排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1
1.
While other regions of Africa have had their share of crises, the challenge of meeting numerous security threats has been particularly arduous in West Africa. Nevertheless, there are unmistakable signs that, through its collective regional integration instrument, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the sub-region is beginning to awaken fully to the need to tackle its security crisis. This article makes two interrelated arguments. First, although the creation of democratic spaces in democratizing states, or complete rebuilding of collapsed states, provides greater opportunities for security sector reform (SSR), the relationship between democratization and democratic governance of the security sector is less clear. Second, a combination of norm setting at the sub-regional level as well as activism in the non-governmental sector across the region is driving the move (even if slow and seemingly uncoordinated) toward improved governance, including in the security sector at the national level. However, the commitment of states to principles of good governance at the inter-governmental level does not naturally lead to corresponding change within the state. Therefore, there is a clear need to promote a security sector governance (SSG) agenda at both sub-regional and national levels in order to expand the space for meaningful SSR processes in West Africa. 相似文献
2.
A military coup abruptly ended Ould Tayas authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regimes fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Tayas own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatuss withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military juntas firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritanias malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization.
1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, A balance sheet of Africastransition to democratic governance, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51.
2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, Malis decade of democracy,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 739; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar NDiaye,Not a miracle after all ... Côte dIvoiresdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89118.
3. Alfred Stepan, Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations, in Guillermo ODonnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 6484.
4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were bright, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, The origin and evolutionof Mauritanias second republic, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 57596.
5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992).
6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de lère pluraliste,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 319.
7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today.
8. El Hor means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom.
9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritanias Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, Ethniccleansing, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45.
10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted.
11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Tayas attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, LIslamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005).
12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate.
13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006.
14. Authors interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004.
15. Mahamadou Sy, Lenfer dinal (LHarmattan,Paris, 2000).
16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Tayas brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali).
17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674.
18. See Philippe Marchesin, Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27.
19. Stepan, Paths, p. 76.
20. See Petit coup dEtat entre amis, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005.
21. Boubacar NDiaye, Mauritanias stalled democratisation,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93.
22. Peter Da Costa, Democracy in doubt, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60.
23. Boubacar NDiaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,Not Yet Democracy: West Africas slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 10737.
24. Cedric Jourde, "The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 42140.
25. Boubacar NDiaye, The effect of Mauritanias"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget",African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 1735.
26. NDiaye et al., Not Yet, p. 193.
27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels regime"faces outside political pressure (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006).
28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 327. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaways semi-authoritarianismof decay category, pp. 213.
29. William Case, New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83104.
30. NDiaye et al., Not Yet, pp. 1226.
31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982).
32. Jennifer Widner, Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 15174; Larry Diamond, Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 45.
33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8.
34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,Mauritanias foreign policy: in search of protection,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288300.For example, the military councils No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group.
35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, Ilévite le face à face, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1.
36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, La tension, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2.
37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal",Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 347.
38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, La Mauritanie dans lordreinternational, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 1119.
39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7.
40. Ibid, p. 10.
41. NDiaye, Not a miracle, p. 105.
42. Stepan, Paths, pp. 778.
43. See Amnesty International, Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005).
44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23.
45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national income or consumption, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent.
46. Moussa Diop, Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!, Léveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3.
47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005.
48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004).
49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 20022003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 20711.
50. Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66.
51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it.
52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,Report of the Chairperson, pp. 1011. 相似文献
1