RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA, 1979-81

This article attempts to contribute to an understanding of thechallenges involved in trying to bring military and securityagencies under constitutional rule in new democracies by analysingthe case of the Limann regime and the failed democratic transitionin Ghana in 1979–81. In the aftermath of democratizationin 1979 the civilian government made aggressive (and not alwaysdiplomatic) efforts to bring the armed forces under its control.In this instance both the civil government and the militarycommand were threatened by the possibility of a coup from belowand were anxious to prevent it. The analysis tries to answerthe question of why the government and the military commandfailed to make common cause, examining first the conflict betweencivilian officials and the military high command over jurisdictionaland other issues, and then between the security agencies themselvesthat provided the opening for the overthrow once again of democracy.The coup itself was the result of the double crisis of civiland military authority. The institutional arrangements throughwhich civil command has been exercised are examined; it is arguedthat civil control of the military in independent Ghana hashistorically been a myth, and that the existence of a civilianregime does not necessarily suggest civil control of the military.