Chechen Demographic Growth as a Reaction to Conflict: The Views of Chechens

Abstract

This article presents the views of émigré Chechens on the reasons behind the particular patterns of demographic growth of Chechnya. The main driving force, identified by the respondents interviewed in the research, is the fear of national extinction. The traditional obligation for Chechen men to defend the homeland adds another explanation: the Chechen respondents consider demographic growth to be related to preparedness for war. Both explanations are related to the perception of Russia as an imminent threat. A range of other factors was mentioned by smaller numbers of respondents. The article concludes that Chechen demographic growth is related to the unresolved Russo–Chechen conflict.     

Minority Religions and Social Justice in Russian Courts: An Analysis of Recent Cases

This paper presents a number of important recent cases from Russia involving new and minority faiths. The cases are examined to see how these unpopular groups are dealt within the context of a rapidly changing Russia. Conclusions are drawn about how the legal system in Russia operates concerning minority faiths, using the sociological variables discussed in this issue's introduction.     

Global money laundering and its domestic political consequences in Kyrgyzstan

This paper examines how Kyrgyzstan's two post-communist political regimes used offshore accounts to launder money and broker lucrative deals with international business partners. It argues that easy access to global financial institutions and availability of offshore markets strengthens a corrupt regime's grip on both political and economic matters and gives regime members a feeling of invincibility both domestically and globally. Offshore connections contributed to the emergence of a vast shadow economy inside Kyrgyzstan that includes clandestine hydropower exports, manipulations in the financial sector, and organized crime. The paper particularly focuses on the non-state actors who served as brokers to mediate connections between regime incumbents and international markets.     

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

Chechen ethnic identity: assessing the shift from resistance to submission

This article critically assesses the ostensible transformation in Chechen ethnic identity. Journalists and scholars who came to this conclusion based their claim on obvious changes in Chechen behavior. The brave and irreconcilable resistance the nation demonstrated during the First and the Second Russo-Chechen Wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2009, respectively, was replaced by a submissive and loyal stance with regard to the new authorities and recent enemies. This article investigates whether such a change in behavior reflects a corresponding change in ethnic identity. This article asserts that ‘non-Chechen’ behavioral models do not signify changes in Chechen ethnic identity by presenting and analyzing Chechen narratives concerning the question. In summary, this article concludes that the ethnic identity of the nation remained mainly untouched. This conclusion is supported by the observed continuity of Chechen resistance, which has always been driven by cherished values such as freedom.     

Farewell to the Caucasus: Regional ethnic clan politics and the growing instability of the ruling elite after the 2012 presidential elections in Russia

One of the most lingering questions about Russian politics that dominates public discourse and media coverage is the future of political regime after the 2012 presidential elections. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the extent of differences between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, how long their “tandemocracy” will last and what can bring about regime change as scarce critics of the Kremlin, from ultra-liberals to communists, have been haphazardly co-opted into the power system, leaving no political ambitions that they would not, in principle, be ready to abandon in return for proper compensation.In sharp contrast to the views of many regional experts and commentators, the present-day Russian Federation is the world's most anti-Soviet state. It is based upon a very different set of values: private ownership, dire individualism, the cult of money, a clan-based political system, and pervasive corruption at all levels of government. The North Caucasus ethnocratic elites, however, do not have access to abundant resources for sale, and are forced to look around for alternative sustenance, as rigid centralism and unification limit their rent-seeking capabilities. Alexander Khloponin, the incumbent presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, seems to continue the policy of buying the loyalty of regional archaic clan-based elites that aggravates rather than improves the situation.The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight grip over the region, neither Putin nor Medvedev has real power to bring change to the North Caucasus? In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the paper examines the triadic relationship among central political elite, who benefited from the massive privatisation of lucrative segments of Soviet industry in the early 1990s, regional clan-based ethnocracy, and non-systemic religious opposition. Drawing on the works of Russian scholars and experts in Russian politics, the paper explores the hypothesis that on-going instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by a well-known set of theories of ethnic violence, because it is carefully negotiated by regional and central political elite, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and whose clan-based rent-seeking agendas have gradually driven Russian statehood into a complete dead-end. Instead of facing the real challenges that are addressed in this paper, it is only able to make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The paper concludes that the deep freeze in the Russian political system has exhausted its debatable potential for change through the existing tandem model of government with its obscure division of roles between two leaders. What we actually see is an imitation of political reform and the resulting degradation of the entire system of governance. Over the past century, Russian polity has never been as weak as today, because the only legitimate source of power in Russia is corruption.     

Post-violence regime survival and expansion in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan

ABSTRACT

Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s governments were able to successfully strengthen their reach and their capacity to control the population in the wake of deadly violence against regime opponents. Yet the process of deepening authoritarianism was not a straightforward affair. Both countries expanded their coercive capabilities – they upgraded policing in rural areas to improve intelligence gathering on the local population and predict the rise of any anti-government activities. While doing so, however, leaders of both countries sought to frame their actions as an inclusive process that was sensitive to the grievances of the affected populations and the general public. This article adds to the growing body of literature on authoritarian state responses to insurgency by showing how authoritarian regimes create narratives, engage civil society and look for political advantage to expand the coercive apparatus.     

Tacit procedural politics: institutional change and member states' strategies in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

This article analyses the dynamics of procedural politics in the EU's Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters across subsequent Treaty regimes (Amsterdam and Lisbon). In the course of legislative policy-making in this area, member states and the European Commission engage in strategic interactions with respect to procedural rules, whereby specifically member states attempt to contain integrationist legislation coming from the Commission through legislative preemption strategies. Drawing on Joseph Jupille's procedural politics approach, the article hypothesizes that member states' strategies are conditioned by several scope conditions, notably jurisdictional ambiguity, influence difference between different decision-making procedures, and prointegrationist case law from the European Court of Justice. I test these hypotheses by analysing the legislative process on a number of selected cases.