上市公司工会职代会状况调查

调查表明 ,上市公司普遍建立了工会组织 ,工会在维护职工的劳动权益方面发挥了重要作用 ,但在通过职代会、职工董事、职工监事参与公司民主管理方面还不规范。     

论职工董事、监事制度与职工代表大会制度的关系

国有企业改革把职工代表大会制度与职工董事、监事制度内在地联系在一起。这两种制度相互关系的实质是职工董事、监事与职工劳动者的相互关系。在运用这两种制度时 ,可以通过政策中介和制度创新等 ,使其更好地实现职工劳动者和企业出资者的产权权益。     

独立学院培养青年马克思主义者初探

从概念定义、意义论证、解决途径三个方面,在研究其他学者相关理论论述的基础上,结合独立学院的一些自身特点,提出切实有效培养青年马克思主义者的建议。     

第三人诉讼形态中的诉讼费用分配问题初探

于2007年4月1日开始实施的《诉讼费用交纳办法》对司法系统与民间社会均产生了深刻影响。但是,需要指出的是,我国现阶段的诉讼费用制度还不够完善,关于参加之诉的第三人与本诉当事人之间就如何分配诉讼费用的问题面临“无章可循”的司法适用障碍。本文通过对诉讼费用的法经济学思考以及第三人诉讼制度法理的综合考量,对完善我国第三人诉讼形态下的诉讼费用分配制度提出可行性建议。     

我国无独立请求权第三人制度的改革与完善

我国无独立请求权第三人制度具体改革方案的设计以及相关配套措施的推进,应是引进大陆法系的从参加制度时,保障从参加人的诉讼权利,同时赋予从参加人一次性纠纷解决的选择权;而引进美国的第三方被告制度时,则需要为第三人提供更有力的保护措施。此外,还应增设交互诉讼制度,重新界定第三人的范围,将可以作为本诉共同被告的人从第三人中分离出去。     

独立董事法律问题研究

In order to avoid independent directors from being against minority shareholders, and urging them to play the role of checking up big shareholders and insiders with full power in listed companies, the rules for independent directors shall be amended gradually. Currently, the reform on the independent director regime shall be made in some aspects. First, the positions of independent directors shall be held by qualified professionals; Second, independent directors shall pass the exam for such posts; Third, independent directors shall take full-time jobs; Fourth, the firms of independent directors shall be established with limited partnership liability; Fifth, independent directors shall undertake joint liabilities. Guan Xiaofeng, professor of School of Civil and Commercial and Economic Laws, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL). He is also an arbitrator of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (CIETAC). He has engaged in teaching and research on civil and commercial laws for a long term, and written a monograph of Introduction to Financial Law. Moreover, he has released over 40 academic papers in respect of commercial, financial and contract law.     

有效推行独立董事制度的法律思考

独立董事制度特有的价值目标使独立董事必须具备独立性、客观公正性、公司整体利益的代表性。在我国引入独立董事制度,除了要确保独立董事的独立性外,必须建立完善的独立董事激励机制和责任机制,充分调动独立董事的积极性,督促其尽职尽责,更好地行使监督权。     

与大部门共生的独立机构——以贸促机构为例

本文以西方发达国家(地区)贸易促进机构为具体案例,说明在西方行政管理体制改革的过程中,负责执行政府政策或法律、负责监管的独立机构所体现出来的公共治理结构中的多元化、社会化和市场化的趋势。这些独立机构和负责决策的大部门相互分工,相辅相成,共同构成政府公共管理和服务的主体。此外,本文提出在完善我国大部制的过程中,有必要不遗余力地推进独立机构的建设,并且通过对我国贸促机构的分析,提出可以以贸促机构作为我国建立独立机构的试点。     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.