Book review

Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money, New Press, New York, 1998 255 pages; $25.00 cloth.     

Designing and Analyzing Randomized Experiments: Application to a Japanese Election Survey Experiment

Randomized experiments are becoming increasingly common in political science. Despite their well-known advantages over observational studies, randomized experiments are not free from complications. In particular, researchers often cannot force subjects to comply with treatment assignment and to provide the requested information. Furthermore, simple randomization of treatments remains the most commonly used method in the discipline even though more efficient procedures are available. Building on the recent statistical literature, we address these methodological issues by offering general recommendations for designing and analyzing randomized experiments to improve the validity and efficiency of causal inference. We also develop a new statistical methodology to explore causal heterogeneity. The proposed methods are applied to a survey experiment conducted during Japan's 2004 Upper House election, where randomly selected voters were encouraged to obtain policy information from political parties' websites. An R package is publicly available for implementing various methods useful for designing and analyzing randomized experiments .     

Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan

Does reapportionment in a legislature affect policy outcomes? We examine this question from a comparative perspective by focusing on reapportionment associated with the electoral reform in Japan. First, we show that the reform of 1994 resulted in an unprecedented degree of equalization in legislative representation. Second, using municipal‐level data, we present evidence that municipalities in overrepresented districts received significantly more subsidies per capita, as compared to those in underrepresented districts, in both prereform and postreform years. Third, by examining the relationship between the change in the number of seats per capita and the change in the amount of subsidies per capita at the municipal level, we show that the equalization in voting strength resulted in an equalization of total transfers per person.     

Public Opinion in Japan and the Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands

This article examines the role of public opinion in Japan in directly influencing the Japanese government’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in 2012. The public mood in Japan is becoming increasingly nationalistic. Although this does not immediately mean the return of militarism in the country, such a mood is especially evident with respect to China. The nationalization of the Islands took place within this nationalistic domestic environment. In the case of the nationalization, public opinion was channeled most notably through Tokyo Governor Ishihara. His plan to purchase the Islands and strong public support for his plan eventually forced the central government’s intervention. Prime Minister Noda simply could not force Ishihara to give up his plan because going against such a popular politician who was enjoying strong public support would almost certainly have caused a strong public backlash and resulted in electoral punishment. On the other hand, Noda was also concerned that Tokyo’s successful acquisition of the Islands would lead to severe criticism of his government for not properly protecting Japan’s territorial integrity. There was also a more serious concern that Ishihara’s control of the Islands might lead to a change of the status quo and thus dangerously provoke China. Therefore, Noda had no choice but to intervene and nationalize the Islands. If he was also seeking to mobilize public opinion in his favor, he was not entirely successful.     

Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality: Evidence for Lijphart's Proposition from Venezuela

What difference does it make if the state makes people vote? The question is central to normative debates about the rights and duties of citizens in a democracy, and to contemporary policy debates in a number of Latin American countries over what actions states should take to encourage electoral participation. Focusing on a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela, this article shows that not forcing people to vote yielded a more unequal distribution of income. The evidence supports Arend Lijphart's claim, advanced in his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, that compulsory voting can offset class bias in turnout and, in turn, contribute to the equality of influence.