The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective

Regulatory arbitrage, or the ability of financial firms to circumvent or neutralize rules, is a classic problem of financial regulation. This article draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) to reformulate this old problem, thus defining regulatory arbitrage as a contracting hazard arising from interactions between the regulator and regulated firms, given bounded rationality and opportunism. Following standard TCE, the article first characterizes the implicit regulatory contract in finance, focusing in particular on the mobile and elastic nature of regulated actors and financial assets as well as the contested utility of financial innovation. It is then argued that this incomplete and hazard-prone regulatory bargain must be matched with a governance structure that both adapts to unforeseen circumstances and avoidance strategies and copes with radical uncertainty about the welfare consequences of financial innovation. To that end, the article discusses how a governance structure here termed “relational regulation” might facilitate such ex post governance under uncertainty.     

Satisfaction,Alternatives, Investments,and the Microfoundations of Audience Cost Models

In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory. Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states. However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not always the case. We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a precondition for the application of audience costs. Using the UN and NATO as case studies, we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations. Correlational and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular institutions are poor. Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed.     

论影响力交易罪

影响力交易罪 ,是《联合国反腐败公约》规定的一类新型犯罪。影响力交易罪的内涵 ,可以从交易的影响力、交易的主体、交易物和交易行为四个方面进行解读。在外延上 ,影响力交易罪与我国刑法中的受贿、行贿等罪有一定重合。我国刑法应当移植影响力交易罪的概念。     

论商法的统一

商法的统一重在交易规则的统一。统一有时间、空间的定位,时间上从历史的探求,定位于现代商法的统一;空间上鉴于现代市场是无边界的,商法全球统一是不可阻挡的时代潮流,但当今仍然是主权国家组成的世界,定位本国商法的统一显然是全球商法统一的基础。     

许霆案归责的法经济学分析

法律责任的归责要遵循四个基本的原则,分别是责任法定原则、责任相称原则、责任自负原则、因果关系原则,这些基本原则是有机统一的。这些原则可以运用个人主义、交易成本、公共选择、外部性等经济学原理进行分析。通过这些理论工具的运用,本文认为,许霆案的司法判决违反这四个原则,因此从经济分析的角度来看,许霆案的判决是无效率的。     

财政法的经济学根基——交易成本公共物品理论的提出

传统上,财政学和财政法均认为财政存在的必要性在于外部性理论以及在此基础上提出的传统公共物品理论。而交易成本公共物品理论则主张,财政法的经济学根基不在于外部性,而在于解决外部性的交易成本的高低。政府应以更低的交易费用来提供公共物品,提供公共物品的目的是为了降低整个社会的交易费用。财政和财政法的主要职能是降低整个社会的交易费用,而不是所谓的教务式的“提供公共物品”。借“私人不愿提供公共物品”之名而行垄断之实,其结果往往导致该物品的交易费用增加。因此,在决定一类物品由谁提供时,政府应该这样思考：该物品由私人提供和由国家提供,哪种方式交易费用较低？政府如何降低其交易费用？     

论政府在水权交易中的角色定位

水资源和水权自身的特性以及水权交易所产生的外部性说明了水权交易中政府介入的必要性。政府所具有的经济管理和公共事务管理双重基本职能使得政府在水权交易中的介入具有现实的可行性。政府在水权交易中应扮演好以下角色:政府应成为初始水权的配置者;政府应成为水权交易制度的供给者;政府应成为良好水权交易环境的塑造者。     

物权行为与善意取得保障交易安全机能之分析与比较

物权行为和善意取得以各自不同的机制,保护交易关系中的第三人利益,从而维护交易安全。物权行为以其无因性原则,切断前手交易的瑕疵,保护第三人利益,具有保障无偿取得者正当利益和维护债权人权益的善意取得所不具有的机能。但在无权处分时,物权行为无法发挥作用,只能借助于善意取得制度来实现对第三人利益的保护。物权行为和善意取得在保障交易安全方面的机能各有所长,两者均不可偏废,都应在我国的物权立法中体现。     

关注金融衍生交易的市场风险向法律风险的转化——对中航油、中信泰富事件的反思

金融衍生交易的市场风险与法律风险通常被视为两个完全不同的问题,但对于中国企业,特别是具有国资背景的海外上市公司来说,最大的损失源自金融衍生交易的市场风险向法律风险的转化。它显示了传统的国有企业管理体制与现代金融衍生交易的市场规则、法律规则之间的碰撞。中航油事件与中信泰富事件所揭示出的这一风险转化过程,为观察金融衍生交易的法律风险提供了一个新的视角。     

The impact of economic theories on the law in market relations

The impact of economic theories on legal development, thinking and practice is undeniable. This is particularly true for neo-classical and institutional economics. Neo-classical economics are based on model assumptions of human behaviour such as pursuit of personal advantage, individualistic goals, complete information and at the same time law obedience which are the foundations of the functioning of the market mechanisms. The assumption leads to an almost mystical belief in the self-regulatory power of the market and a strong disdain and disapproval of the State. The concepts of a minimal State and de-regulation of all social relations follow from there. This article argues that model assumptions are valid scientific tools, as long as they are not taken to reflect the real world which is populated by real people that are not necessarily behaving like homines oeconomici. Preaching de-regulation and the dismissal of the State can prove simplistic and even dangerous and may lead to financial and economic crises like the ones witnessed in recent years. Institutional economics part from these empirical findings. They do not question individualism and the pursuit of egoistic objectives of market-participants, but they insist on inherent risks of this mechanism which stems from opportunistic behaviour, lack of information and transparency and the limits of trust. Property economists deduct from there that sustainable and dynamic economic development is unthinkable without well defined property title, the distinction of property and possession and credit securities. These institutions cannot be self-regulatory but need a clear legal frame, in other words rules established by a State. Transaction costs economists understand the danger of opportunistic behaviour and a corresponding systemic lack of trust in the negotiation, conclusion and execution of contracts. They underline the necessity of institutions which are capable of limiting these dangers and thus reducing transaction costs. Institutions may be customs, informal arrangements and formal law. At the end two examples are presented-real estate transactions and post-patriarchal family relations-to test the utility of these considerations.