秘密侦查手段在经济犯罪侦控中的运用

新刑事诉讼法明确了秘密侦查措施的合法身份,这对侦查活动来说,既是机遇也是挑战。经济犯罪案件的隐蔽性、复杂性特征决定了在其预防控制阶段及侦查过程中使用秘密侦查手段,均具有理论依据及合法性基础。在把秘密侦查手段具体应用于经济犯罪的预防与侦查过程中,要结合经济犯罪案件自身的特点,同时应当严格遵照法律的规制。     

Institutional reform and political party engagement: Challenges to democratic transformation in post-CPA Sudan

ABSTRACT

This article looks at the role of institutions and political parties as main agents of the democratisation process in the Sudan, following the signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A review of the historic weaknesses of intermittent democratic rule in the Sudan, since its independence in 1956 and through to the signing of the CPA, is offered. Those elements of the CPA critical to institutional reform and democratisation are identified and their implementation assessed, including the results of the CPA-mandated elections held in April 2010. The four principal political parties and their capacities to contribute to democratic transformation are analysed.     

Democracy's Effect on Terrorist Organizations: Regime Type and Armed Group Behavior in Chile

How does democracy influence terrorism? The regime-responsive school argues that lack of representation in autocracies motivates violence; the regime-permissive school posits that individual liberty in democracies allows it. The schools thus disagree about the democratic feature to which violence responds—representation or individual liberty. These arguments are problematic in two ways. First, neither accounts for the potentially competing effects of different democratic features. Second, treating terrorism as a set response to operating context ignores the operational processes behind violence, described in organizational theories of terrorism. This article develops a bridge between the regime-responsive and regime-permissive schools by applying organizational theories of terrorism to their key arguments. I argue that representation and individual liberty have independent, and sometimes competing, effects on armed groups' missions, hierarchies, and membership—collectively organizational capacity, the ability to survive and influence the environment. This explains the mixed effects of democracy on terrorism: both high-functioning democracy and repressive autocracy weaken organizational capacity, but decreased representation in a democracy or higher individual liberty in an autocracy removes organizational stresses. New research on Chile between 1965 and 1995—representing five government periods, with four armed groups operating—acts as an initial test of these relationships.     

The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramural challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’

Abstract

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.     

‘Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power,Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries

This article provides a systematic overview of the institutional basis of presidential power in 30 sub-Saharan African countries, using a broad comparative scheme to assess presidential power developed by Siaroff (2003). The dual purpose is, first, to compare the power of African presidents to patterns found by Siaroff for countries worldwide, looking particularly at the relation between regime type and presidential power; and second, to make a preliminary analysis of the political consequences of high levels of presidential power in the light of earlier theoretical claims associating it with regime problems such as democratic breakdown.

The article's comparative framework illustrates the high levels of institutional power of presidents in 30 African countries. As argued by Siaroff, regime type tells us little about presidential power; in these African cases, semi-presidential systems score even higher than presidential systems. One ‘parliamentary’ system also shows a high degree of presidential power. Moreover, there is very little difference in presidential power between democracies and non-democracies, and ‘minimal’ electoral democracies score higher on average than non-democracies and liberal democracies.

Examination of the consequences of high levels of presidential power also shows that more than a quarter (28.6 per cent) of such regimes experienced a democratic breakdown, although this is not a statistically significant level. A weak correlation is found between presidential power and freedom and democracy ratings, again not at a statistically significant level, while correlations with governance ratings are strong and statistically significant. A repeated measures test, however, does show a statistically significant relation with freedom and democracy. Although more research is needed, including a larger N and more variation in the independent variable, the evidence supports intuitive knowledge: a high degree of presidential power bodes ill for democracy and good governance in Africa.     

Internationalized regimes: a second dimension of regime hybridity

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.     

Party systems in Latin America: institutionalization,decay, and collapse,edited by Scott Mainwaring

Although coming of age under a totalitarian regime drastically reduces the chances of acquiring democratic values or supporting democracy, factors other than the formal nature of the political regime shape political values as well. The informal structure of the political regime, which consists of rules developed in political practice and economic and human development, may shape individual values and attitudes and produce different attitudes towards democracy in different totalitarian regimes. This article focuses on the effect of early socialization on the support for democracy among citizens who have been ruled under two different non-democratic regimes. We compare the dynamics in Spain and Romania during the post-totalitarian period with the aim of identifying how coming of age operated in these two different totalitarian regimes and how each type of non-democratic regime affected the legitimacy of the new democratic rule. Using survey data from various sources (Standard Eurobarometer, Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer) that allow both longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons, we decompose the social change in support for democracy over the post-totalitarian period in both countries using cross-classified fixed effects models. The analyses demonstrate the different effects of socialization on support for democracy in these two different totalitarian contexts.     

Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?

Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.     

Autocracies,democracies, and the violation of civil liberties

Research on autocracies and their consequences has been a growth industry in the latest decade. Nonetheless, the relationship between the type of autocracy and the violation of civil liberties has largely been ignored. In this article, we employ a new dataset, which includes cross-temporal data on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly/association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement, to shed light on this issue. Analysing 182 countries in the period 1979–2008, we show that democracies repress civil liberties less than autocracies do, whereas we find little evidence to the effect that different kinds of autocracies violate civil liberties to different degrees. However, we also show that the differences between democracies and autocracies have declined starkly since the Cold War. Finally, our results demonstrate that the difference in the extent to which democracies and autocracies repress civil liberties is larger for the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly/association than for the freedom of religion and freedom of movement. We take the general difference between the two categories of liberties as evidence that autocracies repress political liberties more than private liberties because the former presents levers for oppositional activity. We argue that the cross-temporal differences are a consequence of the spread of more minimalist democracies since the end of the Cold War.     

Remittances and varieties of democratization in developing countries

ABSTRACT

How do remittances affect democratization in developing countries? In this paper we reconcile divergent findings in the literature by examining the effect of remittances on procedural and liberal democracy in developing countries at various stages of their democratic development. Remittances are primarily sent to middle-class individuals and bypass government control. Yet, governments in countries receiving remittances want to tax this remittance income. Government officials therefore need to incentivize participation of the middle class in the formal economy by reducing the threat of expropriation. Improving procedural democracy, which assures citizens of improved property and rule of law protections, is one way to accomplish this. We argue that this relationship should only be present in mixed regime types, with the democratizing effect of remittances waning as the country’s level of democracy or autocracy strengthens. Further, we expect elements of liberal democracy, such as civil rights and equality under the law, to remain unchanged in all remittance-receiving countries. The middle class and governing elite are less incentivized to improve liberal democracy to limit the power and mobilization capacity of the poor and prevent increased redistribution. We test our theory on a dataset of developing countries from 1975 through 2011.