Problem-oriented policing of transnational environmental crimes: a social harms approach

Since the publication of Herman Goldstein’s seminal article on Problem-oriented Policing (POP) in 1979, criminologists have attempted to apply its proactive methodology, with a large body of police work concentrating on how operational policing can benefit from the methodologies of POP, and specifically how events are recognised, approached and resolved as policing problems. Even then, most of these works ascribe a non-existing ontological value to events, supposing a bad actor against whom the good actor intervenes. This atomised, state-centrist notion of criminality has been discredited by social harms theory, which emphasises a reading of crime that reaches beyond the bureaucratic abilities of state criminal justice agencies. This article is aimed at illustrating how both POP and a social harms approach to crime can enrich each other, especially with regard to environmental crimes.     

Enter the dragon: the ecological disorganisation of Chinese capital in Africa

This article draws on the theory and recent research on ‘ecological disorganization’- defined as ‘the ways in which human preferences for organizing economic production consistent with the objectives of capitalism are an inherent contradiction with the health of the ecological system’- to explore the ‘corporate violence’ apropos of Chinese investment in Africa. In line with other ecological disorganization theorists, we show how the deployment of Chinese capital in Africa structures and reproduces subjectivation, but also how, ultimately, this subjectivation is implicated in Africa’s ecological disorganization.     

President Museveni and the politics of presidential tenure in Uganda

There are various reasons why President Museveni is so determined to hold on to power in Uganda. These are similar to the ones motivating other African presidents seeking to entrench themselves in office. Museveni believes he is indispensable for Uganda's stability and prosperity, especially in a country devastated by bad leadership in earlier post-independence decades. Moreover, Museveni and his close allies are fearful of being prosecuted under a new president for alleged wrongdoings.

Opposition to Museveni's continued stay in power has come from within the ruling party, as well as other parties and the Buganda kingdom. But, as elsewhere in Africa, the opposition is too weakly developed to challenge Museveni effectively. Also, presidential manipulations, election rigging, and coercive measures have helped to secure Museveni's grip on power. In particular, Museveni has used the military to entrench himself in office.

Moreover, as in some African countries, international pressures to force Museveni to relinquish power are limited. In fact, donors have propped up a quasi-authoritarian regime with large amounts of resources. Museveni has overseen a prolonged period of economic and political stability and donors argue he deserves their support, even when his record on democracy and good governance is tainted.

In Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the strength of domestic and international pressures. Where political opposition is organised and united or where international donors use their aid to promote greater democratisation, then leaders are more likely to abandon plans to stay in power. It is the absence of such conditions and pressures that are leading to the creation of a life presidency in Uganda.     

Patronage politics, donor reforms, and regime consolidation in Uganda

Using the state and its resources has constituted a vital formof consolidating power for Africa’s rulers. However, donor-sponsoredreforms have threatened to curtail the opportunities of Africanleaders to maintain their regimes in power. Donor reforms introducedunder structural adjustment programmes have sought to reducethe size and scope of government as well as to cut state spendingand thereby curb the possibilities of state patronage. Reformshave also attempted to contain corruption and improve stategovernance. In Uganda, however, the relationship between donorsand the government has reproduced patronage government. Thedonors have hailed Uganda as a major case of economic successin Africa. They have provided it with large amounts of financialassistance to support the implementation of reforms. High levelsof foreign aid have provided the government with public resourcesto sustain the patronage basis of the regime. Moreover, in acontext where wide discretionary authority was conferred ongoverning elites in the implementation of reforms, public resourcescould be used in unaccountable and non-transparent ways to helpthe government maintain its political dominance. The donorshave begun to realize belatedly that they have been proppingup a corrupt government in Uganda.