“辩侦交易因素”在贪污贿赂犯罪侦查中的存在理性及其司法运行问题研究——以“相对合理主义”为基本视角

在贪污贿赂犯罪案件的侦查工作中引入“辩侦交易因素”，可以在很大程度上加大反贪力度和推进反贪工作，达到更好地惩治和预防腐败的目的。然而触及到为什么能够以及如何将“辩侦交易因素”很好地引入贪污贿赂犯罪侦查理论和反贪办案实践的问题时，就不得不对其本身的存在理性和司法运行等问题进行研究和分析。当然这种研究的视角是多样的、自由的甚至是随意的，这里选择“相对合理主义”作为一个基本视角，但愿是相对理性的     

Scientific Uncertainty and Science-Based Precaution

The debate between advocates of the "Precautionary Principle" and those of "science-based regulation" hinges in large part on the standard of proof to be applied to the scientific evidence that a given action poses a danger of serious and irreversible environmental harm. We propose an intermediate approach, which we term "science-based precaution," intended to facilitate adaptive management of environmental issues – that is, learning through experience and experimentation.We propose that evidence justifying precautionary action must be sufficient to create a "reasonable belief" of serious and irreversible environmental danger. In other cases, in which the proponents of an action bear the burden of proof that the actions they propose will not cause environmental harm, we propose that they must make a "clear showing"to that effect. Both of these standards of proof are derived from a scale constructed from the standards of proof used in various branches of US law.The "reasonableness" standard of proof for the application of the Precautionary Principle is more cautious than the record of international efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and to deal with climate change. It is analogous to the standard of proof imposed by US administrative law, and is also consistent with the position of the European Union and the holdings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the beef hormones case. We further propose a Reasonableness Principle: that scientific research and technological innovations promising major benefits not be unreasonably blocked before their full implications are understood.     

论《道路交通安全法》第76条无过错责任之合理性

《道路交通安全法》第76条之规定被解读为“机动车负全责”,从而成为社会讨论的的焦点问题。该第76条中规定了两个无过错责任,即保险公司的无过错责任以及机动车对行人、非机动车的无过错责任。分析得出,保险公司承担无过错责任,是与保险分散社会风险的原理分不开;机动车损伤行人、非机动车后,对保险赔偿剩余的部分,由机动车方承担相对的无过错责任,同时规定可以就受害人的过失进行相抵。具合理性。     

论行政诉讼上的合理性审查

在行政诉讼上由"滥用职权""明显不当"构建的合理性审查,就是实质合法性审查。我国行政诉讼法第70条胪列的各种审查标准实际上暗含着适用次序,形式合法审查标准先于实质合法审查标准,"滥用职权"先于"明显不当"。这对于隔断随意流动、阐释各自的内涵与边界、形成较为稳定的解释结构至关重要。为了进一步科学合理地界定"滥用职权""明显不当",对于"滥用职权"的解释应当去主观化,受限于变更判决的"木桶效应",不宜无限扩大"明显不当"的内涵。     

宪政的价值构成与宪政的合理性分析

宪政的合理性不仅在于其对权力的正当化和规范化 ,更在于其对正义、民主、自由等价值理念的张扬与坚持 ;前者旨在解说宪政的工具合理性 ,后者则力图以宪政的价值合理性来论证宪政的工具合理性 ,并为宪政实践提供方向性指引。在宪政的价值构成体系内 ,正义具有综合性与绝对性的特质 ,是宪政的第一性价值 ,并构成宪政价值合理性的基础 ;民主、自由等具体价值目标是宪政的第二性价值 ,它们源自于正义且受制于正义 ,并成为宪政价值合理性的证明。     

Power,norms and theory. A meta-political inquiry

Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must reveal the specific standards internal to the political practice of handling power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking normativity until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In contrast, this essay identifies a normative dimension internal to (the conquest and exercise of) power. Power depends on recognition and support in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of politics.     

中国传统司法思维模式的文化分析

中国古代法官在审判过程中,为追求实质正义-无讼与和谐,往往会舍法而取情理,依情理进行审判。这种法律思维模式与西方的严格形式主义相对,被称为实质性思维模式,它是中国古代审判文化的一个特质。其产生的文化根源是中国人对和谐、无讼理想社会的追求及越过事物的形式追求实质内容的思维模式,以实质性思维处理案件亦可达至息讼止争的社会目的,但这种思维模式也造成了中国人法治观念的淡漠,同时阻碍了中国法治社会的建立。然而,无论如何它作为中国传统法律文化的一部分又是无法抛弃的,只能期待我们现代人对其进行创造性的转化。     

农业税质疑

作者在文中对正在试行中的农村税费改革方案保留农业税、提高农业税税率提出质疑，认为这是政府过度提取农业剩余为工业进行资本原始积累政策的延续；违背了公平税负的原则；不利于农业、农民入世；包含了农民负担反弹的可能；数额不大，征收成本高。     

Police officers' perceptual distortions during lethal force situations: Informing the reasonableness standard*

Research Summary In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that determinations about the constitutional appropriateness of police force usage—deadly or not—must be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Although the Court's ruling established a clear standard for judging officers' actions (i.e., the perspective of a reasonable police officer on the scene), we know little about the sorts of factors that might frame the perspective of reasonable police officers during situations in which they apply force. This article presents the results of a study that examined 80 police officers' detailed accounts of how they perceived what transpired during 113 incidents in which they shot citizens. Respondents reported experiencing a wide range of sensory distortions, with the vast majority of officers reporting two or more distinct sorts. This study takes these findings as a point of departure to expand our understanding of what constitutes a reasonable officer's perspective during the tense, uncertain moments during which he or she makes the decision to employ deadly force. Policy Implications Given that officers are likely to experience multiple distortions during shootings, the findings have implications for civilian and police oversight policies. In particular, those responsible for reviewing police shooting incidents should take into consideration that officers' behavior will not always be based on the objective reality of what is occurring at the time they decide to pull the trigger, but rather an altered conception of it. Such an understanding is crucial to improving the image of police in certain communities and positively impacting citizen trust of, and satisfaction with, the police.     

RHETORIC OF THE LAWYER AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONVERSATION

The article focuses on the difference between strategic rhetoric and philosophical conversation. It first tries to distinguish between sophistical manipulation and valid strategic argumentation. In order to do that, the author tries to give a new meaning to the old Aristotelian tripartition between logos, ethos, and pathos. Then, he uses Chaim Perelman’s theory of argumentation to show that the standard of rationality in practical reasoning is a specific one. After having clarified the very concept of strategic argumentation, the author distinguishes it from the notion of philosophical conversation. He tries to show that if the latter is completely replaced by the former, the danger exists that victimization and morals “a la carte” will generate a defeat of critical thought.