On the value of formal assessment of uncertainty in regulatory analysis

The US Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2003 a new requirement for the treatment of uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of proposed regulations, requiring agencies to carry out a formal quantitative uncertainty assessment regarding a regulation’s benefits and costs if either is expected to reach $1 billion annually. Despite previous use in other contexts, such formal assessments of uncertainty have rarely been employed in RIAs or other regulatory analyses. We describe how formal quantitative assessments of uncertainty – in particular, Monte Carlo analyses – can be conducted, we examine the challenges and limitations of such analyses in the context of RIAs, and we assess how the resulting information can affect the evaluation of regulations. For illustrative purposes, we compare Monte Carlo analysis with methods typically used in RIAs to evaluate uncertainty in the context of economic analyses carried out for the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Nonroad Diesel Rule, which became effective in 2004.     

The economic significance of “insignificant” rules

We know relatively little about the economic effects of “insignificant” rules because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be cumulatively important. We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants, which is not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit–cost test. We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to benefit–cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.     

Globalization and institutional competitiveness

Only dead institutions do not change and only rarely do institutions change by themselves. To maintain performing institutions takes institutional entrepreneurs who are willing to take risks and who possess the capacity and the talent to innovate. A regulation discourse, in contrast to a marketization discourse, would not picture the relationship between globalization and institutional change as a deterministic one. Rather, it would expect that all kinds of actors play a large number of different roles in the course of ongoing institutional change. The result of such complex institutional change, at the level of welfare states, multinational businesses, public administration, and training systems, to mention just a few of the empirical areas covered in this special issue, cannot be fully understood by applying an overly rigid, static, and dualistic approach to modern capitalist economies. The concept of institutional competitiveness, on the contrary, allows for institutional entrepreneurship and institutional hybrids constituting pulsating polities.     

The changing face of ‘Drivers of Change’

In 2001 the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID) launched a new way of conducting political economy analysis, called ‘Drivers of Change’ (DoC). DoC is now well known amongst international development practitioners and professionals. This article provides an introduction to DoC, explaining what it is, where DoC analysis has taken place and which organisations have been involved. It also explores the history and background to DoC, outlines its effect on other bi and multi‐lateral donors and shows how the approach has evolved over the last 5 years. The final section of the article analyses some of the current limitations in the way DoC analysis is used by DFID and predicts how the approach may develop in the future. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

我国收入分配差距过大的制度原因分析

制度安排是影响收入分配最本质的根源。我国城乡二元经济体制加剧了城市居民与农民的收入差距；经济体制转型期的制度缺陷造成了阶层收入差距的扩大；政策的倾斜形成了地区和行业收入的巨大差距。针对收入分配差距过大的现状，我们必须加快产权制度改革，推进政府职能转变，不断打破垄断，尽快建立健全完善的社会保障体系。     

双重制度逻辑与县级人大常委会的成长——一种新制度主义视角的解析

就中国县级人大常委会这个新组织而言，其运作和成长的制度环境主要是具有内在紧张关系的双重制度逻辑并存，即自上而下和自下而上的责任逻辑。因此，中国县级人大常委会的组织运作和成长是在平衡矛盾性的制度逻辑、应对制度环境约束中进行的。     

我国宗教发展趋势分析

新世纪新阶段,我国宗教出现了一些新的趋势:教态平衡发生变化,信仰多元化趋势增强;信教群体面扩大,活动场所需求增加,活动方式灵活多样;宗教思想理论建设加强,教职人员素质提升;宗教世俗化不断发展,宗教神秘主义亦在涌动;宗教在构建和谐社会与促进世界和平发展中的作用越来越大。认清和把握这些趋势,对于引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应具有重要意义。     

关于对群体性事件发展规律及对策分析

当前,群体性事件已经成为影响社会稳定的突出问题,作为社会发展进程中的产物,群体性事件伴随着社会发展形态的进化而不断变化,本文试从社会学和政治学的角度对其发展规律进行了分析,并着重探索目前社会条件下对其有较强操作性的解决方案。     

关于上颌牙弓性别差异的研究

利用自动显示游标卡尺测量200例（男、女各100例，年龄18～24岁）上颌石膏模型上牙弓宽、长及高等18个指标。经统计分析发现除切牙弓长、尖牙间距对应高及第二双尖牙间距对应高外，其余15项测量指标男性均大于女性（P＜0．05）。逐步判别分析仅用7个测量指标，判别率可达到75．50％。     

应用判别分析法判断胸骨性别的研究

本文测量了85例国人胸骨(男52,女33)的全长、柄长、体长、柄最大宽、体最大宽、柄最大厚及体最大厚七个项目,发现所有项目都具有非常显著的性别差异,但两性间重迭率较高,用单项难以准确判定性别。为此,采用 Fisher 判别分析法建立了判定胸骨性别的判别函数,判别率最高达90%。考虑到残缺胸骨的性别鉴定,亦建立了相应的判别函数。与国外研究相比,本文方法判别率较高且更具有实用价值。