日本财政投融资体制改革的特点及借鉴

日本的财政投融资体制曾经对日本经济的发展产生过重要影响。但是,随着日本经济的不断发展,财政投融资的僵化体制已经越来越不适应新的经济发展形势。在这一背景下,以市场筹集资金为核心的财政投融资体制改革便展开了。此次改革有如下特点：总体规模逐步缩小;资金来源更加多样化;资金运用方向有所调整;加强信息披露引入政策成本分析机制等。从日本财政投融资体制改革中我们可以借鉴的是改革方向的市场化、信息的透明和资金的重点集中投放。     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

UK Governance: From Overloading to Freeloading

The UK's ongoing political turbulence has prompted a reprise of debates from the 1970s when many concluded the country was ungovernable. Then, the most influential diagnosis conceptualised the UK's governance problem as one of ‘overloading’ caused by the electorate's excessive expectations. This article argues that these accounts overlooked another phenomenon besieging UK governance during this period. This phenomenon was freeloading: the withering of government capacity deriving from the ability of actors to enjoy the benefits of citizenship without altogether contributing to the cost. In the interim, these problems have become endemic, not least because of the unspoken but discernible policy of successive governments to turn the UK into a tax haven. High‐profile scandals involving prominent individuals and corporations, plus the failure to clamp down on them have reinforced the perception that the UK's political system is geared towards the rich and the powerful at the expense of the marginalised majority.     

The early modern origins of contemporary European tax outcomes

What explains variation in tax outcomes between European states? Previous studies emphasise the role played by political institutions, but focus mostly on the input side of politics – how access to power and policy making is structured – and the institutions of relatively recent times. It is argued in this article that output‐side institutions related to the implementation of political decisions also matter and have deep institutional origins. As the classic literature has argued, the early modern period from 1450 to 1800 was formative for the development of fiscal capacity, but European states diverged in the stock of capacity they acquired. This article tests whether these differences still affect contemporary tax outcomes using a novel measure of fiscal capacity, based on the age, extent and quality of state‐administered cadastral records. The empirical analysis shows that, on average, countries with higher early modern fiscal capacity have higher tax revenue today, compared to countries with lower early modern fiscal capacity. This association is robust to different model specifications and alternative measurements. The findings have important policy implications as they indicate how deeply the current fiscal problems of the continent are entrenched, but also point to what needs to be prioritised within ongoing tax reforms.     

Do citizens care about government debt? Evidence from survey experiments on budgetary priorities

Ever since the Great Recession, public debt has become politicised. Some research suggests that citizens are fiscally conservative, while other research shows that they punish governments for implementing fiscal consolidation. This begs the question of whether and how much citizens care about debt. We argue that debt is not a priority for citizens because reducing it involves spending and tax trade-offs. Using a split-sample experiment and a conjoint experiment in four European countries, we show that fiscal consolidation at the cost of spending cuts or taxes hikes is less popular than commonly assumed. Revenue-based consolidation is especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidation is also contested. Moreover, the public has clear fiscal policy priorities: People do not favour lower debt and taxes, but they support higher progressive taxes to pay for more government spending. The article furthers our understanding of public opinion on fiscal policies and the likely political consequences of austerity.     

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalization across the north-eastern states of India: Evidence from panel data

While numerous studies have tried to analyze the impact of intergovernmental transfers in fostering fiscal equalization in India, there need to be more studies in the context of north-eastern (NE) states. Situating in a geographically isolated and economically backward region, the states of NE India depend heavily on central fiscal transfers to meet expenditures and to promote various economic activities in the region. One of the essential objectives of these transfers is to achieve fiscal equity. Hence, the study attempts to analyze the fiscal equalizing nature of the intergovernmental transfers across NE India during 1991–2019. The coefficient of variation (CV) analysis results indicates that although fiscal transfers reduced the magnitude of disparity in the own-source revenue across the NE states, a significant amount of disparity still exists in the resource base across these states. The regression analysis findings suggest that the transfers across these states need to be more fiscal equalizing. The per capita gross state domestic product emerges as a positive and significant in predicting per capita transfers, and hence it questions the progressivity of central transfers. When assigning the interstate share of transfers, more weight should be placed on fiscal equalizing factors such as per capita income. The Finance Commission of India should emphasize fiscal equalizing criteria when allocating weights and recommending transfers to the NE States. Additionally, states with low incomes should be recognized in plan schemes.     

A Tangled Web: Complexity and Inequality in the English Local Government Finance Settlement

The £29 billion formula grant stands at the heart of the English local government finance system. This transfer of resource from central to local government has, since 2006–07, been distributed using the so-called ‘four block model’. This extraordinarily complex formula-based funding mechanism aims to ensure that all local authorities are able to provide individuals with a broadly comparable level of public service – offering greatest support to local authorities with high service needs and/or low capacity to raise revenue. This paper outlines the structure and workings of the four block model and, drawing attention to key methodological shortcomings, explains why the resulting distribution of the formula grant is both arbitrary and inequitable. In particular it argues that key model parameters – specifically the need and resource equalisation proportions – are set in order to fulfil a particular funding outcome. This flies in the face of the basic tenets of resource allocation methodology in that, being outcome-led, the approach is clearly neither need-based nor impartial. The paper argues that the four block model fails to meet its own goal of fiscal equalisation, is likely to lead to increasing service disparities, and must be replaced as a matter of urgency.     

The Road to Good Governance: Via the Path Less Accountable? The Effectiveness of Fiscal Accountability in Liberia

Accountability mechanisms are touted as a path to “good governance.” But are accountability mechanisms a sure route to achieving the objectives of “good governance”? Limited case studies have offered inconsistent evidence (Blair, 2000 Blair, H. 2000. Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in sex countries. World Development, 28(1): 21–29. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Charlick, 2001 Charlick, R.B. 2001. Popular participation and local government reform.. Public Administration and Development, 21: 149–157. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Devas &; Grant, 2003 Devas, N. and Grant, U. 2003. Local government decision-making-citizen participation and local accountability: Some evidence from Kenya and Uganda. Public Administration and Development, 23: 307–316. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). But empirical evidence of the relationships among principles of good governance—high citizen participation, low levels of corruption, high-quality service delivery—and accountability mechanisms is lacking. We examine the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms in Liberia and find relationships between measures of county level fiscal accountability and measures of good governance do not always produce expected results, making fiscal accountability mechanisms no guarantee for achieving goals of good governance.     

A New Predictor of Local Financial Distress

The development of predictive models for financial distress is a recurring topic in both private and public contexts, although currently its repercussions are greater in the public sphere, where efforts are being made to define new warning systems for fiscal crises. The present study thus aims first to show the similarities and differences between the absolute and relative models based on a 10-point scale, in order to subsequently combine the positive aspects of both proposals to find a system that can determine local fiscal distress in a more robust way.

The results obtained show that the optimum predictive system is a slight variant of the model proposed by Kloha et al. (2005) Kloha, P., Weissert, C. S. and Kleine, R. 2005. Developing and testing a composite model to predict local fiscal distress. Public Administration Review, 65(3): 313–323. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. This variant consists of the inclusion of two indicators of financial independence proposed by Zafra-Gómez et al. (2009a) Zafra-Gomez, J. S., López-Hernández, A. M. and Hernández-Bastida, A. 2009a. Developing an alert system for local governments in financial crisis. Public Money &; Management, 29(3): 175–82. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] for which an alert threshold has been empirically determined.     

Hardening Budget Constraints: A Cross-National Study of Fiscal Sustainability and Subnational Debt

This study explores the financial sustainability of subnational governments in four different countries. Scholars argue that subnational fiscal capacity helps local governments deliver better public services and provide public goods, which in turn helps to promote economic growth. While administrative control by the central governments contributes to reducing moral hazard from the soft budget constraints, bottom-up strategies to manage fiscal profligacy also need attention. The study first provides understanding about the characteristics of central-local governance and management of subnational government debt of each country. Then, we test our hypotheses regarding local fiscal capacity and administrative control, including political-economic factors that may affect debt spending by local governments. Our findings show that subnational fiscal sustainability improves when the central governments have clear rules to intergovernmental transfers in place and more (market) liberal policies, meanwhile when subnational governments have a more fiscal capacity and less intergovernmental transfers they are able to manage their debt more soundly.