A novel method for the analysis of discharged smokeless powder residues

A novel method for the estimation of intermediate-long firing distance range is proposed. The method is based on the characterization and chemical analysis of the smokeless powder particles on the target. An adhesive lifter is applied to collect the suspected gunshot residues (GSRs) from the surface of an object, and a Modified Griess Test (MGT) is carried out after alkaline hydrolysis on the adhesive lifter. Visualized particles are removed from the adhesive lifter under a microscope. Two systems are used for the analysis of organic discharge residues from the smokeless powder: (1) gas chromatography/thermal energy analysis (GC/TEA) for the analysis of nitroglycerine (NG) and 2,4-dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT), (2) gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) for the identification of organic components such as DNT, NG, and some stabilizers. By using this procedure and confirming that the suspected particles are indeed GSR, one can estimate the intermediate-long firing distance of c. 0.75-3 m in the presence of very few particles and provide information for the classification of ammunition type in casework.     

Developments in Policy Analysis and Evaluation in Public Administration

Established in 1948, Israel can be considered a new developing state in transition; on the other hand, it can be viewed as a modern western society and the only strong democracy in a rather unstable region. While the former implies lack of public administration tradition and the need to invest in basic infrastructures, the latter requires, among other responsibilities, the adoption of norms of systematic policy planning and accountability. In Israel, security problems, limited (and loss of) resources, lack of stability and huge waves of immigration have displaced more mundane issues such as administrative reforms and systematic policy planning approaches. From its inception, there was constant criticism of the state's lack of established norms, functions, and skilled practitioners, particularly in policy analysis and evaluation. At first the criticism came from academia (especially Dror 1968, 1971), but in time it crossed lines and was raised by parties and Members of Parliament (the Knesset), and constituted a major issue in the work of different committees concerned with reforms in the public service and in government reorganization. This paper (1) will discuss the main reasons for the shortcomings of Israeli public policy analysis, evaluation and planning, and (2) will present shifts in conceptualization during recent years, with regard to systematic policy making.     

A Unique Denial: Israel's Foreign Policy and the Armenian Genocide

This article focuses on the Israeli politicization of the Armenian genocide from the perspective of foreign policy. Since the early 1980s Israel's official position has been to not recognize the Armenian genocide. The issue of recognition came to the surface in 1982 after Turkey put pressure on Israel to cancel a Holocaust and genocide conference. This article shows that Israel agreed to pressure the conference organizers to cancel the conference in order to secure protection for Jews fleeing Iran and Syria through the Turkish border. This article also explores the role of informal ambassadors in shaping Israel's position on this issue. Using recently declassified archival documents and oral interviews with key Israeli stakeholders, this is the first investigation into the role of informal ambassadors, specifically the Jewish minority in Turkey, and the American Jewish pro-Israeli lobby. The article also addresses a secondary incentive for Israel's refusal to recognize the genocide: ethnic competition between Jews and Armenians as victims of genocide.     

Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.