities that take place at annual party conferences. An exhaustive study of these activities at the three main British party conferences between 1994–97 is reported, covering the period from Tony Blair's first appearance as party leader to the aftermath of the 1997 General Election. There is clear growth of visible lobbying, particularly at the Labour conferences, over the period leading up to the election, and a dropping off in 1997; particularly at the Conservative conference. The implications of the results for organisations, and particularly for public affairs practitioners, are considered. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications