民事诉讼当事人适格刍论

适格当事人通常就是作为诉讼标的的实体法律关系的主体 ,但是 ,在某些特殊情况下 ,根据当事人的意思或者法律的规定 ,争议的民事实体法律关系以外的人也可以成为正当当事人。     

Arguing a fortiori

Courts and lawyers often argue a fortiori . Sometimes they actually use the Latin phrase to indicate that their conclusions do not just follow, but ‘follow a fortiori ’ from certain premises. These are taken to be inferences of a distinct and important kind. But how exactly are they distinct, and why are they important? Despite their popularity, a fortiori arguments are not well understood and have not drawn much attention from legal theorists. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to bring out the form of a fortiori arguments, articulating those assumptions that, though typically left unstated, are necessary elements of arguments of this kind. The second goal is to say something about the point of such arguments, and to characterise the sort of context in which an arguer will have reason to deploy an a fortiori rather than an inference of a different type.     

Unpacking public justification

ABSTRACT

This brief response to Greenfeld’s caveat submits that public justification is not omnipresent, but can extend, and has extended, beyond the modern, liberal West. Subscribing to a thin, rather than thick, conceptualization of public justification, we chart the contested contours of public justification, and urge scholars of this emergent field to clarify their own take before advancing pertinent theories and case studies. We briefly expound the nature and historical roots of both ‘justification’ and ‘the public’, suggesting that their amalgam into public justification transcends the modern, liberal West.     

The public valuation of religion in global health governance: spiritual health and the faith factor

ABSTRACT

This article explores how the role of religion is evaluated in global health institutions, focusing on policy debates in the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank. Drawing on Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s pragmatist approach to justification, I suggest that religious values are creative and worldly performances. The public value of religion is established through a two-pronged justification process, combining generalizing arguments with particularizing empirical tests. To substantiate the claim that abstraction alone does not suffice to create religious values in global public health, I compare the futile attempts of the 1980s to add ‘spiritual health’ to the WHO’s mandate with the more recent creation of a ‘faith factor’ in public health. While the vague reference to some ‘Factor X’ inhibited the acceptance of spiritual health in the first case, in the second case, ‘compassion’ became a measurable and recognized religious value.     

警察职务防卫权行使的正当性要素及原则

本文以警察职务防卫权的主体、内容及目的等要素作为分析逻辑,解析了警察职务防卫权主体的适格性、内容的法定性以及目的设定与手段对应具有高度的契合性等正当化要素,提出了警察职务防卫权行使及理论建构必须坚持的原则。     

宪法未列举权利的文本模式及证成

宪法文本的有限性和权利体系的开放性使得对权利的完全列举是不可能的,现代社会的发展产生了新的权利需求,从而在宪法列举权利外产生了宪法未列举的权利。缺少未列举权利的宪法权利体系只是由有限的权利组成的封闭的权利系统,无法适应社会的发展和公民对权利的需求。基于宪法的根本法性质,宪法未列举权利指的是公民不可缺少的基本权利。权利是时代的产物,是个人生存条件的法律表达,保护宪法未列举权利既可以充分保障公民的基本权利,又能克服宪法文本的局限性。     

正当行为与犯罪构成传统关系之维护

犯罪构成是认定犯罪的唯一标准，刑法中的正当行为不符合我国的犯罪构成，将其视为犯罪成立的消极条件并不科学。犯罪构成与正当行为不是入罪与出罪的反向关系，二者之间是基本规定与注意规定之间的关系。传统的体系安排具有合理性，应当加以维护。不应该将其作为对我国传统犯罪构成大动干戈的借口。     

The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Public Choice Failure and Voter Incompetence in France

This article explains failures of politics and government through the incompetence of voters and their perception biases. It illustrates this argument using the French case. If voters lack knowledge and develop irrational beliefs, then voting is probably not effective as a mechanism for sanctioning public policy. The incompetence of French voters and their anti‐capitalist bias is well documented. This incompetence can be partly explained by the low cost of holding irrational beliefs in politics. Voters’ anti‐capitalist attitudes are explained by the utility they obtain from expressing themselves in favour of state intervention, and by France's prohibitive level of justification costs of holding pro‐capitalist views. The resulting biases contribute to the failure of public choice.     

Neutrality of what?

In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens? Traditionally, liberals have provided two different answers to this question. Some have adopted a conception of neutrality of justification, while others a conception of neutrality of effects. Recently, Alan Patten has defended an alternative, novel and sophisticated, conception of neutrality – neutrality of treatment. In this article I assess whether neutrality of treatment is, in fact, a superior conception of neutrality. I try to show that neutrality of treatment suffers from the very same weaknesses that Patten attributes to its alternatives and that, overall, neutrality of justification, properly construed, provides a more promising account of both the sense in which a state ought to be neutral and of the object of neutrality. Finally, I argue for a broader account of the normative bases of liberal neutrality than the one proposed by Patten. This account includes, beyond considerations of fairness, a relational principle of equal standing.