Marxism and the vernacular revolutionary traditions

ABSTRACT

Marxism has been the name increasingly given by friend and foe to contemporary radical revolutionary movements in the last couple of centuries. That opens the seldom-asked question, what about the radical revolutionary movements and ideas which could not be so described? For them the collective term often used negatively was ‘vulgar’, or, less negative but still unacceptable to Marxists, ‘utopian’ and ‘vernacular’. That last turn indicated spontaneous radicalism of the lower classes, which lack the incise language (polish?) of academic debate. The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘vernacular’ as the ‘language spoken in particular area by a particular group especially one that is not the official or written language’. It introduced often a history-passed-and-third-worldly accentuation. Experience has shown that most effective revolutionary movements were led by a group representing a mixture (interdependence?) of Marxism with vernacular radicalism, often described as Marxism with a ‘xxxx’ face (Chinese or Czechoslovak or something else). One can even conclude that for Marxism to make way it must link with radical local tradition, definitely not-Marxist. Moreover, it doesn’t quite ‘work’ singly, for its success depends on the mixture of Marxism and non-Marxism. It seems that particular role in that confrontation is defined by a conceptual (ideological?) set of collectively dominant ideas or ‘idols’. If so, a major blocking force to the advance of Marxist movements is, on top of the power of the existing state and political economy, some prevailing ideological elements accepted by the ‘masses’ since the Second International. Those would be ‘purism’, ‘scientism’, ‘progressivism’ and ‘statism’. We shall eventually touch in that context on supporting the revolutionary vernacular of the People’s Will party of Russia, its implications and its relations to Marx’s own Marxism.     

Land grabbing and the making of an authoritarian populist regime in Hungary

ABSTRACT

How do authoritarian populist regimes emerge within the European Union in the twenty-first century? In Hungary, land grabbing by oligarchs have been one of the pillars maintaining Prime Minister Orbán’s regime. The phenomenon remains out of the public purview and meets little resistance as the regime-controlled media keeps Hungarians ‘distracted’ with ‘dangers’ inflicted by the ‘enemies of the Hungarian people’ such as refugees and the European Union. The Hungarian case calls for scholarly-activist attention to how authoritarian populism is maintained by, and affects rural areas, as well as how emancipation can be envisaged in such a context.     

‘No regionalism please,we are Leghisti !’ The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini

Whilst the Lega Nord has traditionally been defined as a regionalist populist party, since Matteo Salvini became its leader in 2013 it has undergone a process of profound ideological transformation. This article assesses this momentous change and the impact it could have on the future of the Lega, drawing on a content analysis of Salvini’s and the party’s Facebook posts, as well as interviews with regional leaders. It argues that, under Salvini’s personal style of leadership: (a) regionalism has been replaced by an empty form of nativist nationalism, which fails to address socio-economic issues related to the North–South divide; (b) populism remains central to the party’s strategic communication, but the EU has taken Rome’s place as the people’s ‘enemy’; (c) this ideological shift has paid-off at the 2018 general election, but is underpinned by latent fractures between the leader and regional representatives which could have profound implications in the future.     

‘The battlefield is in Brussels’: Islamophobia in the Visegrád Four in its global context

ABSTRACT

A common popular and scholarly opinion of Islamophobia in the so-called ‘Visegrád Four’ or ‘V4’ (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) sees it as caused by circumstances unique to Eastern Europe. Specifically to blame, it is alleged, is a distinctive local history of intolerance, especially antisemitism, and the fact that under socialism these countries were exempt from the post-war soul-searching that took place in Western Europe. Kalmar’s paper, instead, decentres Islamophobia in the V4 by considering it less as a limited regional phenomenon, and more in terms of how it is linked to Islamophobia in other European Union member states and the United States. As elsewhere, foremost among the conditions that encourage Islamophobia in the V4 is the alienation of certain publics on the periphery, which is an effect of global neoliberal policies. These have generated, along with Islamism and Islamophobia, a reinvented, essentializing discourse of difference between Eastern and Western Europe. In spite of that alleged difference, however, Islamophobic populism in the V4 is not just a regional threat to liberal democracy, but targets all of the European Union and the world.     

Brexit: The EU Policy‐Making State Hits the Populist Buffers

There seems to be an emerging conventional wisdom that the Brexit vote resulted from specific domestic factors in Britain, such as divisions within the ruling Conservative party, the rise of UKIP, strong reaction to increased immigration, all set against the backdrop of globalisation and its adverse effects. The end result was a populist revolt. The argument presented here is somewhat different. Whilst accepting that the above factors were certainly very important, it is argued that it is important to examine the key role of the EU itself in the creation of the current crisis within the EU. The construction of an EU policy‐making state has run far ahead of what voters at the national level want, leading to a central paradox within the EU, namely that the European elite which runs the EU has introduced some very beneficial public policies, yet that elite has become increasingly out of touch with its peoples.     

Missed Opportunities and New Risks: Penal Policy in England and Wales in the Past Twenty‐Five Years

This paper discusses trends in criminal justice and penal policy over the past twenty‐five years. This period has been characterised as a time of penal populism, which originated in the failure of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, and the competition between the main political parties to be ‘tough on crime’. However, this is not the only trend to be found in penal policy. There has continued to be a strong undertow of support for rehabilitation and community penalties, including restorative justice. There has been pressure from the left as much as the right to take domestic violence, sexual offences against women and children, and hate crimes more seriously. There have been pressures to meet performance targets—which gradually transformed into calls to build the legitimacy of the justice system. Finally, there have been pressures to privatise criminal justice agencies. These various impulses have sometimes amplified and sometimes counteracted the pressures towards tough penal policy. If the period of intense penal populism ran from 1993 to 2007, inertia in the system has ensured that there have been no significant attempts to row back from tough policies, and to reassert the values of penal parsimony. Given that money has been tight since 2007 and crime has continued to fall, this must amount to a lost opportunity of significant proportions.     

Breaking Bad News: Penal Populism,Tabloid Adversarialism and Brexit

This article analyses the role that British conservative tabloid newspapers play in promoting penal populism and delegitimising liberal prison reform initiatives. Principally, we consider how different sections of the British press reacted to the then Prime Minister David Cameron's prison reform speech of 8 February 2016. The analysis illustrates how different newspapers cohered around two diametrically opposing interpretations of the scandalous state of the prison system, reflecting distinctive penal philosophies and moral positions. In the context of penal populism and the populist furies unleashed by the Brexit campaign, the central research finding is that the comparatively passive and equivocal support offered by the broadsheets was no match for the vitriolic attack mounted by the conservative tabloids on the ‘soft justice’ parts of Cameron's prison reform agenda. We conclude by arguing that the stark lesson to be learned is that the scandal‐ridden prison is a particularly toxic issue marked by serial policy failure. Consequently, in a febrile, intermediatised penal populist context, why would any political leader take on the manifest risks associated with embarking on liberal prison reform?     

Denunciatory technology: forging publics through populism and secrecy

This paper theorizes contemporary institutionalized forms of denunciation, or what I call ‘denunciatory technologies’. Denunciatory technologies are mechanisms that allow citizens to report one another to the state for a wide range of wrongdoing, such as welfare fraud. The scarce literature on such initiatives relies heavily on concepts of neoliberalism to explain their emergence and operation. I first argue that a focus on neoliberalism fails to recognize these technologies as a sophisticated type of statecraft that promotes public sensibilities. I then offer a more robust account of denunciatory technologies. Rather than relying on an analysis of neoliberalism, I argue that these technologies fuse the policing of political criminals like the ‘welfare cheat’ to the very notion of ‘public good’, and refract vertical populist energies back onto the population. I conclude that, through such technologies, publics become an integral tool in their own governance.     

Populisms and liberal democracy – business as usual?

Populism is often thought to mark a sharp break with liberal democracy. But to what extent is this the case? In this contribution the connections between populism and liberal democracy are sketched in the context of several areas where discussions about populisms have stressed their discontinuity with the liberal democratic tradition and its practices. The discussion concentrates upon the notions of the people, their representation, elites, constitutional issues and economic policies. In each case it is suggested that continuities are as strong, and sometimes stronger, than discontinuities in these relationships. The contribution ends with a discussion of how it might be possible to defend liberal democracy from a non-liberal position in the face of the critique from populisms.     

Failed expectations: Quality of government and support for populist parties in Europe

This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on support for populist parties: How do perceptions of the local quality of government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument highlights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their area is used to estimate both individual‐ and regional‐level models of the link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. The empirical results show a strong and robust association between within‐country variation in QoG and support for populist parties.