How Should Governments Make Risky Policy Decisions?

Public policy-making does not follow the long-established and well-recognised principles of rational decision analysis under risk. Public views of risk are often inconsistent and seemingly irrational, and a gulf exists between risk perceptions and attitudes of the public and those of 'experts'. On the other hand, experts often claim unjustifiably high levels of confidence in their predictions of policy choice outcomes, creating a lack of public faith in their recommendations. While risky policy choices deserve more systematic decision analysis, many challenges remain to effective implementation of such analyses. Among the suggestions for improvement that we offer is the need for more effective interaction between policy-makers, decision analysts and the public.     

中国妇女运动的“阶级”——中国共产党全国代表大会妇女运动决议研究

本文主要研究了中国共产党全国代表大会妇女运动决议关于中国妇女运动的阶级分析与评价,发现妇女运动是凝聚阶级、民族与性别多重关系的颇具张力的概念。劳动妇女运动和一般妇女运动是两个基本分析范畴。党对妇女运动的评价与态度随着革命形势而发展变化,充满辨证法思想。     

Effects of Defendant Sexual Orientation on Jurors’ Perceptions of Child Sexual Assault

We examined mock jurors’ reactions to a sexual abuse case involving a male teacher and a 10-year-old child. Because gay men are sometimes stereotyped as child molesters, we portrayed defendant sexual orientation as either gay or straight and the victim as either a boy or girl. Jurors made more pro-prosecution decisions in cases involving a gay versus straight defendant, particularly when the victim was a boy. In boy-victim cases, jurors’ emotional feelings of moral outrage toward the defendant mediated these effects. On average, women jurors were more pro-prosecution than were men. Results have implications for understanding social perceptions of cross- and same-gender child sexual abuse and juror decision making in child sexual assault cases perpetrated by homosexual and heterosexual men.

On the Diagnosticity of Multiple-Witness Identifications

It is not uncommon for there to be multiple eyewitnesses to a crime, each of whom is later shown a lineup. How is the probative value, or diagnosticity, of such multiple-witness identifications to be evaluated? Previous treatments have focused on the diagnosticity of a single eyewitness’s response to a lineup (Wells and Lindsay, Psychol. Bull. 3 (1980) 776); however, the results of eyewitness identification experiments indicate that the responses of multiple independent witnesses may often be inconsistent. The present paper calculates response diagnosticity for multiple witnesses and shows how diagnostic probabilities change across various combinations of consistent and inconsistent witness responses. Multiple-witness diagnosticity is examined across variation in the conditions of observation, lineup composition, and lineup presentation. In general, the diagnostic probabilities of guilt were shown to increase with the addition of suspect identifications and decrease with the addition of nonidentifications. Foil identification results were more complicated-diagnostic of innocence in many cases, but nondiagnostic or diagnostic of innocence in biased lineups. These analyses illustrate the importance of securing clear records of all witness responses, rather than myopically focusing on the witness who identified the suspect while ignoring those witnesses who did not.     

The Forensic Confirmation Bias: A Comparison Between Experts and Novices

A large body of research has described the influence of context information on forensic decision‐making. In this study, we examined the effect of context information on the search for and selection of traces by students (N = 36) and crime scene investigators (N = 58). Participants investigated an ambiguous mock crime scene and received prior information indicating suicide, a violent death or no information. Participants described their impression of the scene and wrote down which traces they wanted to secure. Results showed that context information impacted first impression of the scene and crime scene behavior, namely number of traces secured. Participants in the murder condition secured most traces. Furthermore, the students secured more crime‐related traces. Students were more confident in their first impression. This study does not indicate that experts outperform novices. We therefore argue for proper training on cognitive processes as an integral part of all forensic education.     

Reimagining Sutherland 80 years after white‐collar crime*

Eighty years ago, Edwin H. Sutherland conceptualized and defined white‐collar crime. In this article, I engage retrospectively with Sutherland's ideas and work to emphasize important aspects that continue to guide research today; to note where he was prescient as well as shortsighted. I center this discussion around “corporate crime” or crimes by business. Four main themes are discussed: 1) law and official responses to corporate offending—the data problem, 2) corporate crime and the life cycle of organizations, 3) psychological and trait‐based explanations, and 4) consequences of definitional ambiguity.     

Learning on the job: Studying expertise in residential burglars using virtual environments*

In this article, we describe a quasi‐experiment in which experienced incarcerated burglars (n = 56), other offenders (n = 50), and nonoffenders (n = 55) undertook a mock burglary within a virtual neighborhood. We draw from the cognitive psychology literature on expertise and apply it to offending behavior, demonstrating synergy with rational choice perspectives, yet extending them in several respects. Our principal goal was to carry out the first robust test of expertise in offenders by having these groups undertake a burglary in a fully fledged reenactment of a crime in a virtual environment. Our findings indicate that the virtual environment successfully reinstated the context of the crime showing clear differences in the decision making of burglars compared with other groups in ways commensurate with expertise in other behavioral domains. Specifically, burglars scoped the neighborhood more thoroughly, spent more time in the high‐value areas of the crime scene while traveling less distance there, and targeted different goods from the comparison groups. The level of detail in the data generated sheds new light on the cognitive processes and actions of burglars and how they “learn on the job.” Implications for criminal decision‐making perspectives and psychological theories of expertise are discussed.     

“Cannot Decide”: The Fine Line Between Appropriate Inconclusive Determinations Versus Unjustifiably Deciding Not To Decide

Inconclusive decisions, deciding not to decide, are decisions. We present a cognitive model which takes into account that decisions are an outcome of interactions and intersections between the actual data and human cognition. Using this model it is suggested under which circumstances inconclusive decisions are justified and even warranted (reflecting proper caution and meta‐cognitive abilities in recognizing limited abilities), and, conversely, under what circumstances inconclusive decisions are unjustifiable and should not be permitted. The model further explores the limitations and problems in using categorical decision‐making when the data are actually a continuum. Solutions are suggested within the forensic fingerprinting domain, but they can be applied to other forensic domains, and, with modifications, may also be applied to other expert domains.