农杆菌介导O型口蹄疫病毒P12A~*3C基因转化玉米的研究

通过农杆菌介导转化法,将O型口蹄疫病毒P12A*3C基因转化到玉米自交系18-599的Ⅱ型胚性愈伤组织中,经潮霉素抗性筛选获得25株抗性再生植株。对转基因植株的PCR检测,PCR-Southern及RT-PCR检测表明,目的基因P12A*3C已经整合到玉米基因组中并得到表达。T1代植株的PCR检测表明,P12A*3C基因能稳定遗传,本研究为转基因玉米口蹄疫可饲疫苗的生产奠定了试验基础。     

决策树算法在未成年人犯罪成因中的应用研究

犯罪成因的分析在未成年人犯罪研究中起着重要的作用,而分类算法在分析犯罪成因上是卓有成效的。决策树算法是分类算法中一类重要的算法,其中以C4．5算法最为流行,但这种算法在时间复杂性和增量式学习方面还不是很理想,因此有必要对其进行改进。     

丹皮酚对高脂血清诱导的大鼠主动脉内皮细胞损伤的保护作用及其黏附功能的影响

目的观察丹皮酚（Paeonal,Pae）对高脂血清诱导的大鼠单核细胞（mononuclear cell,MC）与大鼠主动脉内皮细胞（rat aortic endothelial cells,RAECs）黏附的影响及对RAECs损伤的保护作用。方法高脂乳剂灌胃大鼠并制备高脂血清;组织块预消化贴壁法培养RAECs;淋巴细胞分离液分离MC;孟加拉玫瑰红活细胞染色法测定MC与RAECs的黏附功能;甲基噻唑基四唑比色法以及台盼蓝死细胞染色法检测Pae对高脂血清诱导的RAECs损伤的保护作用。结果30～70ml／L高脂血清呈剂量依赖性地诱导MC与RAECs的黏附,50ml／L时促进MC与RAECs黏附达最大值;高脂血清与RAECs共育6h即可明显促进黏附作用,24h时达最大诱导效应。Pae在浓度为15～240μmol／L时,呈剂量依赖性地抑制高脂血清诱导的黏附作用;240μmol／L孵育24h时抑制作用最明显;Pae在30,60,120μmol／L浓度时,对高脂血清损伤的大鼠RAECs有明显的保护作用。结论Pae对高脂血清诱导的大鼠MC与RAECs黏附功能有抑制效应,对高脂血清损伤的大鼠RAECs有明显的保护作用。     

糖肾康颗粒对糖尿病肾病气阴两虚、瘀血阻络证患者血清胱抑素C及尿纤维连接蛋白的干预作用

目的 观察Ⅲ～Ⅳ期糖尿病肾病（diabetic nephropathy,DN）气阴两虚、瘀血阻络证患者血清胱抑素C（cystatin C,CysC）、尿纤维连接蛋白（urinary fibronectin,UFn）水平及糖肾康颗粒的干预作用。方法 将60例Ⅲ～Ⅳ期糖尿病肾病气阴两虚、瘀血阻络证患者随机分为治疗组和对照组,各30例,并选取20名健康体检者作为正常组。治疗组与对照组均给予常规降糖、降压治疗,治疗组加用糖肾康颗粒,疗程2个月。治疗前后分别检测治疗组与对照组尿白蛋白/尿肌酐比值（microalbuminuria/urine creatinine,MAU/UCr）、肾小球滤过率估算值（estimated glomerular filtration rate,eGFR）以及CysC、UFn水平,并与正常组比较。结果 治疗组中医证候疗效显著优于对照组（P＜0.01）;在降低MAU/UCr比值和CysC、UFn水平,以及升高eGFR水平方面,治疗组显著优于对照组（P<0.01）。结论 糖肾康颗粒可降低Ⅲ～Ⅳ期DN气阴两虚、瘀血阻络证患者血清CysC、UFn水平,并可减少DN患者尿蛋白排泄,维持肾小球滤过率,在一定程度上具有保护肾功能、延缓疾病进展的作用。     

BAT在非离子型造影剂过敏反应中的诊断价值

目的通过测定免疫正常人、β-内酰胺类药物过敏者以及非离子型造影剂过敏者血液中CD63、肥大细胞羧肽酶A3(MC-CPA3)、人末端补体复合物SC5b-9,探讨嗜碱性粒细胞活化试验(basophil activation test,BAT)在非离子型造影剂过敏反应中的诊断价值。方法采用流式细胞术测定全血中嗜碱性粒细胞CD63表达率。采用ELISA法测定血清中MC-CPA3、血浆中SC5b-9含量。结果非离子型造影剂和β-内酰胺类药物过敏者血液中嗜碱性粒细胞CD63表达率、MC-CPA3以及SC5b-9含量均较免疫正常人升高(P0.05)。结论非离子型造影剂过敏者血液中嗜碱性粒细胞和肥大细胞发生活化,补体系统的激活也参与了非离子型造影剂过敏反应的发生。流式细胞术分析BAT可作为非离子型造影剂过敏反应的诊断方法。     

Consensus to Contestation: Reconfiguring Democratic Representation in the European Union in the Light of 19th Century United States Democratization

This article explores how proposals for democratizing the European Union (EU) according to a supranational, contestational model are likely to disrupt its existing political system. The current EU is characterized by a dual system of representation that combines the representation of member states with that of individual citizens. Democratization typically entails enhancing the representation of individuals at the expense of state prerogatives. It is thus possible to make a pertinent analogy with the antebellum United States, which also featured dual representation, and where a great wave of democratization took place following Andrew Jackson's presidency (1829–1837). As the system of representation there became more majoritarian, John C. Calhoun led the calls for introducing new anti-majoritarian constitutional safeguards. A transatlantic comparison suggests the contestational system born of EU democratization will require institutional innovation in order to prove viable. In this context, Calhoun's theory of nullification, an ex post political mechanism wielded by the units to stymie federal legislation, appears more appropriate as an anti-majoritarian bulwark and better able to engender constitutional debate over competences than is the EU's stillborn judicial principle of subsidiarity. In similarly Calhounian fashion, a bottom-up procedure of constitutional amendment originating in the units is further proposed as a way of establishing unit acquiescence to greater supranationalism.     

A unified model of settlement and trial expenditures: The Priest–Klein model extended

Settlement and trial expenditures are crucially interrelated. The literature on settlement, however, takes no account of models of trial. In this paper, we develop a unified model of settlement and trial expenditures. We do this by discarding the usual assumption of settlement models that trial costs are constant across cases. Instead, we follow the literature on trial by permitting trial costs to vary with the legal merit of the plaintiff's case. Our approach can be used to extend standard models of settlement such as the well-known Priest–Klein model as well as models based on asymmetric information. As a demonstration, we extend the Priest–Klein model and generally overturn that model's canonical results. In particular, we show that even in a fully symmetric model, predicted win rates at trial can deviate substantially from 50 percent. Furthermore, win rates will vary in response to legal reforms that shift the decision standard.