Divorcing Responsibly

In this article I argue that Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 gives expression to a new form ofresponsibility. I begin by suggesting thatresponsible behaviour has shifted from prohibiting orrequiring particular actions: we now exhibitresponsibility by our attitude towards our actions. I then examine where this new conception ofresponsibility has come from. Through an examinationof the work of post-liberal theorists, principallyMichael Sandel, I argue that a changing view ofpersonhood within post-liberal theory has led to aquestioning of the possibility of choice, and that theabsence of choice necessitates a shift in thedefinition of responsible behaviour. If we are createdby our decisions then we cannot be held to account forour decisions, but only for the care we have takenover them. Responsibility is therefore measured notby our level of self-control but by our level ofself-awareness. Finally I examine the consequences ofthis shift in the meaning of responsibility. Withinthis framework autonomy is illusory thereforedecisions do not need to be respected. This explainswhy the implementation of Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 has been called into question. Within thisframework responsibility is relative therefore itextends indefinitely. This enables the Family Law Actto be uniquely intrusive and judgmental: everydivorcing couple, on being held up to scrutiny, isfound lacking.     

“法轮功”练习者受精神控制的心理分析

邪教“法轮功”在世纪末的兴起和发展,有着一定的社会心理基础,迎合了一些人的实际需要,既有历史的巧合,又有现实的矛盾;既有迷信的沉淀,也有道德的困惑。“法轮功”练习者对“法轮功”的认识大体上经历了“知、信、求”三个阶段,当然每一个练习者的表现会有所不同。从动机上分析,有实用型、信仰型、盲目型、泄恨型和牟利型五种情况,但无论是出于何种动机,每一个参加“法轮功”练习的人必定是从中获得了某种需要的满足,才能促使他们以较为坚定的毅力坚持练功,而这种不断获得,不断反馈,又不断强化练功动机的过程也正是他们在心理上受“法轮功”及李洪志本人不断影响与操纵的过程。李洪志利用“法轮功”对广大练习者实行精神控制,并通过教主崇拜、邪说恐吓、群体效应予以实施,进而实现邪教反社会的目的。     

读《史记·货殖列传》札记三篇

札记一<史记·货殖列传>和<汉书·货殖传>均有子贡传,唯不尽同.前者是表彰货殖家之贤而富者,后者意在尊孔,所以对子贡传加以更改.札记二<史记·货殖列传>中"椎埋"一词凡两见,其一是指货殖家"取与以时"牟利致富,与椎埋不相干,当为"推移"二字之误.札记三<史记·货殖列传>中"权利"一词在汉朝是盐铁的同义语.     

以“三个代表”为指针 加强中心城区党建工作

加强中心城区党建工作必须以"三个代表”的思想为指针,紧密结合城区党建工作的实际情况,调查研究,总结经验,找出薄弱环节,查找深层次原因,切实解决存在的问题,探索并建立中心城区党建工作的新思路和新机制.     

从苏东变局看无产阶级执政党始终代表先进生产力的极端重要性

前苏东国家执政党长期背离解放和发展生产力的根本任务,导致经济发展滞后,人民生活水平提高缓慢,最终被人民所唾弃.江泽民同志总揽全局,在世纪之交提出了具有强烈针对性和时代感的“三个代表”思想,发展了马克思主义的建党学说,为中国共产党在新世纪应对各种风浪和挑战的考验提供了强大的思想武器.     

计算机网络与大学生思想政治工作

计算机网络是当今时代信息革命的重要标志,网络的发展给大学生思想政治工作创新带来了难得的发展机遇,也使传统的思想政治工作模式面临严峻挑战。借助计算机网络技术对大学生思想政治工作进行“嫁接”和改造,是新时期大学生思想政治工作新的途径和方法,网络思想政治工作也将成为新时期大学生思想政治工作的重要领域。符合大学生思想政治工作要求的信息网络建设和管理是网络思想政治工作的基础。一支高素质的思想政治工作队伍是网络思想政治工作的必然要求和组织保证。     

浅论邓小平对毛泽东文艺思想的丰富和发展

本文从文艺与人民、文艺与政治两大角度论述了邓小平的文艺理论 ,并探讨了邓小平对毛泽东文艺思想的丰富和发展     

孙子“择人而任劳”辨正

人们历来把《孙子兵法·势篇》最后一段“不责于人,故能择人,而任势”中的“人”释为“力战”或“兵众”、“指挥员”,把“择”释为“选择”,这是错误的。本文通过训释字义及考察孙子关于“众寡之用”的关系、兵员多寡优劣与力量强弱的关系,提出了“择人而任势”是指撇除兵员数量多寡这个因素去使用“势”的新观点。     

An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP’s New Turkey

ABSTRACT

Since roughly 2011, the Turkish state and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been going through a process of mutual transformation. Some of the historical apprehensions, biases and frustrations exhibited by Turkey as a middle power have been absorbed by the relatively reformist AKP. Conversely, the AKP and its undisputed leader Erdo?an have seen their socio-political fears, power based conflicts and ethno-religious desires become dominant in all areas, including religion. As a consequence of this bilateral transformation, Turkey has become both an inclusionary and a hegemonic-authoritarian state, and at the same time a weak one. Within this new identity and structure of the state, Sunni Islam has become one of the regime’s key focal points, with a new logic. This article seeks to explain the transformation of the relations between the AKP’s Turkish state, religion and religious groups, by scrutinising Karrie Koesel’s logic of state-religion interaction in authoritarian regimes.     

The intersectionality of gender,sexuality, and religion: novelties and continuities in Turkey during the AKP era

ABSTRACT

This article argues that in the AKP era, gender and sexuality play a central role in reshaping the secular-religious divide to instil ‘yeni milli’ (new national) – or as AKP members call it, ‘yerli ve milli’ (homegrown and national)- values. Adopting a feminist and reflexive approach, this article seeks to demonstrate that Erdo?an and the AKP have used gender and sexuality-related issue areas not as diversions to highjack the public agenda, as it is often assumed, but as a medium to regulate the neoliberal redistribution of conservative values. After a brief presentation of the historical background of the gendered evolution of the secular-religious divide in Turkish politics, this article focuses on the following three particular cases: the policies and discourse on LGBTI rights; the link that was established between the reproductive rights of women and ethnic identity; and how the AKP created new types of ‘other men’ and ‘other women.’ The article also seeks to show that in each case the meanings attributed to the secular and the religious in the secular-religious divide have shifted accordingly and that shift was reflective of, and was used to instil the particular set of values supportive of particular political positions.