A note on the status of discretion in police research

“Discretion” holds an unrivaled position at the core of the notional inventory employed in the study of criminal justice generally and policing particularly. Efforts to systematically define the term have been irregular and its status in the empirical literature is an ambiguous one. While spoken of as a quantitative aspect of the policing which influences behavior, measurement is rarely addressed. After sketching problems in present formulations, discretion is recast in terms of perceived job autonomy and an outline of two general constructs is contributed in hopes of renewing consideration of the potential relevance of the concept for police theory and research.     

Law enforcement information sharing: A Florida case study

Many attempts have been made over the last several decades to improve communication among law enforcement agencies. This article is a case study of a “low-level” data sharing project in Florida that could serve as a national model. The Florida Law Enforcement Data Sharing Consortium is a partnership between the University of Central Florida and more than one hundred law enforcement agencies. It offers an inexpensive, yet technically advanced alternative to the proprietary data sharing model. Its distributed architecture was endorsed by the Markle Foundation, the 9/11 Commission, and the 2004 National Security Act. Civil liberties concerns raised by this and other types of data sharing projects are discussed.     

A mesolevel comparative approach to maxi and mini strategies of public enterprise reform

Large-scale privatization is an unfamiliar area of public policy. The practice and study of property reforms and privatization needs to include mesolvel phenomena such as laws, regulations, institutions and standard operating procedures. There has been little comparative analysis of privatization programs around the world. The author argues that analysts should compare the most immediately relevant institutional environment of the enterprise. Conceptually, this mesolevel system is situated between the firm and the macroeconomy. This system of action is especially fruitful for cross-national comparisons of privatization programs because it is at this level that privatization strategies are designed. The problem for Eastern Europe and for less-developed countries is lack of experience with the relatively light economic regulation that characterizes industrial countries. Government leaders must also decide how much effort to devote to privatization of state-owned enterprises and how much to fostering private sector investment in new firms. Ernest J. Wilson, III is affiliated with the National Security Council, Washington, D.C.     

Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Effects of Accountability and Obstacles to Policy Change

Numerous analyses have been conducted on how political institutions affect economic performance. In recent years the emphasis has been on a causal logic that emphasizes institutional obstacles to policy change, such as those presented by multiple veto points. This has especially been the case when it comes to the important question of how political institutions influence governments' responses to exogenous economic shocks. We make the case for a substantial broadening of focus and show that when it comes to a major type of exogenous shock, a forced exchange-rate devaluation, variations in the breadth of accountability of the chief executive are more robustly associated with the post-shock growth recovery than variations in obstacles to policy change. We first argue that the size of the winning coalition will be positively associated with growth recoveries following forced devaluations. We then use a newly developed measure of the size of the winning coalition to test our claim. Our statistical analysis is based on a study of the responses of 44 countries to forced exchange-rate devaluations in the late 1990s.