Access to Power Versus Exercise of Power Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy in Latin America

Research on comparative democratization has recently expanded its focus to issues of institutional quality: clientelism, corruption, abuse of executive decree authority, and weak checks and balances. However, problems of institutional quality are so different from those involved in regime transitions that it is unproductive to treat them as part of the same macro-process, democratization. Whereas regime transitions are changes in the form of access to power, problems of institutional quality involve the exercise of power. Abuses in the exercise of power affecting institutional quality are best characterized not as indicators of authoritarianism and deficiencies in democratization but as reflecting—in Weberian terms—patrimonialism and failures in bureaucratization. Moreover, struggles over the exercise of power involve causes, mechanisms, and actors that can be quite distinct from those at play in conflicts over access to power. The proposed analytical framework centered on the distinction between access and exercise enhances conceptual clarity and provides a stronger theoretical basis for tackling fundamental questions about politics in Latin America, including the failure of democratization to curb clientelism and foster other improvements of institutional quality, and the prospects of democratic stability under patrimonial administrations.     

From contention to social bargaining: labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

The main objective of this article is to examine how the links between trade unions and affiliated political parties of the left influenced the strategies of labour during the transition and the early years of democracy in Spain. It argues that political partisanship is a key factor for understanding the unions' strategies. After a period of intense labour conflict during the transition to democracy, labour mobilization decreased and Spain's unions and other social actors initiated distinctive processes of social bargaining, starting in 1979. The central argument is that the relationship of unions and political parties in the authoritarian and transition periods was a major factor in conditioning strategies in the post-authoritarian period. In the end, the consolidation of Spanish democracy has led to the strengthening of the main trade unions. Contrary to what happened in other historical periods they used this power to contribute to governability and the consolidation of the new democratic regime.     

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.     

Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy

The study of Colombian foreign policy emphasises external constraints and presidential prerogative in foreign policymaking. Drawing on insights from recent foreign policy analysis literature and evidence from several cases (Plan Colombia, US military bases, free trade talks with China, and ICJ arbitration of a maritime border with Nicaragua), this article challenges commonplace presidentialist assumptions. A novel model of ‘contested presidentialism’ better captures how Colombian domestic actors mobilise to raise political costs to block or modify presidential preferences. When the opposition fails to raise costs, presidentialist assumptions apply. Otherwise, presidents respond strategically by abandoning policies or substituting second-best alternatives.     

Book Reviews

Andrea C. Bianculli and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, eds., Regional Organizations and Social Policy in Europe and Latin America: A Space for Social Citizenship? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Abbreviations, figures, tables, bibliography, index, 317 pp.; hardcover $109, ebook $84.99. Barry Cannon, The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony and the Struggle for the State. New York: Routledge, 2016. Tables, bibliography, index, 182 pp.; hardcover $127.50, paperback $44.59. Jordi Díez, The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Bibliography, index, 301 pp.; hardcover $48.99, paperback $29.99, ebook $24. Julio Ríos‐Figueroa, Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil‐Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Illustrations, figures, tables, bibliography, index, 256 pp.; hardcover $110, paperback $34.99, ebook $88. María Soledad Segura and Silvio Waisbord, Media Movements: Civil Society and Media Policy Reform in Latin America. London: Zed Books, 2016. Bibliography, index, 224 pp.; hardcover $95, paperback $29.95, ebook $23.96. Lee J. Alston, Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira, Brazil in Transition: Beliefs, Leadership, and Institutional Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. Illustrations, tables, abbreviations, bibliography, index, 280 pp.; hardcover $39.50, ebook. Sean W. Burges, Brazil in the World: The International Relations of a South American Giant. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017. Figures, tables, bibliography, index, 296 pp.; hardcover $115, paperback $32.95, ebook. Alejandro Velasco, Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics and the Making of Modern Venezuela. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. Maps, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 321 pp.; paperback $29.95. Tiffany D. Barnes, Gendering Legislative Behavior: Institutional Constraints and Collaboration. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Map, figures, tables, bibliography, index, 274 pp.; hardcover $99.99, paperback $34.99, ebook $28. Judith Teichman, The Politics of Inclusive Development: Policy, Sate Capacity, and Coalition Building. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Figures, bibliography, index, 261 pp.; hardcover $109, ebook $84.99.     

Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.     

Online teaching and copyright from the European Union perspective in COVID times

China-EU Law Journal - Teaching may involve the use of copyrighted works. It is very important that teachers and professors know two things: (1) what kind of contents they can use in their classes;...     

Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina

I study the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing when constitutional constraints are systematically chosen to obtain better credit conditions. I argue that the impact of institutional constraints on country risk premia depends on the government’s concern with the country’s creditworthiness and its “willingness to repay”; two variables that are hardly observable. To properly evaluate the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing, I focus on the link between institutional constraints and the risk premia of Argentine bonds between 1822 and 1913. Specifically, I analyze whether a “structural break” in the government’s cost of borrowing time-series exists. I use the Perron-Volesang test for structural change with unknown break dates. The statistical analysis indicates that the adoption of institutional constraints led to significant improvements in borrowing terms: the series has a single structural change; and the distinctive break point is associated with the country’s adoption of constitutional checks and balances. Time-series regressions and instrumental variables (IV) estimation reinforce these findings.