Economic aspirations, well-being and political support in recession and boom periods: the case of West Germany

Abstract. Usually the aggregate over-time relationship between economics and politics is empirically reduced to a simple one equation regression model which specifies political support as the dependent, and several economic indicators as independent variables. Here more comprehensive causal model is tested for West Germany. Economic aspirations, personal well-being, fear of the direct effects of economic crisis and political demands are introduced as intervening causal structures between the state of the economy and political support. It is demonstrated that the strength of the relationship between the economy and political support is quite different in recession and boom periods, depending on the subjective importance of economic concerns and the degree of fear of losing one's job. As the analysis of four different economic periods reveals, the effects of inflation and unemployment on political support are strongest when these indicators have an upward tendency. If they are stationary at a low or a higher level, their influences disappear.     

The long‐term development of organised business and its implications for corporatism: A cross‐national comparison of membership,activities and governing capacities of business interest associations, 1980–2003

Internationalisation of markets and the demise of Keynesianism have made business more independent of associational action. Membership density and ‘corporatist’ involvement in wage bargaining and public policy have declined only modestly, while the capacity to govern members has dwindled significantly. This development is driven by the way in which large firms and the state relate to business associations. Large firms still have a vital interest not only in associational action, but also in integrating their smaller counterparts. Stated‐based support for multi‐employer bargaining, as established in most countries, buttresses business associations. By equipping the associations with an encompassing grip on the labour market, this support prompts governments to involve them in public policy. Since encompassing labour market regulation enables the associations to impose negative externalities on unaffiliated businesses, it provides them with a strong selective incentive for membership. The significant decline of the associations' governing capacity emanates from pressures of their large members to reduce costs of association. The implications of this development for interest intermediation are twofold. Given the strong decay of union power, the resilience of corporatism strongly hinges on the continued strength of organised business and on its state‐sponsored engagement in bargaining. At the same time, leeway for compromising has been restrained by the significant decline in the governing capacity of organised business. This decline echoes an ever‐growing predominance of large firms in business associations, while economic internationalisation exacerbates interest conflicts between larger and smaller firms. To the extent that this configuration of interest and power weakens the ability of business associations to integrate the mass of small firms, it develops into the new Achilles heel of corporatism.