Economic incentives for the self-regulation of the release of price-sensitive information

Companies, as primary disseminators of information, and financial institutions, as major recipients, have economic incentives to self-regulate the transmission and usage of price-sensitive information. These include increased (lost) reputation costs and adverse share price penalties arising from poor management of information disclosure. The economic motivation for self-regulation is seen as conceptually linked to but distinct from legislative changes. Self-regulation has the strong support of economic efficiency arguments, whereas recent additional new legislative changes do not. This article examines a major corporate and institutional response to the new regulatory climate—to internalize part of the regulatory process during their regular relationship communications. Relationships between the case companies and institutions already exist for transaction purposes. They are used as a convenient and low-cost means to pursue self-regulation and to avoid errors of price-sensitive information release. This self-regulatory process is illustrated using case material. It is clear from the response pattern presented that the development of a self-regulatory framework by the parties has been an iterative one. The corporate and institutional systems that have been evolving seem to be significantly influenced by the regulatory trends. The regulatory changes appear to have played a role in increasing market costs incurred by those companies with poor stock market communication practices. The article ends by arguing that new proposals to change in the formal regulatory system should recognize that further legislation is unlikely to improve the poor prosecution record. Nevertheless, legislative changes can combine with and buttress the self-regulation process to create an effective regulatory system.     

帮助犯罪分子逃避处罚罪若干问题研究

帮助犯罪分子逃避处罚罪是刑法增设的一个新罪名,关于其理解和适用都存在一些争议和难点。本文从剖析理论和实践中的分歧出发,对本罪主体范围的界定、客观方面的认定、本罪与近似犯罪的区分以及本罪认定中的一罪与数罪等问题进行了研究。     

银行信用证审单标准的法哲学思考:精确性、模糊性还是原则性

银行信用证的审单有精确性标准、模糊性标准和原则性标准之分。精确性标准的主要理论学说为镜像标准说,模糊性标准的代表学说是实质相符理论,而原则性标准在法律上的反映则是严格相符。精确性标准因过于僵化和刻板,无法适应客观实践的需要;模糊性标准因具有随意性而日趋式微;原则性标准克服了镜像标准和实质相符标准的不足,为开证行的审单确立了一个合理的标准,这种标准既给开证行提供了一个“单单相符、单证相符”的具体的审单尺度,同时,也给开证行提供了一定的灵活操作空间,可谓是灵活性和规范行相结合的典范。     

法律文书写作的多媒体教学探讨

法律文书运用多媒体教学是教学方法的创新,能取得比传统教学方法更好的效果,由此要求教师实现从“专业型”转变 为“一专多能型”。但是,多媒体教学也有其局限性,只有将现代教育技术与传统教学手段结合起来,才能实现教育教学的最优化。     

中国证监会信息监管的法律反思

证监会作为证券市场最直接、最权威的管理者,在我国证券市场的信息披露监管方面取得了一定成效,但在审核效率、执法手段、处罚措施等方面仍存在许多问题。本文通过对证监会信息监管存在的问题进行分析,并就如何完善信息披露监管提出了相关的建议。     

信息权利——一种权利类型分析

二十世纪 6 0年代以来 ,以蓬勃发展的信息技术为先导 ,人类开始步入信息社会。信息问题成为最具时代魅力和理论潜能的前沿领域 ,进而成为法学研究所关注的对象。信息是信息社会中极为重要的资源形式和社会的构成性元素。作为法律概念的信息是满足特定条件的符号系。信息权利是一个以信息为客体的法律权利束 ,作为一个权利类型具有解释性和制度性的双重功能优势     

消费者的知情权

在信息社会中 ,知情权日益受到人们的重视。消费者的知情权是消费者权利体系中的基础性权利。消费者与生产者、经营者之间的信息不对称是法律赋予消费者知情权的原因。知情权作为确立消费者人格的基础 ,除了要求生产者、经营者履行信息披露义务之外 ,还要求政府的积极保护 ,实现对消费风险的事先控制 ,从而更好地保护消费者。     

主观与客观之间——知识产权“信息说”的重新审视

作为知识产权对象的信息不应是信息论意义上的信息,而应是控制论意义上的信息,即具有"同型结构+意义"双重结构。这有其法学上的规范意义。具备"源于人、有价值、法定性"条件的信息即可成为知识产权的对象,其特点有主客观双重属性、与载体的可分离性、可复制性、可传递性、可共享性等。知识产权的诸多困境即源于信息的主客观双重属性。     

汶川地震相关的若干刑事问题研究

"5.12"汶川地震发生后,出现了很多疑难刑事法律问题,如建筑物毁损责任追究问题、趁灾造谣、非法经营、灾民哄抢救灾物资等行为的定性问题等,对于这些问题,应当区分不同情形,作出相应处理。