Wasting innovation: barriers to entry and European regulation on waste electronic equipment

The European Directive on Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment 2002/96/EC distorts incentives in regulated markets. Treatment of ‘historical waste’—i.e. products sold prior to 13 August 2005—is financed by all firms in the market at the time of disposal. This stimulates excessive pre-regulation output by incumbents for two reasons: a costs sharing effect and entry deterrence. Entry deterrence is achieved by raising the common costs of waste disposal. Entry is a main driver of innovation in the affected industries. The feasibility of a first best policy is discussed and an alternative rule superior to the status quo is presented.

Costs and recovery rates in the Dutch liquidation-based bankruptcy system

We present evidence on the efficiency of the resolution of financial distress in bankruptcy in The Netherlands. Direct costs average 16%, firm recovery 37% and bank debt recovery 80%. The direct costs are lower in larger firms and in firms with more bank debt. Costs increase with the time it takes to sell assets. Firm recovery is influenced by asset structure, capital structure and to a lesser extent Dutch legal variables. However, the opportunity to continue operations in bankruptcy is chosen by about half the firms and this has a positive effect on recoveries.

Deregulation,property rights,and legal system

During regulation the regulator carries out an intermediary role between shareholders and managers, consequently affecting property rights and the agency relation between the two. Deregulation implies that this intermediary role ceases to exist. This article analyses how government deregulation changes property rights, differentiating between firms of network and non-network structures. Changes in property rights affect the agency relation between shareholders and managers, increasing information asymmetry and agency costs. I argue that the way to reduce agency costs depend to a great extent on the country’s legal system classified as of common or civil law tradition.

论设立中公司交易的责任

设立中公司交易就是在设立公司过程中的交易行为,是设立中公司的行为。设立中公司交易主要有设立中公司合同和发起人协议。设立中公司在法律地位上属于一种合伙企业,第三人可向承担顺位连带责任的设立中公司与发起人行使双重优先权。英美法系、大陆法系国家的立法对此问题给予了充分关注。我国对于设立中公司交易责任承担的法律规定却很不完善,建议借鉴先进国家立法经验,完善我国的相关立法。     

Helpful local surtaxes? Florida and disadvantaged families

Well-intended tax policy often produces unintended consequences. In this article, we look at one such tax policy, specialised surtaxes in the State of Florida. Surtaxes are frequently adopted to provide financial assistance to poverty-based local programmes and services. Despite the intended benefits, we show that the contributors of the tax have been able to capitalise the cost into the residential property market, ultimately placing the burden of the surtax upon the population its revenue intends to help.     

Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

What Drives For-Profit and Nonprofit Organizations’ Entry into Voucher Markets?

This study investigates a social service voucher program in Korea to examine why local governments rely on external actors, such as for-profit and nonprofit organizations, in provisioning social services and what encourages such market entry in view of the transaction cost theory. The social service voucher program, first introduced in 2007, offers a unique dataset of 1,101 local markets to examine how local governments are willing to stay in control of provisioning the nationwide program while promoting private actor entry. This study finds that local governments with lower fiscal capacities or in markets in which multiple existing organizations operate are more motivated to foster for-profit entry, whereas only existing nonprofit organizations in the market that provide the same services predict nonprofit entry. The implication is that the facilitation of for-profit entry is associated with local governments’ need to manage transaction costs, although this may not be true for nonprofit entry.     

违约救济的多种模式以及我国的选择

在违约救济领域存在着多种模式,理论上较为完善的有大陆模式、英美模式以及国际模式三种。我国在借鉴的过程中,不仅要分析这些模式本身的利弊,还要考虑自身的条件和需求。鉴于大陆模式更有助于培养诚信意识、建立交易秩序并且对法官的依赖较少,所以应当成为我们主要的制度渊源。     

A Tale of Two Cities: Bureaucratisation in Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Municipalities

This paper presents a theory that predicts under what circumstances self-interested politicians ‘bureaucratise’ their administrations, in the sense that they delegate the powers to hire, fire and promote public employees to autonomous bodies (like civil service commissions). The main testable proposition is that, in polities with a higher concentration of powers, politicians will bureaucratise their administrations to overcome time inconsistency problems in their relationships with public employees. This prediction is tested with data drawn from US municipalities, where two main types of local governments co-exist: mayor-council and council-manager. Results show that municipal governments with a higher concentration of powers (i.e. mayor-council) tend to have more bureaucratised administrations.     

“交易成本”概念的历史

文章回顾了“交易成本”概念的历史。这个概念从20世纪30年代科斯等人提出开始,经历了60年代含义的扩张,70－80年代运用于经济组织的分析和制度演化的分析,终于成为经济学理论中的一个基本的概念。