侦查程序中的人权保障——以犯罪嫌疑人的主体地位为视角

犯罪嫌疑人的主体性表现为平等权、参与权、救济权有机的权利体系。当前我国在建构和保障犯罪嫌疑人在侦查程序中的主体地位方面与西方存在较大差距,我国应借鉴西方国家的理论、制度和做法对我国犯罪嫌疑人的主体性进行建构:法律上确认犯罪嫌疑人的主体权利,建立司法介入制度,确立侦查谦抑和检察监督侦查的原则和制度。     

民事审级改革略论

公正合理的审级制度是最大限度地实现司法职能和法律价值目标的前提条件.而我国司法的行政化导致法院缺乏独立性;司法腐败和地方保护主义导致法官的不独立;再审制度导致裁判的不确定和司法权威的下降.现行司法的审级制度影响法院独立行使裁判权,影响司法公正,必须进行改革.对民事审级改革中各审级法院审理的范围方式,审查程序提出了具体的改革思路.     

论党内法规制度建设的理论基础问题

从“推进党的制度建设科学化”到“加快党内法规制度体系建设”,体现了我国政党治理法治化的发展趋势。法律的政治化与政治的法治化是近代以来世界民主法治建设的基本发展特点,党内法规制度建设应当以法治与政治的统一性原理建构其理论基础。要以政治性引领党内法规制度体系建设,确保其规范内容上体现先进性、规范目的上聚焦领导力、规范渊源上关照实践面。同时,更要以法治性补强以往党的制度建设的短板,运用法治思维和法治方式加快党内法规制度体系建设,增强其概念的可通用性、体系的可衔接性、执行的可协同性。     

货币演进的历史观与货币创造的政治经济学

一种流行的对现代货币理论的批评认为,现代货币理论忽视了金融市场在货币创造中的主体地位;现代货币理论的错误认识会导致政府对市场的过度干预。这种反对意见不仅误解了现代货币理论,而且建立在错误的历史观上,忽视了政府在市场经济中的重要作用。首先,现代货币理论形成了包括商业银行和政府在内的对货币等级结构的完整认识。其次,在历史上,财政作为货币创造主体的作用并没有让位于商业银行体系,相反,随着布雷顿森林体系的解体,国家财政的作用获得了极大的解放。再次,政府的货币创造具有生产性的一面,它在推动创新和生产力发展上扮演着重要角色;政府创造和回收货币并不是剥削,而是国家的公共目的所使然。最后,货币创造主体的制度设计及其争论的问题本质上是更深层次的政治经济学问题。     

刘少奇法制思想探析

刘少奇法制思想的主要内容,可以概括为七点.这些思想的实施所经历的曲折,有三个主要原因.从这些思想和这些原因,可以得出至少五点启示.     

Partisan effects in morality policy making

Current comparative policy research gives no clear answer to the question of whether partisan politics in general or the partisan composition of governments in particular matter for different morality policy outputs across countries and over time. This article addresses this desideratum by employing a new encompassing dataset that captures the regulatory permissiveness in six morality policies that are homosexuality, same‐sex partnership, prostitution, pornography, abortion and euthanasia in 16 European countries over five decades from 1960 to 2010. Given the prevalent scepticism about a role for political parties for morality policies in existing research, this is a ‘hard’ test case for the ‘parties do matter’ argument. Starting from the basic theoretical assumption that different party families, if represented in national governments to varying degrees, ought to leave differing imprints on morality policy making, this research demonstrates that parties matter when accounting for the variation in morality policy outputs. This general statement needs to be qualified in three important ways. First, the nature of morality policy implies that party positions or preferences cannot be fully understood by merely focusing on one single cleavage alone. Instead, morality policy is located at the interface of different cleavages, including not only left‐right and secular‐religious dimensions, but also the conflicts between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐nationalist (GAL‐TAN) parties, and integration and demarcation. Second, it is argued in this article that the relevance of different cleavages for morality issues varies over time. Third, partisan effects can be found only if individual cabinets, rather than country‐years, are used as the unit of analysis in the research design. In particular, party families that tend to prioritise individual freedom over collective interests (i.e., left and liberal parties) are associated with significantly more liberal morality policies than party families that stress societal values and order (i.e., conservative/right and religious parties). While the latter are unlikely to overturn previous moves towards permissiveness, these results suggest that they might preserve the status quo at least. Curiously, no systematic effects of green parties are found, which may be because they have been represented in European governments at later periods when morality policy outputs were already quite permissive.     

Electoral infidelity: Why party members cast defecting votes

Party politics and electoral research generally assume that party members are loyal voters. This article first assesses the empirical basis for this assumption before providing individual‐level explanations for defection. It combines prominent theories from party politics and electoral behaviour research and argues that internal disagreement and external pressure can each bring about disloyal voting. The hypotheses are motivated with multi‐country European survey data and tested on two sets of party‐level national surveys. The results show, first, that, on average, 8 per cent of European party members cast a defecting vote in the last election, and second, that dissatisfaction with the leadership is the strongest predictor of defection. Additionally, internal ideological disagreement is associated with higher probabilities of defection, whereas the effects of pull factors in the form of contentious policies are rather limited. These findings emphasise the importance of testing scientific assumptions and the potential significance of party leadership contests.     

Electoral volatility and parties’ ideological responsiveness

For a number of decades now, scholars have been indicating that ties between citizens and parties are eroding. As a consequence, electoral behaviour has become more volatile and also more unpredictable. The consequences of this process of change on parties’ strategic behaviour have, however, received little attention. In this article, the impact of dealignment on parties’ strategic behaviour is examined, with the focus being on the extent to which parties are responsive to the mean voter. The expectation of dealignment allowing parties ‘to move around more freely’ leads to the hypothesis that parties are more responsive in a context of dealignment. The analyses provide evidence that is in line with this expectation. Ideological responsiveness is conditioned by the level of volatility in the electorate. The conclusion to draw from these results is that dealignment, which profoundly affects voters’ behaviour, leads parties to become more responsive to the mean voter.     

Positions and saliency of immigration in party manifestos: A novel dataset using crowd coding

Immigration is one of the most widely debated issues today. It has, therefore, also become an important issue in party competition, and radical right parties are trying to exploit the issue. This opens up many pressing questions for researchers. To answer these questions, data on the self‐ascribed and unified party positions on immigration and immigrant integration issues is needed. So far, researchers have relied on expert survey data, media analysis data and ‘proxy’ categories from the Manifesto Project Dataset. However, the former two only give the mediated party position, and the latter relies on proxies that do not specifically measure immigration. The new dataset presented in this article provides researchers with party positions and saliency estimates on two issue dimensions – immigration and immigrant integration – in 14 countries and 43 elections. Deriving the data from manifestos enables the provision of parties’ unified and unfiltered immigration positions for countries and time points not covered in expert surveys and media studies, making it possible to link immigration and immigrant integration positions and saliency scores to other issue areas covered in the Manifesto Project Dataset. Well‐established criteria are used to distinguish between statements on (1) immigration control and (2) immigrant integration. This allows for a more fine‐grained analysis along these two dimensions. Furthermore, the dataset has been generated using the new method of crowd coding, which allows a relatively fast manual coding of political texts. Some of the advantages of crowd coding are that it is easily replicated and expanded, and, as such, presents the research community with the opportunity to amend and expand upon this coding scheme.     

Foreign threat and political party change: Russia and changes in party manifestos

How do political parties react to foreign security threats? There has been very little attention paid in the literature generally to how parties react to international events, particularly how parties react to foreign policy threats. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, we examine how political parties in countries in Europe have reacted to Russian actions in terms of their emphasis on security issues. Based upon our analysis of the manifestoes from 331 parties in 36 countries we find that, generally, interstate threats have no significant effect on the military position adopted by political parties, although these effects vary by party type and by the type of threat. Russian based threats appear to be associated with the Far Left becoming more dovish (which is consistent with what would be expected by the literature) and the Far Right becoming significantly less hawkish.