以改革创新精神提高领导干部党性修养和理想信念教育的水平

理想信念教育是干部党性教育的核心内容,面对世界多极化、经济全球化深入发展带来的新挑战,干部党性教育要坚持党性原则,紧紧围绕党的中心工作深化教育内容,既要注重机制建设努力培育良好的政治生态,又要注重党的政治纪律规范,既要注重党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领、基本方针教育,又要注重进行道德品行的教育和修养。干部党性教育是我们党的优良传统和政治优势,要提高科学化水平,遵循以人为本的原则,注重创新教育方法,既要坚持多年积累成形的一整套教育方式,又要将党性修养和教育贯穿于教学、管理、考察、组织生活等各个环节,积极探索和丰富新的教育方式。     

加强警察文化建设锻造新时期高素质的公安队伍

分析警察文化基本特征,论述警察文化与传统文化、企业文化、思想政治工作以及警察管理的联系与区别的基础上,提出要以警察精神为核心,通过锻铸警魂、培养素质、规范行为、塑造形象、营造氛围等途径,建设具有公安行业特点的警察文化,努力造就一支适应新时期公安工作需要的高素质的公安队伍.     

农村基层民主选举过程中存在的问题与对策

农村基层民主选举推动了我国民主化进程,促进了农村稳定和经济发展。但由于对基层民主选举认识的不一致,实践中制度不建全,有关法律、法规不配套,程序操作的不规范以及人为因素的影响,直接引发或诱发了村民之间的矛盾,给农村政治稳定带来了不利的影响,成为建设和谐社会的障碍。应当健全村委会选举制度,加强农村法治建设,进一步规范基层民主选举的程序,推进“四个”民主的统一。     

社会主义政治文明建设要以人为本

社会主义政治文明建设以人为本是人的本质和历史作用决定的,是建设社会主义政治文明的内在要求。加强社会主义政治文明建设,必须树立“以人为本”的战略思想,践行人民当家作主原则,提高公民政治素质,塑造公民文化,不断推进政治社会化,造就符合社会主义政治文明建设需要的合格公民。     

全面建设小康社会机遇期内党的自身建设重点解读

全面建设小康社会机遇期内加强和改进党的自身建设 ,是党的十六大的一个重要的观点。其主要内容是 ,在加强和改进党的思想、组织、作风等三大建设方面 ,贯彻三个代表重要思想、形成高水平的领导层及根治腐败等九个重点。分别从党的科学性、严密性、一致性及纯洁性侧面来加强和改进党的自身的创造力、凝聚力和战斗力。     

努力创建文化名城积极推进"大大连"建设

努力创建文化名城,既是"大大连"建设的目标之一,又是实现"大大连"建设目标的重要推动力.大连市通过创建文明城市活动,文化建设取得重要成就,为经济发展提供了重要思想保证和智力支持.但是,综观文化建设的全局,与外地文化建设先进城市与地区相比,仍存在一些问题,应通过深化改革,认真加以解决.     

牢记"两个务必"加强党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争

加强党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争,是全党的一项重大政治任务.反腐倡廉,关系党和国家的生死存亡.我们必须从战略和全局的高度,充分认识反腐倡廉的紧迫性和重要性、长期性和艰巨性,进一步增强政治责任感和使命感,以"三个代表"重要思想为指导,牢记"两个务必",坚定不移地做好党风廉政建设和反腐败工作,为实现全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标提供重要保证.     

进一步扩大对外开放加快建设"大大连"

进一步扩大对外开放,加快建设"大大连",必须提升新市区对外开放水平;力争国家批准建立大连自由贸易区;提高旅顺口区和长海县的开放度;保持外贸出口高速增长;扩大利用外资领域;加快以金融、会展、物流业为重点的服务贸易领域对外开放;实施"走出去"战略.     

试析全面建设小康社会的政治文明特征

发展社会主义民主政治,建设社会主义政治文明,是全面建设小康社会的重要目标。全面建设小康社会政治文明必须坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国。     

Learning from the Philippine occupation: nation‐building and institutional development in Iraq and other high security risk nations

Outcomes of armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the U.S. has been unprepared to fully address problems related to establishing social and economic stability, security and governance in the aftermath of war. This is unfortunate, given that U.S. policy makers' nation‐building efforts to achieve stability, security and good governance in these nations do not reflect what they should already have learnt about organisational and institutional development from past experiences providing significant development assistance to highly unstable nations. Based on the analysis rendered in this article, ‘smart practice’ development administration in such nations comprises the following key points that link nation building to institutional/organisational development:

• Nation building (creating new national sovereignty) is different from, and harder than, building government capacity (creating or strengthening institutions and organisations).
• Given that building government capacity typically requires years of patient assistance and financing, it is better to build on existing indigenous institutions like the civil service and military.
• The time and expense of development assistance to high security risk nations means that it is advisable to establish a multi‐lateral development assistance plan and a multi‐national, multi‐institutional framework for financing development to pay for all that is necessary over a long period of time (i.e. 20–50 years).
• Policy makers should emphasise social stability and stable economic growth under self‐governance to prevent actual or perceived economic exploitation.
• Policy makers' diplomatic efforts should secure accommodation of various stakeholders sufficient to permit compromise leading to formation of an independent government.
• Where occupation appears necessary to achieve security and stability, policy makers should allocate enough troops and money to do the job, and accurately assess and report all costs of military occupation and nation building.
• Once occupation has occurred, policy makers should not withdraw military support in a way that would increase the likelihood of civil war.
• Premature withdrawal of security, economic and political support prior to the point where high security risk nations are capable of governing themselves will cause a power vacuum, and may result in fragmented regional leadership by warlords. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.