A view from the policy community: a new strategic narrative for Europe?

ABSTRACT

Reflecting on the results presented in articles in this special issue, European leaders should take greater account of external perceptions in crafting the European Union's strategic narrative and guiding its actions. Failure to do so has impaired external policies like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Leaders emerging from the Arab uprisings perceived the EU as complicit with their countries’ former anciens régimes and Russian leaders see EU support for democracy and the market economy in former Soviet states as duplicitous and instrusive. Awareness of such perceptions should be filtered into EU decision-making, without validating views that European officials and diplomats consider misleading.     

September 11th and U.S. Hegemony—Or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?

The tragedy of September 11 highlights the stark contrast between the real and measurable capabilities possessed by one state, and the almost inevitable resentments which the possession of those capabilities engendered in others. The purpose of this article is not to interrogate the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of American decline. Nor is it to speculate at length about September 11th. It is instead to set the scene and try and identify the underlying causes of America's transition from presumed crisis in the 1970s and 1980s to new self-confidence in the 1990s—a self-confidence that some now feel has been shattered by the events of September. While there were important structural reasons why the United States was unlikely to go the way of other powers, it was a peculiar conjuncture of mainly unforeseen developments that combined together after 1989 to improve the U.S. position within the world. We will then move on to discuss the most effective way of characterizing this position. Here, we will mount a defense of the somewhat contentious notion of "hegemony" While recognizing the problems associated with the idea, it will be argued that as a concept it has serious intellectual advantages over its various theoretical competitors. If nothing else, because it focuses on the American role within the world system, rather than just its statically defined position, it is theoretically more suggestive than the less dynamic idea of unipolarity.     

Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations Over Access to Medicines

After the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into operation in 1995 developing countries have found themselves in a process of continual negotiation over intellectual property rights and access to medicines. These negotiations have taken place in the World Trade Organization and in the context of free trade agreements. The paper suggests that the only real win for developing countries has been the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001. What have been the lessons for developing countries in a decade of negotiations over access to medicines? Drawing on themes of rule complexity and regulatory ritualism the paper discusses four key lessons for developing countries. It concludes by arguing that developing countries will do better if they adopt a networked governance approach to negotiation rather than continuing to rely on traditional coalition formation.     

Explaining economic growth in the Soviet Union, 1950–86

Production function estimates are provided for Soviet industrial production and gross national product for the period 1950–86. A variety of alternative specifications is tested, including Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution and variable elasticity of substitution production functions, and an error correction mechanism is used to investigate the long-run properties of the estimated equation. The structural stability of the estimates is also examined. Constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production functions suggest that the rate of total factor productivity growth in the Soviet economy has declined steadily over time, becoming negative sometime in the period between 1970 and 1980. However the extensive statistical tests can doubt on the validity of any production function estimated on Soviet data.