IDENTIFYING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT MEDIATE THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PARENTING PRACTICES AND DELINQUENCY*

Past research has largely ignored the developmental changes within the child that account for the association between parenting and risk for delinquency. We used structural equation modeling and data from a longitudinal study of several hundred African‐American families to test the contentions of various theories regarding the sociocognitive and emotional factors that mediate the impact of parental behavior on a youth's risk for delinquency. Our findings largely supported the theories. The impact of monitoring/discipline was indirect through low self‐control and acceptance of deviant norms, whereas the effect of hostility/ rejection was indirect through low self‐control, hostile view of relationships, and acceptance of deviant norms. These two dimensions of parenting were no longer related either to affiliation with deviant peers or to conduct problems once the effects of these psychological characteristics were taken into account; the impact of these parenting practices was completely mediated by these four cognitive/affective variables. Contrary to expectation, however, these psychological factors did not mediate any of the relationship between caretaker involvement in antisocial behavior and child conduct problems.     

Canada and the Honduran Coup

The purpose of this article is to expose the part played by Canadian imperialism in Honduras before and after the military overthrow of democratically elected Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, on 28 June 2009. It draws attention to the neglected role of the Canadian state's efforts to protect the interests of Canadian capital in Honduras and Latin America more generally through the constant undermining of Zelaya's attempts to return to his legitimate office, and in the ultimate consolidation of the coup under Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo in early 2010. The article simultaneously develops a critique of what has become the standard account of the Honduran coup of 2009. We show how Zelaya was neither a puppet of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, nor an autocrat seeking to entrench his power indefinitely through illegal constitutional reform when he was violently tossed out of government.     

POWER, RATIONALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

In this paper we propose answers to the research question: how does power shape the construction of legitimacy in the context of public organizations? We suggest that while organizational structures of dominancy will be embedded, not all structures of dominancy align with those that are normatively presented as legitimate and authoritative. Such situations make the creation and sustenance of legitimacy problematic for organizational action. This paper advances our understanding of the relation between power, rationality and legitimacy by showing how structures of domination recursively constitute, and are constituted by, legitimacy that may not be authoritative. We show, empirically, how these relations prevented a police organization from reforming by breaking the recursive patterns of domination and legitimization. Theoretically, we argue that understanding organizational change must be connected to issues of power and legitimacy.     

Case Processing Times in Three Courts

The time it takes a court to process its cases, a critical aspect of court performance, varies widely from case to case, from court to court, and within a given court as the court and its environment change over time. The sources of this variation, however, have remained largely obscure.
This paper examines the structural and case-level influences on processing times in three criminal courts experiencing structural changes, including a number of administrative reforms designed to reduce processing times. We find both similarities and differences between courts, but in general both many structural arrangements and many case characteristics affect processing times, with some case characteristics having different effects under different structural arrangements, and some structural arrangements affecting different sorts of cases differently. We conclude with a discussion of implications for court management.